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Constitutional Clause Aggregation and 
the Marijuana Crimes 
Scott W. Howe* 
Abstract 
An important question for our time concerns whether the 
Constitution could establish a right to engage in certain 
marijuana-related activities. Several states have now legalized 
cannabis, within strict limits, for recreational purposes, and that 
number will grow. Yet, some states will not promptly legalize but, 
instead, continue to criminalize, or only “decriminalize” in minor 
ways, and the federal criminalization statutes also will likely 
survive for a time. There currently is no recognized right under the 
Constitution to possess, use, cultivate, or distribute cannabis for 
recreational purposes, even in small amounts, and traditional, 
single-clause arguments for such a right are weak. Neither the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the Fourth Amendment, 
the Due Process Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause can justify 
such a protection, and that would remain true even when most 
states have legalized. But, could another theory justify this 
constitutional right? 
A second important and topical legal question concerns when 
two or more rights-based clauses in the Constitution can combine 
to invalidate government action that none of the clauses could 
disallow on their own. The Supreme Court generally has declined 
to recognize multiple-clause rights. But, in the past, it occasionally 
seemed to endorse the approach. And, recently, in Obergefell v. 
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Hodges, it gave new impetus to the idea by declaring the existence 
of a “synergy” between the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses that it asserted had helped explain its acknowledgment of 
certain rights previously and that purportedly helped lead, in the 
case at hand, to its acknowledgment of a right to same-sex 
marriage. In consequence, enthusiasm has again intensified over 
the notion that rights-based clause aggregation can expand 
constitutional protections. But, is clause aggregation only rhetoric 
offered to justify something the Court would have done anyway 
under a single clause or can it sometimes really matter? And, if so, 
when?  
This Article puts both problems in play by asking this question: 
After a super-majority of states legalize, could multiple clauses 
together reveal a constitutional right to engage in certain 
recreational marijuana activities? The Article answers with 
cautious affirmance: Clause aggregation could help justify such a 
constitutional right, in tightly limited circumstances. But, the 
Article also notes that many of the contours remain undeveloped in 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on rights-based clause 
aggregation, complicating any effort to predict whether and how the 
Justices would apply it in the future to recreational marijuana. 
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I. Introduction 
The movement to legalize cannabis, or marijuana, for 
recreational purposes is one of the important legal stories of our 
time. Through acts of direct democracy, eight states plus the 
District of Columbia since 2012 have “legalized,”1 within tight 
limits, the possession, use, cultivation and distribution of 
marijuana for recreational purposes.2 Many other states have 
recently created exceptions for medical use or have decriminalized 
first-time possession cases.3 The rapidity of these developments 
suggests that a majority of states may fully legalize 
marijuana-related activities in limited circumstances in the years 
ahead. Yet, some states will surely resist the trend and even 
continue to criminalize possession of small amounts, because the 
use of cannabis is still widely viewed as immoral and somewhat 
dangerous,4 and the survival of those perceptions will vary across 
the country. There is also doubt that Congress will soon legalize at 
the federal level,5 and the absence of opportunities for direct 
                                                                                                     
 1. I use the term “legalize” in a non-technical sense throughout the Article 
to denote only a state’s elimination of its own prohibitions on certain 
marijuana-related activities. The federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 801–904 (2012), criminalizes, among other things, possessing, cultivating, 
distributing and manufacturing cannabis, and those federal prohibitions continue 
to apply in states that have repealed their criminal prohibitions on certain 
marijuana-related activities. Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, 
state laws cannot authorize what federal law prohibits. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
For a discussion of state and federal laws governing marijuana-related activities, 
see ROBERT A. MIKOS, MARIJUANA LAW, POLICY AND AUTHORITY 35–194 (2017). 
 2. See Marijuana Overview, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 30, 2017), 
www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/marijuana-overview.aspx 
(last visited Mar 5, 2018) [hereinafter NCSL, Marijuana Overview] (noting 
that “[e]ight States and the District of Columbia now have legalized small 
amounts of marijuana for adult recreational use” and, in every case, through an 
act of direct democracy by the populace) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 3. Thirteen states, beyond those that have legalized, have decriminalized 
the possession and use of small amounts of marijuana. Id. In addition, another 
eight states allow for the medical use of marijuana. State Medical Marijuana 
Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 14, 2017), www.ncsl.org/research/ 
health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx (last visited Mar. 5, 2018) [hereinafter 
NCSL, State Medical Marijuana Laws] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 4. See infra notes 144–148 and accompanying text (indicating a trend 
against legalization of recreational marijuana in some states). 
 5. See Richard J. Bonnie, The Surprising Collapse of Marijuana 
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democracy in the federal arena confirms that the federal crimes 
could survive for several years.6 This specter raises the question 
whether reformers could at some point successfully urge the 
judiciary to legalize certain marijuana-related activities under the 
federal Constitution. 
Under any of the constitutional clauses that come to mind, the 
arguments for even tightly circumscribed legalization for 
recreational use are not compelling, even when a majority of states 
plus the District of Columbia have legalized recreational 
marijuana. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in the 
Eighth Amendment7 probably would not work. With the federal 
government and many states still criminalizing the conduct, the 
Court would not likely find a sufficiently strong societal consensus 
against the minor marijuana crimes to hold that they violate the 
Eighth Amendment.8 The Fourth Amendment would not work, 
although marijuana crimes have significantly reduced persons’ 
freedom from police intrusions.9 The essence of the Fourth 
Amendment is that searches and seizures must be reasonable,10 
and the existence of the marijuana crimes themselves has been 
                                                                                                     
Prohibition: What Now?, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 573, 592 (2016) (noting the 
“befuddling abdication of responsibility by Congress” in addressing the need for 
change to the federal marijuana laws). 
 6. See infra note 149 and accompanying text (explaining that Congress, 
unlike the states, has no referendum option to spur legislative change). 
 7. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 8. In the modern era, the Supreme Court has not invalidated the death 
penalty under the Eighth Amendment in circumstances when that punishment 
is allowed by federal civilian law, but has invalidated that punishment in several 
circumstances in which federal law and a majority of states disallow it. See Scott 
W. Howe, The Federal Death Penalty and the Constitutionality of Capital 
Punishment, 50 CRIM. L. BULL. 1388, 1390–91 (2014) (discussing three recent 
categories of offenders for which the Court rejected the death penalty—mentally 
disabled offenders, youthful offenders, and child rapists). 
 9. See, e.g., HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 282–
84 (1968) (discussing how drug crimes, among other vice crimes, cause the police 
to become “snoopers” and “harassers,” especially among the urban poor). 
 10. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
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understood generally to authorize reasonable police invasions 
focused on cannabis.11 The Due Process Clauses12 probably would 
not work, because recreational marijuana use does not easily 
qualify as a “fundamental right.”13 Likewise, the Equal Protection 
Clause14 would not seem to work, because there is no suspect 
classification or improper discriminatory purpose involved and 
marijuana-related activities arguably will cause at least some risk 
of minor harm to the actor and to others,15 which the criminalizing 
states—to demonstrate a “rational basis” for their statutes16—can 
argue they seek to prevent. 
For civil-libertarians and those who hope to obtain and use 
cannabis legally in places where it will remain illegal, the 
troubling aspect of this clause-by-clause approach is that it fails to 
capture the force of the overall case for legalization. Gallup polls 
                                                                                                     
 11. See, e.g., Susan F. Mandiberg, Marijuana Prohibition and the Shrinking 
of the Fourth Amendment, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 23, 39 (2012) (concluding that 
“at the Supreme Court level, marijuana has played a central role in cases where 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion was based at least in part on an officer’s 
‘plain smell,’” and citing thirteen cases). 
 12. There are Due Process Clauses in both the Fifth Amendment, which 
applies against the federal government, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
applies against the states. The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that 
“[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent 
part, that “[n]o State . . . shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  
 13. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (recognizing the right to 
an abortion as a “fundamental right” protected by the Due Process Clause). 
 14. The Equal Protection Clause appears in the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which applies against the states. The relevant language provides that “[n]o state 
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Supreme Court has declared that equal 
protection principles apply against the federal government through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 
499–500 (1954) (finding that the Equal Protection Clause is enforceable against 
the District of Columbia because “discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be 
violative of due process”).  
 15. See JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION: WHAT 
EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 34 (2012) [hereinafter CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA 
LEGALIZATION] (discussing the risks of using marijuana and concluding that, 
while there are some, “[e]stimating the extent of marijuana-related damage to 
users, their families, their neighbors, and the wider public” is complex).  
 16. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (describing the “rational basis” standard of review under the Equal 
Protection Clause). 
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAUSE AGGREGATION 785 
already reveal super-majority support at the national level for 
legalization for recreational purposes.17 Although repeal of minor 
marijuana crimes by a majority of states might not suffice under 
the Eighth Amendment without legalization at the federal level, 
the claim would still reveal a high level of societal consensus 
favoring legalization. Also, the criminalization of cannabis has 
played an outsize role in the modern obligation of the police to 
snoop, meddle, and harass,18 in part because the Fourth 
Amendment cases do not define “reasonableness” differently when 
the search is for a mere “roach”19 of marijuana rather than, for 
example, the bloody knife used in a murder.20 Also, while engaging 
in marijuana-related activities may not appear, based on history, 
to qualify as a “fundamental” right for due process purposes, use 
of the drug is increasingly understood to bring substantial 
                                                                                                     
 17. See Justin McCarthy, Record-High Support for Legalizing Marijuana 
Use in U.S., GALLUP NEWS (Oct. 25, 2017), http://news.gallup.com/poll/ 
221018/record-high-support-legalizing-marijuana.aspx (last visited Dec. 26, 
2017) (noting that “64% [of Americans] now say[] its use should be made legal”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 18. See PACKER, supra note 9, at 282–84 (observing that police are seen as 
harassing the urban poor more often than others for vice crimes, including drug 
offenses); see also CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, supra note 15, at 
95–96 (discussing the reasons that criminalization of marijuana calls on police to 
be more intrusive in their search and seizure practices); Kevin B. Zeese, Drug 
War Forever?, in SEARCHING FOR ALTERNATIVES: DRUG-CONTROL POLICY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 251, 254, 260–61 (Melvyn B. Krauss & Edward P. Lazear eds., 
1991) (noting how governmental programs to discover marijuana cultivation after 
the war on drugs commenced in the 1970s led to increased intrusions on privacy); 
JOHN KAPLAN, MARIJUANA—THE NEW PROHIBITION 43–44 (1970) (noting that “the 
frequency of the hotly denied ‘furtive gesture’ or consent to search is reason for 
prosecutors as well as other observers to suspect that police perjury as to 
search-and-seizure issues in marijuana cases is not unknown”); Geoffrey Richard 
Wagner Smith, Note, Possession of Marijuana in San Mateo County: Some Social 
Costs of Criminalization, 22 STAN. L. REV. 101, 117 (1969) (“Since a search may 
be made incident to a lawful misdemeanor arrest, officers who desire to search for 
drugs may be tempted to make arrests for offenses they would ignore under other 
circumstances.”). 
 19. A “roach” is the mostly smoked butt of a marijuana cigarette. For 
discussion of cases that apply marijuana prohibitions to tiny amounts of the 
substance, see MIKOS, supra note 1, at 47, 76. 
 20. See Mandiberg, supra note 11, at 24 (concluding that “the Court could 
have developed virtually all of the same rules and standards” that it has 
developed [under the Fourth Amendment] through cases involving other types of 
evidence” than marijuana). 
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pleasure or benefit to a huge portion of the population.21 In 
addition, while marijuana use is not risk-free, evidence does not 
suggest that it is more dangerous to the user or others than the 
consumption of alcohol and tobacco, which is not criminalized.22 
Indeed, the greatest dangers associated with cannabis for both the 
user and society seem to flow mostly from its criminalization.23 
And, the force of those arguments together, reformists would say, 
paints criminalization as such an unpopular effort, involving such 
                                                                                                     
 21. See, e.g., Lester Grinspoon, Marijuana in a Time of 
Psychopharmacological McCarthyism, in SEARCHING FOR ALTERNATIVES: 
DRUG-CONTROL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 387 (Melvyn B. Krauss & Edward 
P. Lazear eds., 1991) (noting that “tens of millions of [our] citizens use cannabis,” 
because they “not only like to use the substance, but in many cases believe that it 
has enhanced their lives”).  
 22. See, e.g., Philip M. Boffey, What Science Says About Marijuana, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 30, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/31/opinion/what-
science-says-about-marijuana.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2018) (summarizing 
various studies revealing that marijuana is “less dangerous than the highly 
addictive but perfectly legal substances known as alcohol and tobacco”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Wayne Hall, Robin Room & Susan 
Bondy, World Health Organization Project on the Health Implications of Cannabis 
Use: Comparative Appraisal of the Health and Psychological Consequences of 
Alcohol, Cannabis, Nicotine and Opiate Use (Aug. 28, 1995), 
www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/hemp/general/who-index.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 
2018) (discussing the lesser harmfulness of marijuana than tobacco or alcohol to 
both the user and others) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
Marijuana use, depending on frequency, will pose some risks to the user’s 
physical and mental health. See CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, supra 
note 15, at 54–80 (discussing the risks and medical effects of marijuana use). 
However, many experts believe that marijuana involves “less addictive risk than 
tobacco, alcohol, cocaine, stimulants or heroin, not only in terms of likelihood of 
dependence but also the degree of dependence.” Id. at 40. Also, the risk of fatal 
overdose for marijuana is minimal compared to the risk of fatal overdose for 
alcohol. See id. at 62–63 (noting research findings that, while the ratios of 
“average fatal dose to average recreational dose . . . for heroin, alcohol, 
methamphetamine and cocaine range from about six to fifteen,” there is “no 
known fatal dose of marijuana”). For a recent study that uses a “margin of 
exposure” approach (the ratio between toxicological threshold and estimated 
human intake) and concludes that alcohol and tobacco are more dangerous than 
cannabis, see Dirk W. Lachenmeir & Jurgen Rehm, Comparative Risk Assessment 
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Cannabis and Other Illicit Drugs Using the Margin of 
Exposure Approach, in 5 SCI. REP. 1, 4–6 (2015). 
 23. See, e.g., CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, supra note 15, at 
109 (noting that “an arrest, even if it never leads to a conviction, sometimes means 
spending a night or more in jail awaiting arraignment, and a night in jail is much 
more dangerous than an evening stoned”); see id. at 98 (discussing the high 
societal costs of incarceration and enforcement related to marijuana crimes). 
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substantial invasions of privacy, to prosecute such 
mildly-dangerous behavior, at such a high cost to the offender and 
society as to be irrational. 
A conclusion of irrationality under this expanded inquiry, 
however, will not solve the problem of how to legalize cannabis 
under the Constitution. Apart from other difficulties posed by the 
individual-clause claims, for a court to pronounce marijuana 
legalized under one or more clauses separately could set down a 
problematic precedent or be misunderstood as having done so. If 
laws criminalizing marijuana possession and use were deemed to 
violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause without 
legalization at the federal level by Congress, the death penalty 
laws could soon seem cruel and unusual, too, despite the continued 
existence of a federal death penalty.24 If those marijuana laws were 
deemed to infringe the Fourth Amendment, other drug crimes 
might also seem invalid, because they also spur many police 
intrusions on privacy and liberty.25 If those laws were thought to 
violate substantive due process, opioid crimes might also seem 
invalid, because opioid use also brings pleasure and relief to many 
persons.26 If those laws were thought to violate equal protection, 
crimes like polygamy, prostitution and bestiality would all seem 
vulnerable as well, given their lack of serious harm to participants 
or others. And if the Court tried to describe the cannabis cases as 
sui generis under any of those clauses, the decisions would 
justifiably be seen as unfaithful to the notion of principled 
decision-making. 
How, then, could a court possibly understand the federal 
Constitution to legalize recreational marijuana activities in the 
face of continued federal criminalization, and without setting a 
                                                                                                     
 24. For discussion of the federal death penalty laws and their importance to 
the continued view that the death penalty is not cruel and unusual, see Howe, 
supra note 8, at 1388–91. 
 25. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 18, at 106 (noting in one study that, in 
addition to marijuana, police searches frequently turned up amphetamines). 
 26. Evidence of this tendency appears in the large number of users despite 
not only criminalization but the high risk of fatal overdose. Largely due to opioid 
use, drug overdose deaths in the U.S. likely exceeded 59,000 in 2016. Josh Katz, 
Drug Deaths in America Are Rising Faster Than Ever, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/05/upshot/opioid-epidemic-drug-ov
erdose-deaths-are-rising-faster-than-ever.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2018) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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broad precedent? The best approach would seem to involve a 
strategy of clause “aggregation.”27 Using this technique, several 
clauses together could justify limited legalization even if none 
could justify that outcome on their own.28 Because it would be 
multi-sourced among clauses, this approach could also help cabin 
the precedential sweep of the conclusion.29  
A preliminary question, however, is whether this interpretive 
approach is valid. The answer is not entirely clear. While the 
Supreme Court generally has declined to employ clause 
aggregation to identify new rights,30 occasionally it has seemingly 
endorsed the approach by using two or more constitutional 
provisions together to support the existence of a right31 or by 
claiming that in past decisions this is what was really going on. 
For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut,32 the Court famously (or 
infamously33) pointed to “penumbras, formed by emanations” from 
multiple clauses to justify a right of married couples to use 
contraception.34 But, even earlier, in West Virginia Board of 
                                                                                                     
 27. See Ariel Porat & Eric Posner, Aggregation and Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2, 
48–49 (2012) (describing the idea of “hybrid rights” in constitutional law as an 
instance of “cross-claim normative aggregation”). 
 28. For “a systemic examination of combination analysis in U.S. 
constitutional law,” or what I am calling a “clause aggregation approach,” see 
Michael Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1068 
(2016). 
 29. See id. at 1104 (noting that “combination-based holdings will sometimes 
qualify as narrower than their clause-specific counterparts, furnishing courts 
with an effective means of limiting the precedential sweep of holdings they 
pronounce”). 
 30. See id. at 1069–70 (“When litigants assert claims arising under multiple 
areas of constitutional doctrine, the strengths or weaknesses of one clause-specific 
claim typically have no official bearing on the strengths or weaknesses of 
another.”). 
 31. See infra notes 32–35 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court 
decisions that utilized aggregating clauses). 
 32. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 33. The approach has been harshly criticized. See, e.g., Robert G. Dixon, Jr., 
The “New” Substantive Due Process and the Democratic Ethic: A Prolegomenon, 
1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 84 (noting the Griswold Court’s “judicial power to declare 
new freedoms whether or not illumined by the constitutional document, its 
setting, or its easily inferred purposes”); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and 
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 9–10 (1971) (“Griswold, then, is 
an unprincipled decision, both in the way in which it derives a new constitutional 
right and in the way it defines that right, or rather fails to define it.”). 
 34. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484–86 (finding that married couples’ right to 
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Education v. Barnette,35 the Court arguably did something similar. 
Without clearly relying on any particular clause in the First 
Amendment but possibly on principles underlying several of 
them,36 the Court held that schoolchildren may not be required to 
salute the flag and recite the pledge of allegiance.37 Also, after 
Griswold, in Stanley v. Georgia,38 the Court seemed to use multiple 
clauses in the First Amendment, and perhaps others as well, to 
recognize a right to possess and view obscene pornography in the 
privacy of one’s home.39 A much more recent example is Obergefell 
v. Hodges,40 in which the Court identified a “synergy”41 between 
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses that it indicated 
had helped justify its previous recognition of several rights and, in 
the case at hand, its acknowledgment of a right to same-sex 
marriage.42 
But, questions remain: Is this clause-aggregation approach 
simply a rhetorical strategy employed by the Court to help 
rationalize decisions post hoc that it would have reached under a 
single clause anyway? If not, has the use of the technique been 
applied with sufficient repetition and principle to reveal that it has 
prescriptive force? And, if so, might a court properly conclude that 
it could successfully work in the marijuana context? 
This Article aims to answer those questions. Initially, I 
assume that there is a case to be made against rights-based clause 
aggregation on both descriptive and normative levels. I 
hypothesize that aggregation of two or more rights-based clauses 
has never been important in justifying any right under the federal 
                                                                                                     
use contraceptives is imbedded in the right to privacy, which is “created by several 
fundamental constitutional guarantees”). 
 35. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 36. See Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 16, 26 (2015) (describing Barnette as relying “on no single clause of the 
Bill of Rights but on the broader postulates of our constitutional order”). 
 37. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
 38. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
 39. See id. at 564–68 (holding that “the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
prohibit making mere private possession of obscene material a crime”). 
 40. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 41. Id. at 2603. 
 42. See id. at 2602–03 (finding that “[t]he right of same-sex couples to marry 
that is part of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, 
from that Amendment’s guarantee of the equal protection of the laws”). 
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Constitution, even if the Supreme Court may have cited two or 
more clauses when first recognizing the protection. I also 
hypothesize that rights-based clause aggregation (if it really 
matters) is such a rare and unprincipled approach for rationalizing 
new constitutional rights that it lacks normative power. However, 
on both points I concede a failure of proof. While clause aggregation 
is certainly under-theorized in the Court’s opinions as a 
constitutional force, one cannot disprove that it sometimes has 
carried logical influence in the phenomenology of judicial 
decision-making.  
Having failed to disprove the descriptive and normative cases 
for constitutional clause aggregation, the Article addresses 
whether the approach could work to support recreational 
marijuana rights after a super-majority of states have legalized 
that activity. The argument would be that clause aggregation 
makes sense in the unusual case, as here, where litigants might 
show that there are separate but aggregating harms associated 
with each of the clauses.43 The harm from criminalization of 
cannabis is not only the stigma and loss of freedom involved with 
conviction and punishment (the cruel and unusual punishment 
concern)44 but the substantial invasions of privacy that arise 
through the especially intrusive kind of policing required to ferret 
out cannabis violations (the Fourth Amendment concern)45 and the 
loss of enjoyment and benefit from use by those who are deterred 
by prohibition (the substantive due process concern).46 Those 
harms are enhanced by the discriminatory actions of 
government—by the non-prohibition of tobacco and alcohol, which 
are at least as dangerous as cannabis (the equal protection 
                                                                                                     
 43. See, e.g., Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative 
Constitutional Rights 20 (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law Pub. Law and Legal Theory 
Research Paper No. 42, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2642640 (discussing the idea of “intersectionality” between clauses). 
 44. See infra Part III.A (evaluating the efficacy of the argument that the 
criminal punishment of marijuana use violates the cruel and unusual 
punishments clause). 
 45. See infra Part III.B (describing the potential Fourth Amendment claim 
to a constitutional basis for recreational marijuana because of frequent police 
interaction with marijuana users). 
 46. See Grinspoon, supra note 21, at 387 (noting the life-enhancing effects of 
recreational marijuana use). 
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAUSE AGGREGATION 791 
concern).47 The multiple nature of these harms can be 
acknowledged and weighed against a government interest in 
criminalizing cannabis only by a clause-aggregation approach. 
And, at least with respect to certain marijuana-related activities, 
although only some, this more expansive scrutiny allows the 
conclusion that government interests are inadequate to justify 
continued criminalization. 
My project proceeds in four parts, with the first two providing 
background, and the third and fourth doing the central work. Part 
II summarizes the development and current state of the criminal 
laws regarding marijuana and the reasons to expect that, in the 
next decade or two, a majority of states, but not the federal 
Congress, will legalize it within limits for recreational purposes.48 
Part III assumes that this scenario will materialize and 
demonstrates why, when applied separately, neither the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause, the Fourth Amendment, the Due 
Process Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause would establish a 
right to engage in recreational marijuana activities, even in tightly 
limited circumstances.49 
Part IV explores the validity of aggregating rights-based 
clauses to recognize a new constitutional right.50 I discuss a variety 
of Supreme Court cases that arguably serve as precedent for such 
an approach, including the Court’s recent decision in Obergefell, 
which has heightened interest in the subject.51 And, despite 
                                                                                                     
 47. See Boffey, supra note 22 (comparing the dangerousness of alcohol and 
tobacco versus marijuana and concluding that marijuana is no more dangerous 
than alcohol and tobacco). 
 48. Infra Part II. 
 49. Infra Part III. 
 50. Infra Part IV. 
 51. Prominent, recent commentary discussing the clause-aggregation aspect 
of Obergefell reflects this heightened enthusiasm. See, e.g., Coenen, supra note 
28, at 1079 (“Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion cited to the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment as mutually supportive 
of the case’s result.”); Abrams & Garrett, supra note 43, at 23–26 (analyzing 
Justice Kennedy’s summary of other cases that evoke both the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses to rationalize his Obergefell opinion); Kenji Yoshino, 
Comment, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 
171–79 (2015) (comparing Lawrence v. Texas and Obergefell and finding that, 
although there are differences in their analyses, the two cases implicate both 
liberty and equality); see also Tribe, supra note 36 and accompanying text 
(arguing “that Obergefell’s chief jurisprudential achievement is to have tightly 
wound the double helix of Due Process and Equal Protection into a doctrine of 
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skepticism, I demonstrate that one cannot disprove that clause 
aggregation sometimes carries influence in judicial 
decision-making. I also conclude that the approach arguably has 
been employed enough by the Court to suggest some patterns as to 
how its application could work in the future. 
Part V then explores whether a clause-aggregation approach 
could help justify the judiciary in finding a constitutional right to 
engage in certain marijuana-related activities.52 After a 
super-majority of states have legalized, I explain how clause 
aggregation might assist a court, without setting an expansive 
precedent, to conclude that the Constitution, by requiring a 
broader form of assessment than rational-basis inquiry, protects 
the freedom of persons to engage in certain core marijuana-related 
activities that those states have agreed should be legal. I also 
respond to several likely objections. As part of this discussion, I 
make the case that, despite recognition of such constitutional 
rights, the regulation or criminalization of recreational marijuana 
activities should continue to be widely, though not always, 
permitted. But, I also explain that many of the contours in the 
Supreme Court’s application of rights-based clause aggregation 
remain undeveloped, complicating the effort to predict whether 
and how the Justices would apply it in the future to recreational 
marijuana activities.  
II. The Past, Present, and Future of Marijuana Crimes 
The history of marijuana criminalization in the United States 
spans over a hundred years and reflects a complex story of racism, 
fear-mongering, widespread ignorance, politics, international 
relations and, ultimately, popular revolt.53 Large parts of the story 
                                                                                                     
equal dignity”).  
 52. Infra Part V. Part V contends that a clause-aggregation approach is the 
best methodology to support a limited, constitutional right to use and possess 
marijuana. I do not aim to resolve precisely what protections such a right would 
entail beyond that it would protect against a criminal conviction and sanction. 
The right could also protect against other burdens on use and possession, 
particularly civil bans and sanctions. At the same time, I do not propose that it 
would necessarily protect against all such burdens, for example, taxes or even 
criminal prohibitions on marijuana purchases and sales. 
 53. An excellent source on the United States history of marijuana 
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have already been well-told in great detail and need not be 
repeated with as much detail here. For present purposes, an 
outline of the history of criminalization is relevant, along with the 
story of modern-day deterioration in marijuana criminalization 
and the path that the likely collapse will follow in the next few 
years. 
A. The Past 
Marijuana was not always criminalized or even regulated in 
the United States.54 The hemp plant, also known as marijuana or 
cannabis, was legally grown as a source of fiber in the United 
States beginning in the early seventeenth century55 but was 
largely displaced for that purpose in the late 1800s in favor of 
cotton or imported jute.56 By the mid-1800s, the plant remained 
legal in the U.S. and was used for medicinal purposes on a small 
scale.57 “[T]here is evidence that George Washington cultivated it 
at Mount Vernon for that purpose.”58 Until 1937, “it was [also] a 
prescription drug, listed in the official Pharmacopoeia of the 
United States of American as Extractum Cannabis, and was 
available from both large drug companies and vendors of patent 
medicines.”59 It was also used recreationally in the form of hashish 
by the well-off in some American cities.60 However, the practice of 
                                                                                                     
prohibition through the early 1970s is RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. 
WHITEBREAD II, THE MARIJUANA CONVICTION: A HISTORY OF MARIHUANA 
PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES (1974). For a good, short summary of the 
United States history of marijuana prohibition from the early 1970s through 
2016, see Bonnie, supra note 5, at 576–90. 
 54. See Smith, supra note 18, at 101 (noting that marijuana was not a crime 
in most states until 1937). 
 55. See id. (“The settlers of Jamestown planted the first crop in 1611 at the 
behest of Kings James I, who wanted hemp to be made into rope for the British 
navy.”). 
 56. See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 53, at 1–3 (noting that hemp 
cultivation fell into disuse because of the importation of Indian jute and the 
difficulty of cultivating the plant as compared to cotton). 
 57. See id. at 4 (reporting that the health benefits of cannabis were recited 
in medical journals and sold at a pharmacy in Poughkeepsie, New York). 
 58. Smith, supra note 18, at 101. 
 59. Id. (citing COMM. OF REVISION, U.S. PHARMACOPOEIAL CONVENTION, THE 
PHARMACOPOEIA OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 155 (11th ed. 1936)). 
 60. See LARRY SLOMAN, REEFER MADNESS 22–28 (1979) (recounting the 
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smoking marijuana entered the country through immigrants from 
Mexico and the West Indies around 1900.61  
In the subsequent quarter-century, “criminal prohibitions 
appeared on the statute books of nearly every state where the drug 
was used,”62 mostly in the South, the Southwest, and the West.63 
By the mid-1930s, twenty-two states had criminalized its sale or 
possession.64 These laws stemmed largely from racism and concern 
that use would spread.65 Criminalizing states still appreciated the 
therapeutic benefits of marijuana, as the criminalization statutes 
during that period did not proscribe its medical use.66 Nonetheless, 
stories circulated “of violent rampages by Spanish-speaking aliens 
crazed by marijuana,” and there apparently was a “substitution in 
the public mind of the effects” of other drugs that many people 
knew about, “like morphine and cocaine, for the effects of 
marijuana, since the actual properties of marijuana were generally 
unknown.”67 
Well into the 1930s, the federal government did not regulate 
marijuana,68 although it prohibited narcotics, such as opiates and 
                                                                                                     
experiences of two early American upper-class explorers of recreational 
marijuana use in New York City). 
 61. See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 53, at 32 (discussing the 
introduction of marijuana smoking in the United States “in the early years of the 
twentieth century . . . by Mexicans and West Indians”). 
 62. Id. 
 63. See id. at 37–38 (discussing the evolution of state laws in New Mexico, 
California, Louisiana, and Utah, among others). 
 64. Richard J. Bonnie & Charles H. Whitebread II, Forbidden Fruit and the 
Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal History of American Marijuana 
Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REV. 971, 1010 (1970). 
 65. See Mandiberg, supra note 11, at 24–25 (examining the association 
between “Mexican immigrants and other ‘marginal’ populations” use of marijuana 
and its criminalization); Sean Hogan, Race, Ethnicity, and Early U.S. Drug 
Policy, in 1 THE PRAEGER INTERNATIONAL COLLECTION ON ADDICTION: FACES OF 
ADDICTION, THEN AND NOW 37, 46–49 (Angela Browne-Miller ed., 2009) (noting the 
link between Mexican immigrants’ introduction of marijuana to the U.S. and a 
concern that their use would spread from rural, farm areas to big cities). 
 66. See Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 64, at 1026 (“[N]ational policy was 
steadfastly opposed to manufacture, sale and consumption of narcotics and 
alcohol except for medical purposes.”). 
 67. JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED AND WHAT WE CAN DO 
ABOUT IT 23–24 (2001). 
 68. See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 53, at 32 (“[T]he story of 
marihuana policy in the United States begins as a series of distinctly local tales.”). 
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAUSE AGGREGATION 795 
cocaine, along with alcohol.69 However, Harry J. Anslinger, 
Commissioner of the federal Bureau of Narcotics, “took an active 
role” during that era in spreading “fear and misinformation” about 
marijuana in the effort to secure criminalization by more states 
and by the federal government.70 The Bureau collaborated, for 
example, in the production of the 1936 movie, Reefer Madness, 
which conveyed the view that “one puff of pot can lead clean-cut 
teenagers down the road to insanity, criminality, and death.”71 The 
effort to convince Congress succeeded with the passage of the 
Marijuana Tax Act of 1937.72 
The 1937 statute73 only criminalized the “non-medical and 
unlicensed possession or sale of marijuana,”74 but “the net effect 
was that simple possession now became a federal crime.”75 In 
theory, the statute acknowledged the valid medical uses of 
marijuana, because it “provided for medical doctors and others to 
prescribe it, druggists to dispense it, and others to grow, import, 
and manufacture it, as long as each of those parties paid a small 
licensing fee.”76 But there was “a cumbersome bureaucratic 
process” and an “exorbitant tax” that made even medical use 
prohibitive.77 At the same time, “all nonmedical transfers, 
whatever the amount, circumstance or geographical nature,” 
                                                                                                     
 69. Those substances had begun to be criminalized at the state level in the 
second half of the 19th century and at the federal level in the early 1900s. See id. 
at 13–31 (providing a history and chronology of marijuana criminalization). The 
manufacture, sale and transportation of alcohol (but not possession) was 
prohibited by the Eighteenth Amendment beginning in January, 1920, see id. at 
25, until its repeal by the Twenty-first Amendment in December, 1933. See TERRY 
L. JORDAN, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND FASCINATING FACTS ABOUT IT 53 (7th ed. 
2007) (setting forth the language of the 21st Amendment and noting that it was 
ratified on December 5, 1933). 
 70. GRAY, supra note 67, at 24. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Ch. 553, 50 Stat. 551 (1937) (repealed 1970). 
 73. Shortly before repeal and replacement of the Act by Congress in 1970, 
the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional in substantial part because it 
compelled persons to expose themselves to a “real and appreciable risk” of 
self-incrimination. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 16 (1969). 
 74. GRAY, supra note 67, at 25. 
 75. BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 53, at 175. 
 76. GRAY, supra note 67, at 25. 
 77. Id. 
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became federal crimes.78 The effect was to blanket “existing state 
and local offenses with a coextensive range of federal offenses, all 
of these governing the same conduct.”79 
Over the next three decades, U.S. politicians generally 
pursued a “get tough” approach to illicit drugs that lumped 
marijuana together with substances like heroin and cocaine.80 An 
exception was made during World War II, when, faced with short 
supplies of fiber sources for producing materials essential to the 
war effort, the federal government encouraged the production of 
hemp by U.S. farmers.81 After the war, however, hemp again 
became a prohibited substance without legitimate use, and 
Congress repeatedly passed more stringent sentencing laws 
against drug distribution and possession, including cannabis.82 
The Boggs Act of 195183 and the Narcotics Control Act of 195684 
exemplified the trend.85 In 1961, the U.S. government also played 
a central role86 in securing the adoption by many nations of a new 
international treaty—the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs—
to prohibit the production and supply of a variety of substances, 
including cannabis.87 In part to comply with that treaty,88 
                                                                                                     
 78. BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 53, at 175. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See GRAY, supra note 67, at 27 (discussing drug scheduling of marijuana). 
 81. See id. at 26 (addressing exceptions made for marijuana used for hemp 
fibers). 
 82. See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 53, at 204–21 (detailing the 
increased use of narcotics and, as a result, the escalation of penalties for 
marihuana throughout the 1950s). 
 83. Ch. 666, 65 Stat. 767 (1951) (repealed 1970). 
 84. Ch. 629, 70 Stat. 570 (1957) (repealed 1970). 
 85. See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 53, at 206–21 (discussing how the 
Boggs Act “marked a significant shift in the rationale for marihuana’s illegal 
status”). 
 86. See WELLS C. BENNETT & JOHN WALSH, MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION IS AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO MODERNIZE INTERNATIONAL DRUG TREATIES 18 (2014), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/CEPMMJLegalizationv4.pdf 
(describing the United States as “a—if not the—key protagonist”). 
 87. See GRAY, supra note 67, at 27 (noting that “the U.S. government 
somehow convinced many other countries to ratify” the treaty); BENNETT & 
WALSH, supra note 86, at 2 (discussing the implementation of the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs by the 1970 Controlled Substances Act). 
 88. See BENNETT & WALSH, supra note 86, at 6 n.10 (“[C]ertain treaties 
require legislation before they can be enforced domestically. The United States 
passed, and subsequently enforced, just such legislation in the form of the CSA.”). 
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Congress also passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention 
and Control Act of 1970.89 “[C]ommonly known as the Controlled 
Substances Act,”90 Title II, which is still in effect, “explicitly 
prohibits the cultivation, distribution and possession of marijuana 
throughout the United States.”91 There is no exception for medical 
use.92 In the statute, marijuana is a schedule I drug, along with 
substances such as heroin and cocaine, reflecting a conclusion that 
it has “no currently accepted medical use.”93 
Despite the passage of the 1970 federal statute, marijuana 
criminalization began unraveling during the following decade.94 
The original consensus favoring criminalization had rested on 
three conditions: (1) the widespread belief that use of marijuana 
led to abuse and ultimately to “mental deterioration, psychosis and 
violent crime;”95 (2) the view that it was used “primarily by 
insulated ethnic minorities, Mexicans and blacks;”96 and (3) a 
widespread ideological preference in the country for cultural 
homogeneity, fostered by “[t]wo world wars, the depression, 
                                                                                                     
Bennett & Walsh note that the Controlled Substances Act is important in 
fulfilling the United States’ obligations regarding marijuana under several 
treaties: 
[The CSA] law also implements three drug control treaties to which the  
United States is a party: the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 
as Amended by the 1972 Protocol, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances, and the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. The first limits the use of 
marijuana “exclusively to medical and scientific purposes,” among 
other things; the third requires states to criminalize nearly all forms 
of marijuana activity, again apart from the medical and scientific. 
Id. at 2. However, as this discussion reveals, there is no obligation under the 
treaties that marijuana be classified as a Schedule I drug, with no current medical 
use. 
 89. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified in scattered sections of 21 
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
 90. Mandiberg, supra note 11, at 30. 
 91. BENNETT & WALSH, supra note 86, at 2. 
 92. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(B) (2012) (“The drug or other substance has no 
currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States.”). 
 93. Id. 
 94. See Bonnie, supra note 5, at 578 (“The gradual unraveling of marijuana 
prohibition began in the late 60s, but the signal event was the Commission report 
in 1972 . . . .”). 
 95. BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 53, at 222. 
 96. Id. 
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several recessions, the Korean conflict and a cold war,” that 
resulted in “little tolerance for personal deviance” and legislative 
tendencies to try to “compel sexual, sensual, and even intellectual 
orthodoxy.”97 All three of those conditions “wobbled and fell away” 
during the 1960s, as marijuana became widely popular among an 
expanded group of users, especially university populations.98 As a 
consequence, pressure for legislative change surfaced and 
ultimately resulted in the creation of a bipartisan National 
Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse in early 197199 that 
produced a somewhat surprising report the following year favoring 
“decriminalization” of possession of “up to an ounce” and “other 
consumption-related” activities.100 While Congress did not follow 
the recommendation, “[b]etween 1973 and 1977, eleven states 
decriminalized marijuana in response to the Commission 
report.”101 
Although the collapse of marijuana prohibition appeared 
inevitable at that point, “progress came to a sudden halt at the end 
of the [19]70s.”102 There was widespread concern that adolescent 
use had increased, and Nancy Reagan, as First Lady, soon 
promoted a “just say no” campaign against drug use.103 Due largely 
to the crack cocaine epidemic of the 1980s that also brought on 
increased violent crime, a new “drug war” was also “initiated 
during the Reagan period and intensified during the George H.W. 
Bush presidency.”104 The result was a series of harsh drug statutes 
passed by Congress during the late 1980s and early 1990s.105 For 
                                                                                                     
 97. Id. at 223. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See id. at 255 (“[T]he House version of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act provided for a bipartisan National Commission on 
Marihuana and Drug Abuse to be composed of thirteen members, nine to be 
appointed by the president and four by the Congress.”). 
 100. Bonnie, supra note 5, at 578. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 584. 
 103. See id. at 585 (“[T]he parents’ insistence on criminalization prevailed and 
marijuana law reform came to a halt. This perspective was later embraced by 
Nancy Reagan under the rubric of ‘just say no,’ . . . .”). 
 104. Id. at 585. 
 105. See GRAY, supra note 67, at 27–28 (“U.S. presidents and Congress have 
continually reaped political benefits by passing a flood of ‘get tough’ laws, which 
lump all illegal substances together regardless of their properties or effects on the 
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example, “[t]he 1998 Higher Education Act disqualified young 
people from receiving federal aid for college if they had ever been 
convicted of marijuana possession, even though no such 
disqualification applie[d] to convictions of offenses like robbery, 
rape, or manslaughter.”106 One leading scholar concluded that drug 
policy at that time “entered a very dark and regressive period, for 
which we continue to pay a very heavy price.”107 
B. The Present 
The modern deterioration of the marijuana prohibition began 
with states’ legalization of marijuana for medical use.108 The first 
such law was California’s Compassionate Use Act in 1996, the 
product of a voter initiative.109 The act reflected widespread 
awareness among California voters that marijuana has several 
important therapeutic uses, a view now confirmed by scientific 
evidence.110 Since passage of the California initiative, twenty-eight 
                                                                                                     
user.”). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Bonnie, supra note 5, at 586. 
 108. See id. at 588 (“[T]he states’ legalization of access to marijuana for 
medical use, starting with California’s Compassionate Use Act in 1996, has 
played a critically important role in the impending collapse of the prohibition 
against recreational use.”). 
 109. 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 215 (West 1996) (codified as amended at CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (2009)).  
 110. In January 2017, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and 
Medicine issued a report on the health effects of recreational and therapeutic 
cannabis use, based on a review of scientific research published since 1999. See 
NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, AND MED., THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF CANNABIS AND 
CANNABINOIDS: THE CURRENT STATE OF EVIDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
RESEARCH REPORT HIGHLIGHTS 1 (2017), http://nationalacademies.org/hmd/~/ 
media/Files/Report%20Files/2017/Cannabis-Health-Effects/Cannabis-report-highli
ghts.pdf (reviewing the most recent evidence regarding health effects associated 
with cannabis). The report identified conclusive or substantial evidence that 
cannabis or cannabinoids are effective for treating chronic pain in adults, 
chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting, and multiple sclerosis spasticity 
symptoms. The report also identified moderate evidence that cannabis or 
cannabinoids are effective for treating sleep disturbance associated with various 
causes. In addition, the report identified limited evidence that cannabis or 
cannabinoids are effective for treating decreasing weight loss associated with 
HIV/AIDS, symptoms of Tourette syndrome, anxiety symptoms in persons with 
social anxiety disorder and symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder. At the 
same time, the report noted that conclusive evidence regarding the short-term 
800 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 779 (2018) 
more states, the District of Columbia, Guam and Puerto Rico have 
also enacted laws legalizing marijuana for medical use.111  
The movement to legalize cannabis for medical use created 
“political, social, and economic conditions that were conducive” to 
decriminalization and, ultimately, legalization for recreational 
use.112 Several other social factors also spurred this movement, 
including the “growing political influence” of generations that have 
used marijuana with little ill effects,113 an increasing “libertarian 
ascendancy,”114 and public opposition to “excesses in criminal 
justice policy” and to the “heavy costs of the drug war.”115 However, 
marijuana also became legitimized in a sense by the medical-use 
laws.116 Governments that continued to criminalize it without 
regard to its therapeutic value lost credibility on the separate issue 
of whether marijuana could pose risks to health if unregulated.117 
The credibility problem continues to apply not only regarding the 
states that have failed to allow for medical use but at the federal 
level as well.118 Congress continues to classify cannabis as a 
Schedule I drug in the federal Controlled Substances Act, with no 
exception for medical use, based on a purported conclusion that it 
                                                                                                     
and long-term health effects, positive and negative, of cannabis use remains 
elusive and warrants further study. 
 111. See NCSL, State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 5 (listing states 
that have allowed for the medical use of marijuana). 
 112. Bonnie, supra note 6, at 588. 
 113. See JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., CONSIDERING MARIJUANA 
LEGALIZATION: INSIGHTS FOR VERMONT AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS 3 (2015), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR864.readonline.html [hereinafter 
CAULKINS ET AL., CONSIDERING MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION] (“One factor is 
generational turnover leading to a rise in the proportion of the adult population 
who have direct personal experience with marijuana; those who have used 
previously are more likely than those who have not to support legalization.”). 
 114. Bonnie, supra note 5, at 589. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. at 588 (“[T]he states’ legalization of access to marijuana for 
medical use, starting with California’s Compassionate Use Act in 1996, has 
played a critically important role in the impending collapse of the prohibition 
against recreational use.”). 
 117. See id. at 588 (discussing the IOM report in 1999 that bolstered political 
momentum for allowing medical marijuana use). 
 118. See id. at 588–89 (“If federal policymakers had been sensible, they would 
have facilitated lawful access for compassionate use in a tightly controlled 
system.”). 
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has no accepted medical value.119 This view long ago ceased to be, 
if it ever was, plausible.120 
Thirteen states have now decriminalized cannabis for 
recreational use, and eight more plus the District of Columbia have 
now legalized it, within limits, for those purposes.121 
Decriminalization connotes a variety of forms of liberalized 
prohibition, and, on this score, states that have only 
decriminalized vary.122 Some make possession of small amounts 
only a civil infraction, while some make such possession a 
low-grade misdemeanor that carries no possible jail time.123 The 
unifying characteristic among the decriminalizing states is that, 
while not a state crime, the possession of even small amounts is 
still prohibited.124 
 The eight states plus the District of Columbia that have now 
completely legalized some marijuana-related activities for 
recreational purposes account for twenty-one percent of the U.S 
population.125 Colorado and Washington were the first to legalize, 
in 2012, followed by Alaska, Oregon and the District of Columbia 
in 2014.126 Voters in California, Maine, Massachusetts and Nevada 
approved legalization in November, 2016.127 
                                                                                                     
 119. See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text (discussing the 
implementation of the Controlled Substances Act). 
 120. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 27 (2005) (describing the medical uses 
of marijuana). In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the Congress had 
the authority to prohibit the possession and use of even small amounts of 
marijuana under its authority under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 42. 
 121. See NCSL Marijuana Overview, supra note 3 (detailing the legalization 
of marijuana in certain states). 
 122. See id. (“Twenty-two states and the District of Columbia have 
decriminalized small amounts of marijuana.”). 
 123. See id. (“[C]ertain small, personal-consumption amounts are a civil or 
local infraction, not a state crime (or are a lowest misdemeanor with no possibility 
of jail time).”). 
 124. See id. (“[P]ossession or transfer without remuneration of one ounce or 
less of marijuana [is] a civil violation.”). 
 125. See Eli McVey, Map: The Post-Election U.S. Marijuana Landscape, 
MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY (Nov. 14, 2016), https://mjbizdaily.com/chart-majority-of-u-
s-embraces-legal-marijuana/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2018) (“21% of the U.S. 
population lives in states with adult-use laws.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 126. See NCSL Marijuana Overview, supra note 3 (detailing the legalization 
of marijuana). 
 127. See id. (detailing the legalization of marijuana). 
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Because federal law continues to criminalize even mere 
possession of cannabis in small amounts for any purpose, there is 
tension between federal and state enforcement efforts in those 
states that have legalized marijuana for recreational or even 
medical uses.128 Some accommodations have been made by federal 
authorities on a temporary basis.129 In 2013, the Justice 
Department announced130 implicitly that it would not prosecute 
growers, sellers and users in Washington and Colorado as long as 
they strictly complied with the state regulations.131 Likewise, in 
December 2014, and in succeeding years as well, Congress has 
enacted a rider in appropriations bills that prohibits the Justice 
Department from using appropriated funds to prevent states “from 
implementing their own State laws that authorize the use, 
distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.”132 In 
                                                                                                     
 128. See BENNETT & WALSH, supra note 86, at 1 (“Two U.S. states have 
legalized recreational marijuana, and more may follow; . . . Such actions are in 
obvious tension with three international treaties that together commit the United 
States to punish and even criminalize activity related to recreational 
marijuana.”). 
 129. See id. (“Two U.S. states have legalized recreational marijuana, and 
more may follow; the Obama administration has conditionally accepted these 
experiments.”). 
 130. The announcement came in the form of a Memorandum issued by the 
Deputy Attorney General, James M. Cole. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, 
Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Aug. 29, 2013), 
http://www.justice.cog/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf 
(announcing guidance regarding marijuana enforcement). In January, 2018, a 
few days after recreational marijuana sales began in California, Attorney General 
Jeff Sessions rescinded the Obama-era policy, although widespread doubt 
persisted that there would soon follow any prosecutorial crackdown on 
commercial growers, distributors and sellers in legalization states.  See Charlie 
Savage & Jack Healy, Justice Dept. Shift Threatens Legal Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 5, 2018, at A1 (reporting the change in policy and noting that “Justice 
Department officials would not say whether they intended to carry out a 
crackdown and begin prosecuting . . . , or were instead merely trying to sow doubt 
and slow growth in the semilegal industry”). 
 131. See BENNETT & WALSH, supra note 86, at 3 (“Essentially, growers, sellers 
and users of marijuana could steer clear of the feds, provided they strictly hewed 
to the Washington or Colorado regulations.”). 
 132. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 
113-235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2014); see also Brooke Staggs, Medical 
Marijuana Gets Reprieve from Feds in Spending Bill, ORANGE COUNTY REG.,  
https://www.ocregister.com/2017/05/01/medical-marijuana-gets-reprieve-from-fe
ds-in-spending-bill/ (last updated May 17, 2017) (last visited Mar. 6, 2018) (noting 
that the amendment was included in appropriations acts in subsequent years) (on 
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAUSE AGGREGATION 803 
2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that this statute foreclosed, on a temporary basis, an effort by the 
Justice Department to prosecute various persons involved with 
medical marijuana businesses in California.133 Nonetheless, the 
fundamental conflict between the continuing criminalization of 
marijuana activities by the federal Controlled Substances Act and 
the effort of certain states to legalize some cannabis-related 
activities remains unresolved.134 
C. The Future 
The legal status of recreational marijuana activity in the U.S. 
will likely continue to reflect major variances among jurisdictions 
for at least a couple of decades. The rapid movement by eight states 
and the District of Columbia toward limited legalization for 
recreational use since 2012135 suggests that more states will also 
legalize recreational use on a limited basis within only a few years. 
Yet, there is not a strong basis to conclude that the movement will 
promptly proceed toward legalization across the country. 
Regarding even minor recreational marijuana activities, we can 
expect a period in which most states have legalized but Congress 
and a strong minority of states continue to criminalize.  
The prompt spread of legalization probably will be throttled 
some by the limitations on direct democracy in many states. In 
every jurisdiction that has legalized to date, the source of law was 
                                                                                                     
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 133. See United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(“If the federal government prosecutes such individuals, it has prevented the state 
from giving practical effect to its law providing for non-prosecution of individuals 
who engage in the permitted conduct.”). 
 134. One commentator has urged that the Supreme Court should review the 
classification of marijuana as a Schedule I drug in the Controlled Substances Act 
under a “heightened scrutiny” standard, contending that this approach could 
result in the removal of marijuana from the federal statute altogether. See Sandra 
M. Praxmarer, Note, Blazing a New Trail: Using a Federalism Standard of 
Review in Marijuana Cases, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 25, 48–51 (2017) 
(“The same federalism principles that led to a heightened standard of review in 
Windsor can be applied in cases challenging marijuana’s classification.”). 
 135. See supra notes 121–124 and accompanying text (discussing state 
legalization of marijuana since 2012). 
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a ballot initiative.136 The initiative process allows supporters, by 
securing the requisite number of signatures, “to bypass the 
legislature” and propose laws that voters can approve directly.137 
The possibility of a ballot initiative does not assure legalization for 
recreational purposes; Arizona voters rejected such an initiative in 
2016.138 However, the initiative process seems to provide a more 
likely route to passage in many states than does the normal 
legislative process. Several state governments have considered 
bills to legalize recreational marijuana in recent years but none 
have approved it.139 There may be a widely-held sense among 
legislators and governors that legalization of recreational 
marijuana is not good policy, but there may also be a fear that it is 
not good politics. The ballot initiative provides a way around 
resistant or hesitant legislatures. However, only twenty-four 
states have the ballot initiative available to enact state laws.140 
This limitation will mean that reform will have to go through the 
legislature in most jurisdictions.  
In states without the ballot initiative, there is still reason to 
think that legalization of recreational marijuana will eventually 
spread. First, all states allow for the “legislative referendum,” 
through which “the state legislature ‘refers’ proposed legislation to 
                                                                                                     
 136. See NCSL, Marijuana Overview, supra note 2, at 1 (“No state legislature, 
to date, has legalized recreational marijuana separate from a voter initiative.”). 
 137. HENRY S. NOYES, THE LAW OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 103 (2014). 
 138. See NCSL, Marijuana Overview, supra note 2, at 1 (“On Nov. 8, 2016, 
voters in four states, California, Maine, Massachusetts and Nevada, approved 
adult-use recreational marijuana, while voters in Arizona disapproved.”). 
 139. In May 2017, the Vermont legislature became the first to approve a bill 
legalizing recreational marijuana, but the governor vetoed it. See Reid Wilson, 
Vermont Governor Vetoes Marijuana Legalization, THE HILL (May 24, 2017, 1:47 PM), 
http://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/334958-vermont-governor-vetoes-marij
uana-legalization (last visited Mar. 6, 2018) (“Vermont Gov. Phil Scott (R) has 
vetoed legislation that would have legalized marijuana for recreational use, 
delivering a blow to legalization backers who hoped Vermont would be the next 
domino to fall.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 140. The states that allow for initiatives are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. See 
State-by-State List of Initiative and Referendum Provisions, UNIV. S. CAL. 
INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., www.iandrinstitute.org/states.cfm (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2018) (detailing which states have the initiative and referendum process) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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the ballot for a popular vote.”141 Some state legislatures that are 
unwilling to approve of legalization through legislation may be 
willing to put the question to voters by authorizing a referendum, 
and, in some of those states, voters may approve. Also, the 
pressures toward legalization could well increase enough in some 
states that state government will approve it through the normal 
legislative process. In addition to the push from voters, based on 
support for individual liberty, there might be some revenue 
benefits to states that legalize,142 particularly if neighboring states 
have not yet done so.143 
There is good reason to doubt, however, that legalization of 
recreational marijuana will soon extend to all states. Many 
persons continue to believe that even moderate cannabis use is 
risky and immoral.144 For example, the current Attorney General 
of the United States reportedly believes that cannabis “is 
dangerous” and that “[g]ood people don’t smoke marijuana.”145 
Moreover, there are real risks associated with cannabis, 
particularly when used by adolescents, when used excessively by 
adults, or when used at times that might influence one’s driving on 
the public roadways.146 Due to inadequate study, some of the 
possible risks are also still unknown.147 Because the prevalence of 
these concerns will vary among the states, we can expect some 
                                                                                                     
 141. NOYES, supra note 137, at 69. 
 142. For a discussion of the complex nature of the taxation considerations and 
other possible revenue sources from legalization, see CAULKINS ET AL., 
CONSIDERING MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, supra note 113, at 75–100 (discussing the 
ways in which a state might be able to keep revenue from marijuana sales). 
 143. See id. at 156 (noting that, if one state legalizes marijuana and other 
neighbors do not for a number of years, the legalizing state could “generate a 
substantial amount of revenues in the meantime”). 
 144. See id. at 27 (introducing moral arguments against the use of marijuana, 
namely “concerns about the inherent rights and wrongs  of  using  a  mind-altering 
substance”). 
 145. See, e.g., Sharon LaFranier & Matt Apuzzo, A Bond Over Bucking the 
Establishment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2017, at A1 (noting that Attorney General, Jeff 
Sessions, while a senator, said of marijuana, “This drug is dangerous,” and added, 
“Good people don’t smoke marijuana”). 
 146. For a summary of the risks, see CAULKINS ET AL., CONSIDERING 
MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, supra note 113, at 31–38 (describing the health 
consequences of marijuana consumption). 
 147. See CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, supra note 15, at 54 (“As 
for research on the effect of marijuana use on employment and worker 
productivity, the findings vary dramatically.”). 
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jurisdictions to resist the trend toward legalization for a long 
period and even continue to criminalize minor marijuana 
activities.148 
The federal government also will probably not legalize 
recreational marijuana soon. First, there is no opportunity for 
direct democracy because neither the initiative nor the legislative 
referendum is available.149 Second, there are treaties in force that 
Congress and the President would violate if they approved 
legislation to legalize marijuana for recreational use even on a 
tightly limited basis.150 The federal government would first have to 
secure modifications to those treaties before it could properly 
legalize, a task that could easily take several years.151 Finally, 
there are political forces operating that would otherwise make 
such reform difficult.152 Many federal legislators will harbor 
reluctance, “given the political risks that will still attach to 
marijuana legalization in many jurisdictions.”153 As long as many 
states still resist, there will be resistance among many federal 
legislators.154 On this score, it is noteworthy that Congress has 
been unable even to agree to move marijuana from Schedule I to a 
lower level in the Controlled Substances Act to acknowledge that 
it has therapeutic value.155 These considerations suggest that we 
                                                                                                     
 148. In Arizona, for example, voters rejected a legalization initiative in 2016. 
See supra note 138 and accompanying text (discussing the rejection of marijuana 
legalization in Arizona). Even possession of small amounts, except for medical 
use, remains subject to criminal sanction. See AZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3405(A)(1) 
(2010) (“A person shall not knowingly: possess or use marijuana.”). 
 149. See NOYES, supra note 137, at 4 (“For the most part, the use of direct 
democracy in the United States has been limited to state and local governments. 
There is no federal recall.”). 
 150. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (emphasizing the importance 
of the Controlled Substances Act “in fulfilling the United States’ obligations 
regarding marijuana under several treaties”). 
 151. See BENNETT & WALSH, supra note 86, at 1 (“[The United States] and 
other drug treaty partners should begin now to discuss options for substantive 
alterations that create space within international law for conditional legalization 
and for other policy experimentation that seeks to further the treaties’ ultimate 
aims of promoting human health and welfare.”). 
 152. See id. at 22 (discussing how domestic politics would create difficulties 
in reforming the treaty). 
 153. Id. 
 154. See id. (“Domestic politics will make treaty reform hard.”). 
 155. See supra note 91–93 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of 
permitted medical marijuana use at one point). 
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can expect to see a period when Congress and a strong minority of 
states continue to criminalize recreational marijuana even after a 
majority of states have legalized it. 
III. The Absence of Constitutional Protection for Marijuana 
Activity Based on Clauses Considered Separately 
This Part assumes that the scenario described at the end of 
Part II will materialize and asks a traditional sort of constitutional 
law question: Could persons charged with minor marijuana crimes 
in states that continue to criminalize recreational marijuana 
successfully claim a right to engage in the activity under any 
constitutional clause considered individually?156 To make the 
scenario more concrete, let’s hypothesize that the defendants are 
casual, non-dependent users of marijuana charged based on 
knowing and voluntary behavior—either use of marijuana in a 
non-public setting or possession of less than an ounce in public. 
Assume also that the maximum possible punishment is 
incarceration for up to six months. Let’s also suppose that thirty 
states plus the District of Columbia (but not the federal 
government and the twenty other states) have legalized 
recreational marijuana. In claiming a right to engage in the 
activity, the defendants make alternative arguments under the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the Fourth Amendment, 
the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. Could 
they prevail? In what follows, I explain why their arguments using 
                                                                                                     
 156. I do not view incorporation against the states under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of a right recognized under one of the 
specific clauses in the first eight Amendments—here, either the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause or the Fourth Amendment—as clause aggregation, 
although the view is arguable. If incorporation of that sort were viewed as clause 
aggregation, it would, nonetheless, be a special form of it, for there is no 
aggregation of harms or synergy of concerns occurring. Rather, incorporation 
follows automatically based on Supreme Court decree. Long ago, the Supreme 
Court declared that incorporated Bill of Rights provisions “are all to be enforced 
against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same 
standards that protect those personal rights against federal encroachment.” 
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964). The Court reaffirmed this 
identical-application approach when it incorporated the Second Amendment right 
to bear arms in self-defense. See McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 788 
(2010) (concluding that a “two-track” approach is now impractical). 
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this clause-by-clause approach, even with the best of 
presentations, would likely fail. 
A. The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Argument 
Under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,157 the 
defendants should expect to lose because they engaged in 
affirmative, voluntary conduct that society has not yet sufficiently 
condoned. The Supreme Court has used this clause only once to 
invalidate a conviction (as opposed to a punishment), in Robinson 
v. California.158 However, that case, we will see, would not seem to 
protect voluntary use or possession of marijuana.159 The Court also 
has invalidated some criminal punishments (as opposed to 
convictions) under the clause when a societal consensus has 
developed suggesting that they are grossly excessive.160 However, 
our defendants would probably also have a losing argument on that 
score, given that we are hypothesizing that the federal government 
and twenty states would continue to criminalize their behavior.  
The Robinson case, in which the Court invalidated not just a 
punishment but a conviction, involved illegal drugs, but laid down 
a very narrow protection against prosecution.161 The Court 
                                                                                                     
 157. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 158. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (“We hold that a 
state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted as a criminal, even though he 
has never touched any narcotic drug within the State or been guilty of any 
irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 159. See infra notes 161–168 and accompanying text (detailing the Robinson 
Court’s narrow protection against prosecution). 
 160. See infra notes 172–178 and accompanying text (discussing when the 
death penalty and other punishments will be found grossly excessive). 
The Supreme Court has also asserted that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause “prohibits the imposition of inherently barbaric punishments under all 
circumstances.” Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010). However, there 
is only one decision from the Court invalidating a punishment that arguably falls 
into this category. In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 99 (1958), a plurality of four Justices 
concluded that the Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of loss of citizenship 
as a punishment for crime. See generally id. at 103. 
 161. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667 (“We hold that a state law which imprisons 
a person thus afflicted as a criminal, even though he has never touched any 
narcotic drug within the State or been guilty of any irregular behavior there, 
inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth 
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confronted a state statute that California courts had construed to 
criminalize mere addiction to narcotics—in Robinson’s case, 
heroin.162 The statute could have been construed to apply only 
where there was proof that the defendant had voluntarily and 
illegally used the drug in California, but the trial court did not so 
instruct Robinson’s jury, and the state appellate court agreed with 
the trial court’s interpretation.163 In those odd circumstances, the 
Supreme Court invalidated the conviction itself, because the law, 
as interpreted, covered a mere status rather than culpable 
conduct.164 Addiction could arise without any illegal use of drugs 
in California, the Court noted.165 One could be addicted based on 
use outside of the state, on use pursuant to prescription or on 
merely being born to an addicted mother.166 Addiction alone, the 
Court suggested, was like having “a common cold.”167 To 
criminalize that status was cruel and unusual punishment, 
whatever the punishment actually imposed.168 
                                                                                                     
Amendment.”). 
 162. See id. at 660 n.1 
The statute is § 11721 of the California Health and Safety Code. It 
provides: “No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be 
addicted to the use of narcotics, excepting when administered by or 
under the direction of a person licensed by the State to prescribe and 
administer narcotics. It shall be the burden of the defense to show that 
it comes within the exception. Any person convicted of violating any 
provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be 
sentenced to serve a term of not less than 90 days nor more than one 
year in the county jail . . . .” 
 163. See id. at 665 (“It would be possible to construe the statute under which 
the appellant was convicted as one which is operative only upon proof of the actual 
use of narcotics within the State’s jurisdiction. But the California courts have not 
so construed this law.”). 
 164. See id. (“The appellant could be convicted, [the jury] were told, if they 
found simply that the appellant’s ‘status’ or ‘chronic condition’ was that of being 
‘addicted to the use of narcotics.’”). 
 165. See id. at 666 (“California has said that a person can be continuously 
guilty of this offense, whether or not he has ever used or possessed any narcotics 
within the State . . . .”). 
 166. See id. at 667 n.9 (discussing how a person could have “innocently” 
become addicted to the narcotics). 
 167. Id. at 667. 
 168. See id. at 667–68 (“Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual 
punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.”). 
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While the Robinson case could invalidate governmental efforts 
to criminalize certain conditions beyond drug addiction, such as 
mental illness, leprosy or venereal disease,169 it would not protect 
our hypothetical defendants. Knowingly and voluntarily, they 
either possessed cannabis in public or smoked it at home 
recreationally. That is affirmative conduct, not a mere status or 
condition.170 
Our defendants also could not likely prevail under the Court’s 
decisions invalidating criminal punishments (as opposed to 
convictions) as disproportional under the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause.171 Putting aside that those cases do not 
support a right to engage in conduct, they also do not apply to the 
situation of our hypothetical defendants for a separate reason—
the absence of sufficient evidence of a societal consensus condoning 
their behavior. Except in the death penalty context,172 the Court 
                                                                                                     
 169. See id. at 666 (“It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history 
would attempt to make it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a 
leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease.”). 
 170. Even if they were heavy users, the defendants likely could not 
successfully claim an addiction to marijuana of sufficient force to render their 
activity protected under the Eighth Amendment. Only a few years after the 
Robinson decision, in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), the Court rejected an 
Eighth Amendment claim that alcoholism could prevent the application of a 
criminal statute that applied to public intoxication. Id. at 535. The Court 
concluded that alcohol did not produce an addiction sufficiently strong to 
invalidate the conviction of the alcoholic defendant for intoxicated appearance in 
a public place. Id. at 535. Marijuana poses less addictive and withdrawal risks 
than alcohol or heroin. See CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, supra note 
15, at 38–39 (comparing addition from marijuana use to comparable alcohol and 
drug addiction rates). 
 171. See infra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing the four situations, 
besides Robinson, in which the Supreme Court has given substantive or 
procedural protection based on disproportionality under the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause). 
 172. For Eighth Amendment purposes, the Court has declared that “death is 
different” from any other punishment that may be imposed in this country both 
because of its severity and its irremediable nature, and, thus, that more 
demanding requirements will apply. See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 
357–58 (1977) (rejecting procedure that allowed a capital sentencer to impose 
death penalty based in part on information not disclosed to the defense); Lockett 
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (invalidating statute that did not allow a capital 
sentencer to reject death penalty based on mitigating evidence concerning 
defendant’s character, record and crime). This idea is also implicit in the 
invalidation of standardless capital sentencing in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238, 289 (1972) (“The unusual severity of death is manifested most clearly in its 
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has rejected criminal punishments only in a few, extreme 
circumstances under the clause.173 Those cases boil down to the 
                                                                                                     
finality and enormity.”). 
In the last four decades, the Court has repeatedly relied on the “death is 
different” idea to invalidate a death sentence on procedural grounds that would 
not apply in the non-death penalty context. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 
U.S. 104, 112–13 (1982) (rejecting the death sentence imposed under a statute 
interpreted by state courts to foreclose consideration of defendant’s emotional 
disturbance and violent and tumultuous childhood); Skipper v. South Carolina, 
476 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1986) (invalidating a death sentence where the sentencing judge 
had declined to consider evidence of the defendant’s good behavior while 
incarcerated and awaiting trial); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 397–99 
(1987) (overturning a capital sentence based on statutory interpretation by state 
courts that the sentencer could only consider mitigating factors appearing on a 
statutory list); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 83–85 (1987) (rejecting a 
mandatory death penalty for intentional murder by an inmate serving a prison 
sentence of life without the possibility of parole); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 
340 (1989) (overturning a death sentence on the grounds that governing Texas 
statute did not allow the sentencing jury sufficient opportunity to reject the death 
penalty based on the mitigating evidence of retardation and childhood abuse); 
McCoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 439–44 (1990) (rejecting the requirement 
that the jury find mitigating circumstances unanimously). 
On the substantive side, the Court has prohibited the death penalty on 
proportionality grounds in five circumstances: 
In 1977, in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) for the rape of an adult victim 
not involving the taking of human life. Id. at 600. 
In 1982, in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1987), against a felony-murderer 
who did not intend to kill or actually kill, id. at 788, unless, as the Court later 
made clear in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), he was a major participant 
in the felony and displayed reckless indifference to human life. Id. at 158. 
In 2002, in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), against a retarded offender. 
Id. at 321. 
In 2005, in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) against an offender who was 
under age 18. Id. at 578; see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 857 (1988) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (prohibiting a death sentence for persons who offended 
when under sixteen years of age, and the relevant capital-punishment statute 
specified no minimum age requirement). 
In 2008, in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008), for the rape of a child 
victim not involving the taking of human life. Id. at 412. 
The Coker and Kennedy decisions, involving rape, probably mean that the death 
penalty violates the Eighth Amendment for all offenses against individuals that 
do not involve the taking of human life. In Kennedy, the Court declined to address 
whether the death penalty might still apply to “crimes defining and punishing 
treason, espionage, terrorism, and drug kingpin activity, which are offenses 
against the state.” Id. at 437. 
 173. In the non-capital context, the Court has conferred substantive or 
procedural protection based on disproportionality under the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause in four circumstances other than the situation presented in 
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idea that the Court will on rare occasion invalidate what it sees as 
grossly excessive punishment.174 Before reaching such a 
conclusion, the Court has required objective evidence, which can 
be legislation or its absence in other U.S. jurisdictions, revealing a 
societal consensus against the punishment in the particular 
context.175 However, the Court has never invalidated a 
punishment in a context in which it is authorized by twenty states 
and the federal government, which is the situation of our 
hypothetical defendants. In those circumstances, there is not 
enough assurance that the punishment is grossly excessive. 
Granting the defendants protection under the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause would also set down a precedent 
with provocative implications. If the Eighth Amendment 
supported a right to possess or use marijuana when twenty states 
and the federal government still criminalize that behavior, other 
crimes and punishments would seem in danger of constitutional 
invalidation. For example, the death penalty could soon be at risk. 
Currently, nineteen states plus the District of Columbia have 
                                                                                                     
the Robinson case.  
In 1910, in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), to invalidate a sentence 
of hard incarceration and permanent loss of civil liberties for minor offenses 
involving document falsification by a government employee. Id. at 382. 
In 1983, in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), to reject a sentence of life 
imprisonment without parole for a seventh, non-violent felony involving uttering 
a bad check for $100. Id. at 281. 
In 2010, in Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010), to foreclose a sentence 
of life imprisonment without parole for a non-homicide crime by a juvenile. Id. at 
2030. 
In 2012, in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), and a companion case, 
Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), to disallow a mandatory sentence of life 
imprisonment without parole for any offense committed by a juvenile, absent 
special findings in the case of a juvenile defendant whose “crime reflects 
irreparable corruption.” Id. at 2469 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 
(2005)). 
 174. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000–01 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (stating that the controlling opinion concludes that the Eighth 
Amendment contains a “narrow proportionality principle,” that “does not require 
strict proportionality between crime and sentence” but instead “forbids only 
extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime”). 
 175. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010) (explaining that, in 
rare cases where the court infers gross disproportionality, it “should then compare 
the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the 
same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other 
jurisdictions”). 
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abolished capital punishment,176 and the trend is toward abolition 
by more states.177 This movement poses difficulty for our 
hypothetical defendants. They are probably less likely to prevail 
under the Eighth Amendment if their success would soon seem to 
require the categorical invalidation of capital punishment for all 
ordinary crimes even when a strong minority of states and the 
federal government retain it.178  
B. The Fourth Amendment Argument 
The defendants also would not prevail under the Fourth 
Amendment, because they possessed a contraband substance as 
defined by criminal law. To claim a Fourth Amendment right to 
possess and use marijuana, the defendants would be arguing 
essentially that the amendment’s command that searches and 
seizures be “reasonable” categorically forecloses the police from 
invading their privacy to find and seize marijuana. Indeed, the 
claim would have to be even more extreme to provide a right to 
engage in the activity—that the government could not use the 
evidence to prosecute a person even if the person or another gave 
it to the police voluntarily and voluntarily reported the crime! This 
general sort of claim—that the Amendment protects certain kinds 
of evidence from any police search and seizure—has some 
foundation in old Fourth Amendment decisions of the Supreme 
Court.179 However, given that marijuana would be criminal 
                                                                                                     
 176. See States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. 
CTR. (Nov. 9, 2016), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty 
(last visited Mar. 6, 2018) (comparing states with and without the death penalty) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 177. See id. (demonstrating how seven states have abolished the death 
penalty since 2007: New Jersey (2007), New York (2007), New Mexico (2009), 
Illinois (2011), Connecticut (2012), Maryland (2013), and Delaware (2016)). 
Among the states retaining the death penalty, four have also recently experienced 
gubernatorial moratoria on executions, suggesting that they could also soon move 
toward abolition. Id. These states are: Oregon (2011), Colorado (2013), 
Washington (2014) and Pennsylvania (2015). Id. 
 178. For the argument, nonetheless, that given the dearth of federal 
executions over a substantial period, the retention of a federal death should be 
discounted in assessments of the continued propriety of the death penalty for 
murder under the Eighth Amendment, see Howe, supra note 8, at 1427–28. 
 179. See infra notes 181–194 and accompanying text (detailing the early 
search and seizure case law). 
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contraband in any state that would prosecute the defendants, it 
would not be the kind of evidence that would have been immune 
from search and seizure as an historical matter.180 More 
importantly, under modern Fourth Amendment law, there are no 
categories of ordinary criminal evidence that are recognized as 
immune from police search and seizure.181 
Early cases in which the Court construed the Fourth 
Amendment reflected a strong “libertarianism” that demarcated 
“both the zone of constitutionally protected interests and the limits 
on investigative authority.”182 The line began with Boyd v. United 
States,183 in which the Court addressed the constitutionality of a 
statute authorizing a judicial order to the defendant to produce 
records in a proceeding for forfeiture of goods allegedly imported 
without payment of duties.184 The Court ruled the order improper 
and the records inadmissible as evidence.185 The records were 
effectively immune from “a search and seizure, or, what is 
equivalent thereto, a compulsory production . . . .”186 Any such 
search and seizure “of a man’s private papers” merely for “the 
purpose of using them in evidence against him in a criminal case, 
or in a proceeding to enforce the forfeiture of his property” was 
deemed unreasonable.187 The outcome would have differed, the 
Court asserted, if there had been a “search and seizure of articles 
and things which it is unlawful for the person to have in his 
possession for the purpose of issue or disposition, such as 
counterfeit coin, lottery tickets, implements of gambling, 
                                                                                                     
 180. See infra note 195 and accompanying text (discussing how there were no 
protections in early case law for items the defendant was not entitled to possess). 
 181. See infra note 190 and accompanying text (stating the holding of Boyes). 
 182. Lawrence Rosenthal, Binary Searches and the Central Meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment, 22 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. L. REV. 881, 888 (2014). 
 183. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 184. See id. at 618 (addressing the issue in the case). 
 185. See id. at 638 (“We think that the notice to produce the invoice in this 
case, the order by virtue of which it was issued, and the law which authorized the 
order, were unconstitutional and void . . . .”). 
 186. Id. at 622. 
 187. Id. at 622–23; see also id. at 626–30 (discussing Entick v. Carrington, 19 
How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (C.P. 1765), which purportedly helped justify the Fourth 
Amendment, and concluding that “any forcible and compulsory extortion of a 
man’s . . . private papers to be used as evidence to convict him . . . or to forfeit his 
goods, is within the condemnation of that judgment”). 
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[etc.] . . . .”188 But, Boyd’s papers were seized as mere evidence of 
his offense, which was not acceptable.189 Boyd seemed to mean 
“that items to which the owner has a legitimate right to possess 
under the law of property are immune from search or seizure even 
on a warrant or other compelling justification.”190 
This view of Boyd was solidified in the Court’s 1921 decision 
in Gouled v. United States.191 There, the police had obtained search 
warrants for the defendant’s office and, on that authority, had 
searched for and seized some of his papers, which were later 
admitted against him in a trial for fraud.192 The Court held that 
those actions violated Gouled’s rights under the Fourth 
Amendment,193 because the government could assert no right to 
the papers that was greater that Gouled’s.194 The Court noted that 
the outcome would have differed if Gouled had possessed the 
papers unlawfully, which would have been true, for example, if 
they had been “stolen or forged” or were themselves fraudulently 
executed contracts.195 But because Gouled’s papers were mere 
“evidence” of his crimes, they were immune from search and 
seizure when in his possession.196 The Fourth Amendment 
                                                                                                     
 188. Id. at 624. 
 189. See id. at 623 (describing how the evidence was obtained merely to use 
against the defendant). 
 190. Rosenthal, supra note 182, at 889. 
 191. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 303 (1921)  
It would not be possible to add to the emphasis with which the framers 
of our Constitution and this court (in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 
616, in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, and in Silverthorne 
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385) have declared the 
importance to political liberty and to the welfare of our country of the 
due observance of the rights guaranteed under the Constitution by 
these two amendments. 
 192. See id. at 304–05 (discussing the material facts of the case). 
 193. See id. at 309 (“[Search warrants] may not be used as a means of gaining 
access to a man’s house or office and papers solely for the purpose of making 
search to secure evidence to be used against him in a criminal or penal 
proceeding . . . .”). 
 194. See id. at 309–11 (“The Government could desire its possession only to 
use it as evidence against the defendant and to search for and seize it for such 
purpose was unlawful.”). 
 195. See id. at 309–10 (discussing when papers may be obtained for 
evidentiary purposes). 
 196. See id. at 309 (determining that search warrants cannot be used to seize 
papers merely to use them as evidence in a proceeding against the defendant). 
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prohibited the actions to secure them or their use at trial, although 
the government had discovered and seized them pursuant to 
warrants that Gouled had not otherwise challenged.197 
While Boyd and Gouled underscore that some items once were 
immune from searches and seizures, those decisions would not 
have helped our hypothetical defendants even had they been 
charged with marijuana possession or use in 1921. Marijuana is 
contraband where its possession is a crime or civil offense. In those 
circumstances, the government could assert a right to seize the 
substance that would be superior to the possessor’s claim to it, 
meaning that the immunity would not have applied. Boyd and 
Gouled both noted that there was no protection as to items the 
defendant was not entitled to possess.198  
The Boyd and Gouled rulings also would not help our 
modern-day defendants for a second, more fundamental reason: 
The Supreme Court has abandoned the notion that the Fourth 
Amendment renders some categories of ordinary criminal evidence 
immune from police search and seizure.199 In Warden v. Hayden,200 
the Court upheld the introduction in an armed robbery trial of 
clothing matching that worn by the robber that was seized during 
a search incident to arrest of the defendant in his home.201 
Although the clothing was “mere evidence,” the Court found that 
point irrelevant: “Nothing in the language of the Fourth 
Amendment supports the distinction between ‘mere evidence’ and 
instrumentalities, fruits of crime, or contraband.”202 As for the 
Boyd and Gouled holdings, the Court overruled them.203 
                                                                                                     
 197. See id. at 303 (“It was objected on the trial, and is here insisted, that it 
was error to admit these papers in evidence because possession of them was 
obtained by violating the rights secured to the defendant by the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.”). 
 198. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624 (1886) (describing how the 
laws of the Fourth Amendment do not apply to things that are unlawful for a 
person to have in their possession); Gouled, 255 U.S. at 309 (same). 
 199. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 312 (1976) (overturning the Boyd 
and Gouled decisions). 
 200. 387 U.S. 294 (1976). 
 201. See id. at 296–97 (reversing the Court of Appeals’ decision that the 
clothing items had “evidentiary value only” and therefore could not be admitted). 
 202. Id. at 301. 
 203. See id. at 310 (rejecting Boyd and Gouled by holding that, “[t]here is no 
viable reason to distinguish intrusions to secure ‘mere evidence’ from intrusions 
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The Hayden opinion reveals that, although our defendants 
could correctly assert that marijuana criminalization has 
increased the number and the intensity of privacy invasions by 
police, those facts imply no cognizable Fourth Amendment claim 
for legalization. Doubtless, the sheer number of Fourth 
Amendment challenges to searches and seizures involving 
marijuana underscore the large role that cannabis plays in modern 
search-and-seizure activity.204 Criminalization also has likely 
produced invasions of privacy that are especially intrusive, 
because marijuana can be possessed in tiny amounts,205 its 
criminal use is “generally committed in private”206 and 
governments intensified their efforts after the war on drugs 
commenced to discover marijuana cultivation.207 Legalizing 
marijuana surely would help ameliorate the number and nature of 
the police invasions.208 Nonetheless, the Hayden opinion indicates 
that a claim for legalization is not within the province of existing 
                                                                                                     
to secure fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband”). 
In Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976), the Court also rejected a second 
idea reflected in the Boyd and Gouled decisions—that the seizure of a person’s 
private papers can violate a person’s Fifth Amendment privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630; Gouled v. United States, 255 
U.S. 298, 311 (1921). In Andresen, the Court upheld the introduction, in a trial 
for fraud, of certain private papers seized pursuant to a search warrant of the 
defendant’s law office. Andresen, 427 U.S. at 477. The Court clarified that the 
Fifth Amendment does not prevent a search for testimonial papers that is 
properly conducted under the Fourth Amendment, because there is no 
“compulsion” in such a case. Id. at 471–77. 
 204. See, e.g., Mandiberg, supra note 11, at 31 (“Since 1970, the number of 
marijuana-related search-and-seizure opinions issued by state and lower federal 
courts has increased so dramatically that the task of reading them all is 
overwhelming.”). 
 205. On this score, see supra note 19 and accompanying text (detailing how 
small a “roach” of marijuana is); MIKOS, supra note 1, at 47, 76 (discussing cases 
in which courts have applied marijuana prohibitions to tiny amounts of the 
substance). 
 206. KAPLAN, supra note 18, at 42. 
 207. See Zeese, supra note 18, at 254, 260–61 (describing strategies taken by 
the federal government to discover the growth of marijuana). 
 208. The reduction in police intrusions on privacy would not equate, however, 
with the number of marijuana arrests or citations that occurred before 
legalization. Professor John Kaplan once noted that the police “[v]ery 
often . . . discover marijuana possession with very little effort.” KAPLAN, supra 
note 18, at 364. He pointed out that “[o]ften young people, arrested or searched 
on other grounds, are found in possession of a marijuana cigarette.” Id. 
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Fourth Amendment doctrine.209 Although criminalization “does 
enlarge the area of permissible searches,” the Fourth Amendment 
limits those searches by generally requiring that the police have 
an antecedent justification for any given intrusion, and, in some 
cases, also judicial approval.210 The Amendment does not define 
what is permissible evidence and certainly does not define what is 
a crime.211 
To grant the defendants protection under the Fourth 
Amendment would also create a problematic precedent. If the 
Fourth Amendment supported a right to possess or use marijuana 
simply because marijuana criminalization produces many police 
invasions of privacy, other drug crimes, for example, might also 
seem invalid. Police searches for other drugs, including heroin, 
cocaine and amphetamines, can also produce substantial and 
especially intrusive invasions of privacy.212 Those other drugs are 
substantially more dangerous than marijuana,213 but that would 
have no relevance to the number and nature of the police 
intrusions to find them.214 As a logical matter, constitutional 
doctrine might also have to endorse the legalization of those other 
drugs.215 This point only confirms that the defendants are unlikely 
to prevail. 
                                                                                                     
 209. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (“The Fourth 
Amendment allows intrusions upon privacy under these circumstances, and there 
is no viable reason to distinguish intrusions to secure ‘mere evidence’ from 
intrusions to secure fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband.”). 
 210. Id. at 309. 
 211. See id. at 310 (describing how the Fourth Amendment does not 
distinguish between intrusions to obtain “mere evidence” versus intrusions to 
obtain contraband). 
 212. These drugs share many characteristics of marijuana that make the 
number and nature of police invasions of privacy to discover them especially 
intrusive. See supra notes 205–207 and accompanying text (discussing the 
characteristics of marijuana). 
 213. See CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, supra note 15, at 59 
(discussing the risks of driving under the influence of marijuana compared to 
alcohol). 
 214. See supra notes 200–207 and accompanying text (“[A]lthough our 
defendants could correctly assert that marijuana criminalization has increased 
the number and the intensity of privacy invasions by police, those facts imply no 
cognizable Fourth Amendment claim for legalization.”). 
 215. See supra note 179 and accompanying text (presenting the Fourth 
Amendment argument). 
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C. The Due Process Argument 
Our hypothetical defendants would probably also lose their 
due process argument, although this one would present their best 
chance of prevailing on a single-clause claim. The defendants 
would likely lose because possession or ingestion of marijuana for 
recreational purposes probably would not amount to a 
“fundamental right,” and, thus, would not trigger close scrutiny of 
the state’s purposes in criminalizing the behavior.216 On this view, 
states could criminalize as long as they had a “rational basis,”217 
and they could easily satisfy that standard. Marijuana use carries 
enough small risks of minor harm to the user and others to give 
states a rational reason to criminalize the activity.218 At the same 
time, the defendants would have their best chance of prevailing on 
the due process claim because the methodology for identifying a 
fundamental right involves substantial subjectivity,219 which 
leaves room for argument. 
The Supreme Court has construed the Due Process Clauses in 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to contain a “substantive” 
element that safeguards certain liberty interests against state 
infringement regardless of the process provided.220 The idea is that 
                                                                                                     
 216. See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN D. NOWAK, TREATISE ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15.7, at 807–21 (4th ed. 2007) (reviewing the Supreme 
Court’s fundamental substantive due process right jurisprudence and its use of 
strict scrutiny). 
 217. See, e.g., Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 176–77 (1978) (finding 
that international travel, as distinguished from inter-state travel, was not a 
fundamental right, so that only a rational-basis test applied). 
 218. See infra note 480 and accompanying text (reviewing risks of marijuana 
use). 
 219. See 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 216, § 15.7, at 808–09 (“Despite 
claims to the contrary, there has never been a period of time wherein the Court 
did not actively enforce values which a majority of the Justices felt were essential 
in our society even though they had no specific textual basis in the Constitution.”); 
see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
§ 10.1.2, at 829 (5th ed. 2015) (noting that, even under a test that looks to history 
and tradition, the Court can manipulate the level of abstraction at which it states 
the asserted right to make it either consistent with or unsupported by history and 
tradition). 
 220. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) 
(“Respondents’ . . . claim relies upon our line of cases which interprets the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments’ guarantee of ‘due process of law’ to include a 
substantive component, which forbids the government to infringe certain 
‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided . . . .”); 
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some liberties are so important “as to be ranked as fundamental,” 
and consequently cannot be denied, unless the infringement is 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest,221 an often 
(although not always)222 impossible standard for a state to 
satisfy.223 The rights that are fundamental for this purpose are not 
co-extensive with those specifically enumerated in the Bill of 
Rights.224 The Court has determined that some enumerated rights 
are not fundamental, such as the right to indictment by a grand 
jury,225 and that some unenumerated rights are fundamental, such 
                                                                                                     
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (reviewing substantive 
due process). 
 221. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), abrogated in part by 
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 222. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38–39 (1905) 
(upholding state law that required vaccinations because of the government’s 
compelling interest in deterring the spread of contagious diseases). 
 223. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 219, § 10.1.2, at 831 (noting that “the 
government has the burden of persuading the Court that a truly vital interest is 
served” and that “it could not attain the goal through any means less restrictive 
of the right”). 
 224. See id. § 10.1.1, at 826 (“Almost all of these [fundamental] rights are not 
mentioned in the text of the Constitution.”). 
 225. Enumerated rights in the first eight amendments that are not deemed 
“fundamental” are not part of due process and, for that reason, do not apply 
against the states. See id. § 6.3.3, at 525–29 (describing incorporation and listing 
the incorporated rights, including provisions of the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, and Eighth Amendments). As for enumerated but unincorporated rights, 
the Court has never overruled its conclusion that the Fifth Amendment right to 
indictment by a grand jury does not bind the states. See Hurtado v. California, 
110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (“[W]e are unable to say that the substitution for a 
presentment or indictment by a grand jury . . . is not due process of law.”), 
limitation of holding recognized by Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994) 
(“Hurtado held that the Due Process Clause did not make applicable to the States 
the Fifth Amendment’s requirement that all prosecutions for an infamous crime 
be instituted by the indictment of a grand jury.”). Also, while concluding that the 
Sixth Amendment demands unanimous jury verdicts in federal criminal trials, 
the Court has not incorporated this right against the states. See Johnson v. 
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 366, 370–75 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (finding that while 
history demands unanimity among the jury in federal trials, incorporation of the 
Sixth Amendment does not require unanimity among state juries). Some of the 
provisions included in the first eight Amendments also remain unincorporated 
through lack of decision, particularly the Third Amendment protections against 
the quartering of soldiers and the Eighth Amendment prohibition on excessive 
fines. See McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 765 n.13 (2010) (“We have never 
decided whether the Third Amendment or the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
of excessive fines applies to the States through the Due Process Clause.”). The 
Ninth and Tenth Amendments also have not been incorporated against the states, 
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as the right of a woman to choose to terminate her pregnancy prior 
to viability of the fetus on its own outside the womb.226 
In identifying unenumerated rights that rank as fundamental, 
the Court’s modern approach, under Washington v. Glucksberg,227 
has generally reflected great self-restraint, limiting recognition to 
those rights “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition.”228 This approach reflects an effort to avoid repeating the 
sins of the Lochner era, in which the Court used substantive due 
process to implement its vision of economic liberty.229 To further 
the self-restraint,230 the Court also has generally emphasized the 
                                                                                                     
apparently on the view that they only reaffirm that the federal government is one 
of enumerated powers and reserve to the states any authority not given by the 
Constitution to the federal government or denied by it to the states, and, thus, 
could not plausibly limit the states. See 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 216, 
§ 14.2, at 658 (“Under their own terms the Ninth and Tenth Amendments seem 
inapplicable to the states.”). The Court has long hinted that it does not 
contemplate incorporation for these two Amendments. See, e.g., Twining v. New 
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908) (restricting commentary on the possibilities for 
incorporation to the rights protected by “the first eight Amendments”), overruled 
in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); see also McDonald, 561 U.S. at 765 
n.13 (omitting mention of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as among those 
unincorporated through lack of decision, suggesting a view that they could not 
plausibly apply against the states). 
 226. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (“[F]reedom of personal choice 
in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . . That right necessarily 
includes the right of a woman to decide whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy.”). 
 227. 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). 
 228. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (“Under these 
circumstances, we cannot categorically state that pretrial detention ‘offends some 
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to 
be ranked as fundamental.’” (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 
(1934))). 
 229. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) (“There is no 
reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person or the right of free 
contract, by the determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker.”), 
abrogated by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); see also 2 
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 216, § 14.6, at 673 (“The Supreme Court used the 
substantive due process test to control a wide variety of legislation during the 
period from 1885 to 1937.”). 
 230. The Court has also less formally articulated a third aspect of restraint, 
which is that it is more likely to recognize a negative fundamental right (the right 
to be free from governmental restraint) than a positive fundamental right (the 
right to a government benefit). See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (“The [Due Process] Clause is phrased as a 
limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels 
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need to provide a “careful description of the asserted right”—
meaning a description at a very specific level of abstraction—so as 
generally not to “break new ground in this field.”231 Thus, for 
example, in a suit challenging the detention of immigrant juveniles 
pending deportation hearings, the Court carefully described (and 
rejected as not fundamental) the asserted right as not a “freedom 
from physical restraint” but rather “the right of a child who has no 
available parent, close relative, or legal guardian, and for whom 
the government is responsible, to be placed in the custody of a 
willing-and-able private custodian rather than of a 
government-operated or government selected child-care 
institution.”232 
Despite this general approach involving “utmost care”233 to 
show restraint, the Court will sometimes identify a new 
fundamental right. The notion that there is room for exceptions is 
embodied in the assertion that the responsibility to identify 
unenumerated rights “has not been reduced to any formula.”234 
This idea takes precedence when the Court decides not to allow 
“the past alone to rule the present.”235 
While the Court’s approach to recognizing unenumerated 
rights is easily manipulated to produce desired outcomes,236 the 
recreational use of marijuana is somewhat different from the vast 
majority of activities that the modern Court has protected with the 
label, “fundamental.” Our defendants’ asserted right could be 
described broadly as one of personal autonomy, or bodily 
integrity,237 but there is a good chance that a court would instead 
                                                                                                     
of safety and security.”); see also Yoshino, supra note 51, at 159–62 (discussing 
this third, less formal aspect of the Glucksberg strictures). However, the right to 
be free from the criminalization of marijuana-related activities is a negative right, 
which means this point would not pose a problem for the defendants. 
 231. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992). 
 232. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). 
 233. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). 
 234. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 235. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015). 
 236. See supra note 219 and accompanying text (describing how abstraction 
and subjectivity can be used to manipulate a due process inquiry). 
 237. See, e.g., Matthew J. Routh, Re-Thinking Liberty: Cannabis Prohibition 
and Substantive Due Process, 26 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 145 (2017) (arguing 
that “cannabis’ classification and prohibition as a Schedule I narcotic” in the 
federal Controlled Substances Act “violates an individual’s fundamental right to 
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describe it “carefully”238 as something like “the right to publically 
possess and privately ingest marijuana to enjoy the benefits and 
pleasure of its effects.” When described this way, the activity 
appears self-indulgent. Use of marijuana is increasingly 
understood to bring substantial enjoyment, even benefit, to a huge 
proportion of the population. Indeed, shortly before any state 
legalized recreational use, almost thirty million Americans 
reported consuming marijuana in the previous year.239 
Nonetheless, the activities the Court has protected as 
unenumerated, fundamental rights generally have involved an 
avoidance of a serious burden—such as restrictions on the right to 
travel or migrate throughout the country240—or a liberty that also 
involves an assumption of responsibility: the right to contract,241 
the right to engage in the common occupations of life,242 the right 
to marry,243 the right to procreate,244 the right to custody of one’s 
children,245 or the right to control the upbringing of one’s 
                                                                                                     
bodily integrity”). 
 238. See supra notes 231–232 and accompanying text (providing an example 
of the specificity approach). 
 239. See CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, supra note 15, at 19 
(writing first in 2012, “[t]he 33 million Americans who report use in the past year 
far outnumber the users of all the other illicit substances combined”). 
 240. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966) (“The 
constitutional right to travel from one State to another, and necessarily to use the 
highways and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce in doing so, 
occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right 
that has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized.”); Crandall v. 
Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 43–44 (1867) (codifying the fundamental right to move about 
the country). 
 241. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (identifying the right to 
contract, among others, as a fundamental right). 
 242. See id. (noting that “the right of the individual . . . to engage in any of 
the common occupations of life” is protected under due process). 
 243. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95–96 (1987) (recognizing the 
right even of a prison inmate to marry, although allowing the government to 
infringe the right if the action is reasonably related to legitimate penological 
interest); see also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380–81 (1971) (recognizing 
the right of indigent persons to fee waiver in judicial action to secure divorce). 
 244. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536–37, 541 (1942) (declaring 
invalid a state statute that allowed judicially ordered sterilization of persons 
convicted of two or more crimes of “moral turpitude”). 
 245. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982) (rearticulating the 
basic right to “the companionship, care, custody, and management of [one’s] 
children”). 
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children.246 When considered against these kinds of activities, the 
claim of our hypothetical defendants seems less convincing. 
Their claim might carry more force if it focused on medical 
marijuana use to relieve debilitating pain or symptoms.247 When 
presented with such a case in 2007, after eleven states had 
legalized medical marijuana, the Ninth Circuit rejected even 
medical use as a fundamental right, but acknowledged that, as 
more states followed California’a path, the outcome could 
change.248 The Ninth Circuit was stark in its conclusion: “[F]ederal 
law does not recognize a fundamental right to use medical 
marijuana prescribed by a licensed physician to alleviate 
excruciating pain and human suffering.”249 The Supreme Court 
could easily adopt a different view on that issue now that more 
states have legalized.250 As we have seen, marijuana has a long, 
although interrupted, history of legalized medical use,251 and, 
when consumed to relieve “excruciating pain and suffering,” it 
becomes fundamentally important to one’s well-being.252 
                                                                                                     
 246. See Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 
268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (identifying “liberty of parents and guardians to 
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”); Meyer, 262 
U.S. at 399 (stating a right to “establish a home and bring up children”). 
 247. For an example of such a case, see Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850 (9th 
Cir. 2007). There, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that Raich’s use of marijuana 
to treat the effects of numerous medical conditions was potentially necessary not 
only to avoid intolerable suffering but to stay alive. See id. at 855 
(“Marijuana . . . has proven to be of great medical value for Raich.”). One can 
reasonably question whether recreation is any less important than treatment of 
a medical condition or whether we can properly distinguish between recreational 
or medical use of marijuana. See MIKOS, supra note 1, at 212–13 (noting relevant 
commentary on the problems and asking those questions). 
 248. See id. at 865–66 (“We agree . . . medical and conventional wisdom that 
recognizes the use of marijuana for medical purposes is gaining traction in the 
law. . . . But that legal recognition has not yet reached the point where . . . the 
right to use medical marijuana is ‘fundamental’ and ‘implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.’”). 
 249. Id. at 866. 
 250. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (providing modern evidence 
for the benefits of marijuana use that could support the recognition of a 
fundamental right). 
 251. See supra Part I.A (reviewing marijuana’s history in the United States). 
 252. See Raich, 500 F.3d at 855 (“Raich has been using marijuana as a 
medication for nearly eight years, every two waking hours of every day. Dr. 
Lucido states that, for Raich, foregoing marijuana treatment may be fatal. As the 
district court put it, ‘[t]raditional medicine has utterly failed [Raich].’” (citation 
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Nonetheless, the vast majority of marijuana consumers are 
recreational,253 like our hypothetical defendants, and the 
conclusion that the Due Process Clauses should protect that kind 
of use, even on a limited basis, is not as clear. 
To confer a protected liberty interest on the defendants under 
the Due Process Clauses would also set down a troubling 
precedent. Avoiding any semblance of re-Lochnerizing the due 
process inquiry is a serious concern for the Court.254 Yet, if the Due 
Process Clauses supported a right to possess or use marijuana 
because its use provides substantial pleasure, history and 
tradition would have to be ignored. Recreational marijuana use 
may have been legal before the turn of the twentieth century, but 
so was use of much more dangerous drugs, like heroin and cocaine, 
and all of those activities have now been federal crimes for many 
decades.255 A court could try to draw various distinctions to limit 
the precedential effect of a ruling that marijuana use is a 
fundamental right. The court could emphasize, for example, the 
lesser dangerousness of marijuana, the growing trend among 
states to legalize its use, and the non-criminalization of other 
drugs that are at least as dangerous, particularly alcohol and 
tobacco. However, those kinds of distinctions have little to do with 
history and tradition. Consequently, such a ruling could rightfully 
be seen as significantly redefining the measure of what constitutes 
a fundamental right. 
 
                                                                                                     
omitted)). 
 253. See supra note 239 and accompanying text (outlining prevalence and 
recreational benefits of marijuana); CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, 
supra note 15, at 19 (“20 million Americans say they’ve used marijuana in the 
past month . . . About 7 million of those 20 million report using marijuana daily 
or near daily, and more than 4 million meet the clinical criteria for marijuana 
abuse or dependence.”). 
 254. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (“[W]e decline the 
invitation [to follow Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), as the standard for 
interpreting the Due Process Clauses] . . . . We do not sit as a super-legislature to 
determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, 
business affairs, or social conditions.”). 
 255. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (recounting drug history in the 
United States). 
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D. The Equal Protection Argument 
The defendants would surely lose their equal protection 
argument if they lost their due process argument, because using 
marijuana would not be a fundamental right and, further, 
criminalizing marijuana activity involves no discrimination based 
on a suspect classification or improper purpose.256 Defendants 
might try to claim that the original criminalization of marijuana 
in the early twentieth century was based on improper 
discrimination, and, thus, that continuing criminalization should 
be judged as improper. They might also try to claim that the 
criminalization of marijuana use is irrationally discriminatory 
when more dangerous drugs, particularly alcohol and tobacco, are 
not criminalized. However, neither argument as the basis for a 
constitutional right to possess or use marijuana would likely 
persuade. 
The Equal Protection Clause directs that persons in an equal 
position should be treated equally.257 The command depends on 
some external substantive standard that defines who is equal to 
determine its operational value.258 In this sense, it is like a 
command to treat people “fairly” or “justly;” it has little, if any, 
meaning until the meaning is added.259 The Supreme Court has 
tried to give the command some content through a few basic rules 
that call for levels of heightened scrutiny of government action 
rather than “rational basis” review.260 The first rule tracks an idea 
that the Court also uses to try to give meaning to the Due Process 
                                                                                                     
 256. See infra notes 261–266 and accompanying text (listing the key aspects 
of an equal protection claim). 
 257. See Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (“The Equal Protection Clause 
directs that ‘all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’”). 
 258. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 
543–47 (1982) (discussing the difficulty of defining equality); Bork, supra note 33, 
at 11 (noting that “[t]he bare concept of equality provides no guide for courts” but 
that “because of its historical origins,” the Equal Protection Clause “does require 
that government not discriminate along racial lines”). 
 259. See Westen, supra note 258, at 547 (noting that once the external 
standard is determined, the equality idea is “superfluous,” because the external 
standard tells us all that we need to know about how to treat people). 
 260. See 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 216, § 18.3(a)(ii)–(iv), at 306–14 
(outlining the three standards of review: rational-basis, strict scrutiny, and 
intermediate scrutiny); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 219, § 9.1.2, at 697–98 (noting 
that different classifications result in different standards of review). 
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Clause—that government cannot impinge on certain persons’ (or 
in a due process claim, everyone’s) exercise of a “fundamental 
right” unless the discriminatory infringement is narrowly tailored 
to serve a compelling state interest.261 The second focuses on 
certain classifications of persons that the Court has identified as 
suspect or the existence of a discriminatory purpose against such 
a group. These include race,262 national origin,263 alienage,264 
non-marital child status,265 and gender.266 Under this second 
category of decisions, government discrimination against those 
groups, either on the face of the law or through a law’s 
discriminatory purpose and impact, will be subjected to either 
strict or intermediate scrutiny.267 The practical import of these 
doctrines is that where there is government action that interferes 
with a fundamental right or discriminates based on a suspect 
classification, the action will often be unconstitutional, while other 
government sponsored discrimination is more likely to be upheld. 
Having concluded that possession or use of recreational 
marijuana is unlikely to constitute a fundamental right under the 
Due Process Clauses,268 the same conclusion would apply for 
                                                                                                     
 261. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (state statute 
that allowed judicially ordered sterilization of persons convicted of two or more 
crimes of “moral turpitude” held to violate Equal Protection Clause). 
 262. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273–74 (1986) 
(applying strict scrutiny test to racial classifications). 
 263. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (explaining that 
classifications based on national origin are subject to strict scrutiny). 
 264. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (noting that strict 
scrutiny applies to alienage classifications). 
 265. See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461 (finding intermediate scrutiny applies to 
discriminations against non-marital children). 
 266. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (finding that, with respect 
to gender, “classifications must serve important governmental objectives and 
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives”). 
 267. Strict scrutiny will require the government to prove that the 
discrimination is necessary to achieve a compelling governmental purpose that it 
cannot achieve through a less discriminatory manner. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 
U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (“[T]hey must be justified by a compelling governmental 
interest and must be ‘necessary . . . to the accomplishment’ of their legitimate 
purpose.”). Intermediate scrutiny will require the government to prove that the 
discrimination is substantially related to an important governmental objective. 
See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (articulating the intermediate scrutiny standard). 
 268. See supra Part II.C (reviewing the outcome of a potential Due Process 
claim). 
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purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court has 
not differentiated in its determination of what is a fundamental 
right under one clause versus the other.269 Because we have 
determined that there probably is no fundamental right involved, 
the rational basis test would apply. As we saw in the due process 
context, the criminalization of even minor marijuana would meet 
the rational-basis standard.270 
Our defendants would also lose their equal protection 
argument that marijuana criminalization involves a suspect 
classification or an improper purpose to discriminate. Crimes 
against marijuana use or possession involve no facially suspect 
classification, because they apply to all persons. Our defendants 
could try to argue that marijuana laws originated in the early 
1900s based on an improper purpose to discriminate against 
Hispanics and Blacks. However, such arguments would likely not 
persuade courts in the modern era, because marijuana usage is 
widespread among the races and the defendants probably could not 
establish a governmental purpose to discriminate against a 
protected group through the enforcement of the marijuana laws 
today.271 In an equal protection claim against the federal 
marijuana crimes, the challenger would also be hard-pressed to 
persuade that Congress had a discriminatory purpose at the time 
that marijuana was re-criminalized in the 1970 Controlled 
Substances Act. 
                                                                                                     
 269. See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461 (“[C]lassifications affecting fundamental 
rights . . . are given the most exacting scrutiny.”); supra notes 227–235 and 
accompanying text (describing how the Court identifies fundamental rights ). 
 270. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (describing the legitimate 
interest states might invoke to satisfy rational-basis). 
 271. Evidence exists, however, that marijuana laws are enforced in ways that 
produce racially disparate outcomes. See Smoking Marijuana While Black, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/17/opinion/smoking-mari 
juana-while-black.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2018) (discussing recent study 
showing that, while “African-Americans and Latinos make up about half of the 
population” of New York City, “they make up about 85 percent of those arrested 
for low-level marijuana offenses”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Justine McDaniel, Black Adults 8 Times as Likely to be Arrested for Pot 
in Pa. as Whites, Study Shows, PHILA. INQUIRER, http://www.philly.com/ 
philly/business/cannabis/black-adults-8-times-as-likely-to-be-arrested-for-pot-in-
pa-as-whites-study-shows-20171016.html (last updated Oct. 16, 2017) (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2018) (showing racially disparate arrest records for marijuana use 
in 2016, despite marijuana use being equal among races) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Our defendants also would not likely prevail on a claim that 
marijuana crimes discriminate unconstitutionally against them 
because alcohol and tobacco are legal.272 As we have noted, alcohol 
and tobacco use are more dangerous in various ways than 
marijuana use.273 The problem for the defendants is that this kind 
of differing treatment by government of marijuana users versus 
alcohol and tobacco users would only invoke rational-basis review. 
Moreover, the governmental rationale for criminalizing marijuana 
to avoid the dangers from its use would suffice to meet 
rational-basis review even if this action implies that government 
should also have concerns about the dangers of other legal 
substances. The government need not attempt to solve all similar 
problems in order to act rationally in trying to solve one of them.274 
Claims by our defendants about unfair discrimination 
between marijuana use versus alcohol and tobacco use would also 
seem double-edged. If marijuana laws were held to violate equal 
protection, crimes like polygamy, prostitution and bestiality would 
also seem infirm. Those crimes also involve little risk of serious 
harm to the participants or others. Unless those crimes are also to 
fall, our defendants are unlikely to prevail. 
IV. Aggregating Rights-Based Clauses 
While no single clause could readily justify a constitutional 
right to possess and use recreational marijuana even when a 
super-majority of states have legalized it, proponents might 
                                                                                                     
 272. Professor John Kaplan expressed the policy argument for consistency in 
the treatment of marijuana and alcohol by noting the reduced respect for law that 
arises when marijuana is criminalized and alcohol is not. See KAPLAN, supra note 
18, at 291 (“For a criminal law to be effective, it must . . . have a solid moral 
base . . . . The problem with the argument that marijuana, though no worse than 
alcohol, should nonetheless be made illegal, is that it abandons an appeal to 
morality or to reason . . . .”). 
 273. See supra notes 22, 213 and accompanying text (presenting findings 
showing that marijuana use is less risky than other forms of drug use). 
 274. See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 512 (Alaska 1975) (“Assuming some 
degree of control of marijuana use is permissible, it does not follow that the 
political obstacles to placing controls on alcohol and tobacco should render the 
legislature unable to regulate other substances equally or less harmful.”); cf. 
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (asserting that government 
can choose to move forward “one step at a time”). 
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contend that aggregated clauses together would provide support. I 
take a skeptical view, which begins in this Part with a critical 
exploration of the basic validity of rights-based clause aggregation. 
I acknowledge that there are Supreme Court cases that suggest 
that sometimes two or more clauses can substantiate a right that 
none of the clauses alone could validate.275 However, I hypothesize 
that clause aggregation has not actually mattered in the Court’s 
recognition of new rights under the Constitution. I also 
hypothesize that clause aggregation (if it really matters) is such an 
uncommon and unprincipled approach for rationalizing new 
constitutional rights that we should view it as unimportant. 
However, on both points I concede failure. One cannot disprove 
that clause aggregation sometimes has carried influence in judicial 
decision-making and that it has mattered often enough to suggest 
some patterns in which its application might help justify new 
constitutional rights in the future. 
A. Supreme Court Endorsements 
There is ostensible support in Supreme Court opinions for the 
notion that two or more rights-based clauses in the Constitution 
can come together to invalidate government action that none of the 
clauses could disallow on their own. The Court typically has 
declined to recognize multiple-clause rights,276 apparently taking 
                                                                                                     
 275. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015) (asserting 
that the Court’s cases regarding the right to marry reflect a “synergy” between 
“the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause”); Halbert v. Michigan, 
545 U.S. 605, 610 (2005) (asserting that the Court’s decisions regarding access to 
appeal by criminal defendants reflect “both equal protection and due process 
concerns”). 
 276. See Coenen, supra note 28, at 1067 (noting that “the Supreme Court 
typically addresses each of the relevant clauses in separate and sequential 
fashion, taking care not to let its analysis of one clause affect its analysis of any 
other”); Porat & Posner, supra note 27, at 51 (asserting that “outside these 
[aforementioned] settings [of rights-based clause aggregation,], courts rarely 
respond sympathetically to hybrid claims”); David L. Faigman, Madisonian 
Balancing: A Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 661 
(1994) (explaining that typical constitutional rights adjudication involves “an 
individual balancing of each right against the interests that justify the 
government action”). But see Abrams & Garrett, supra note 43, at 1 (asserting, 
based in part on the existence of tacit clause aggregation, that “[c]umulative 
constitutional rights are everywhere”). 
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the view in such cases that a failing argument under one clause 
counts for zero and that adding one zero to another will not 
increase the sum.277 But, the Court occasionally has seemingly 
endorsed the approach by using two or more constitutional 
provisions together to support the existence of a right or by 
claiming that in past decisions this is what was really going on.278 
This kind of clause aggregation to create a new right should be 
distinguished from certain forms of aggregation that are 
undoubtedly permissible and not at issue here. First, courts 
automatically apply against the states’ rights that come from 
certain “incorporated” clauses applicable against the federal 
government by using the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.279 In such cases, the right already theoretically exists 
in relation to the federal government,280 and, rather than being 
created by the “joint interpretation”281 of two clauses, is merely 
being applied in exactly the same way against the states.282 
Second, courts can cumulate the harm to a litigant and thereby 
grant relief based on a series of constitutional errors that 
individually would be harmless.283 This action involves adding 
                                                                                                     
 277. For examples of such cases, see infra notes 410–413 and accompanying 
text (collecting cases). 
 278. See infra Parts III.A.1–10 (reviewing aggregation with respect to various 
rights). 
 279. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010) 
(incorporating the Second Amendment against the states). 
 280. “Reverse incorporation” also amounts to a form of clause aggregation in 
which there is no “joint interpretation” going on, which is dissimilar from the kind 
of clause aggregation at issue here. Under reverse incorporation, the Court 
applies the mandate of equal protection, explicitly applicable against the states 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, against the federal government through the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 
498–500 (1954) (“We hold that racial segregation in the public schools of the 
District of Columbia is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution.”). 
 281. Abrams & Garrett, supra note 43, at 9. 
 282. The Court articulated this same-standards approach beginning in the 
1960s. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964) (declaring that incorporated 
Bill of Rights provisions “are all to be enforced against the States under the 
Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that protect those 
personal rights against federal encroachment”). In recent years, the Court has 
continued to endorse this approach. See, e.g., McDonald, 561 U.S. at 788 
(asserting that a “two-track alternative is now impractical”). 
 283. See, e.g., Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 488 n.15 (1978) (finding that 
the “cumulative” harm from combination of constitutional errors warranted 
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harms from conceded errors, not creating a new right by combining 
two clauses. Third, where a certain level of harm is necessary to 
establish a constitutional violation,284 courts can cumulate the 
harms to a litigant from a series of acts to establish a cognizable 
violation.285 This approach also involves adding harms rather than 
combining clauses to establish the right and its infringement.286 In 
contrast to those kind of aggregations, we are focused on whether 
“partial violations of multiple provisions”287 can establish a right 
that would not otherwise exist. While a more controversial idea, 
                                                                                                     
reversal of conviction under “the due process guarantee of fundamental fairness” 
although none would individually warrant reversal). 
 284. Examples include violations of the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 682 (1984) 
(finding that “the defendant must show that counsel’s errors ‘resulted in actual 
and substantial disadvantage to the course of his defense’” to establish a 
constitutional violation), violations of the due process right to have the 
prosecution disclose material exculpatory evidence, see Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence 
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is 
material either to guilt or punishment”), and violations of the Eighth Amendment 
right against prison conditions amounting to cruel and unusual punishment, see 
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303–05 (1991) (finding that state officials engage 
in cruel and unusual punishment if they act with “deliberate indifference” 
regarding conditions that deprive a prisoner of an “identifiable human need, such 
as food, warmth, or exercise”); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) 
(describing impermissible conditions that expose a prisoner to “an unreasonable 
risk of serious damage to his future health”). 
 285. See Abrams & Garrett, supra note 43, at 8 (noting that “[t]he aggregation 
of incidents of conduct when litigating Strickland claims has not been 
controversial” but rather “has been understood as reflective of the cumulative 
nature of ineffective lawyering at various stages of a criminal case”); Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437–38 (1995) (determining “materiality” of prosecution’s 
failure to disclose exculpatory evidence by considering “the cumulative effect of 
suppression”); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304 (noting that “conditions of confinement 
may establish an Eighth Amendment violation ‘in combination’ when each would 
not do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces 
the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need”). 
 286. While permissible and sensible, lower courts often have not aggregated 
harms, particularly where they are of different types. For the view that courts 
should aggregate the prejudice from all errors affecting reliability, see John H. 
Blume & Christopher Seeds, Reliability Matters: Reassociating Bagley 
Materiality, Strickland Prejudice, and Cumulative Harmless Error, 95 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 1153, 1154 (2005) (noting that violations “are generally divided” 
and proposing “that courts should consider the impact of . . . violations together”). 
 287. Abrams & Garrett, supra note 43, at 14. 
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the Court arguably has sometimes endorsed such hybrid or 
multiple-clause rights.288  
1. Avoiding Compulsory Production of Private Papers 
An early example of arguable clause aggregation by the 
Supreme Court occurred in Boyd v. United States, a case 
previously noted in connection with the Fourth Amendment.289 As 
we saw, in Boyd, the Court found unconstitutional a judicial order, 
issued in conformance with a statute, directing Boyd to produce 
records in a proceeding for forfeiture of merchandise allegedly 
                                                                                                     
 288. To avoid unduly cluttering the text in this section, I mention here a few 
more examples of arguable clause aggregation by the Supreme Court. The first 
concerns ballot access. As Professor Michael Coenen notes: “The Court has struck 
down . . . various ballot access restrictions as running afoul of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, citing to both free association interests and equality 
interests as warranting a more robust set of limits on state laws that burden a 
candidate’s ability to run.” Coenen, supra note 28, at 1080. 
Another example concerns the right to travel or migrate between the states. 
Beginning with Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999), the Court has grounded this 
right “primarily on the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.” Coenen, supra note 28, at 1081 n.44. However, as Professor 
Stephen Kanter has noted, the source of this right is “one of the better examples 
of a composite/hybrid right that clearly reflects a Super-Penumbral or Whole is 
Greater than the Sum of Its Parts approach.” Stephen Kanter, The Griswold 
Diagrams: Toward a Unified Theory of Constitutional Rights, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 
623, 639 (2006). Professor Kanter explains that “[t]he elements of this right come 
from many sources,” including “the penumbral Dormant Commerce Clause, the 
Commerce Clause itself . . . the First Amendment right to ‘petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances[,] Equal Protection, the Citizenship 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, together with the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, § 2, or with the Fourteenth Amendment 
Privileges or Immunities Clause.” Id. (footnotes omitted). 
Various other arguable instances of tacit clause aggregation exist. For example, 
Professors Kerry Abrams and Brandon Garrett contend that the right to effective 
assistance of counsel, recognized in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668 (1984), 
is grounded in both the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the Due Process 
Clause. See Abrams & Garrett, supra note 43, at 31 
(“[T]he . . . claim . . . vindicates both Sixth Amendment right to counsel and 
Fourteenth Amendment due process concerns.”). They note that the Sixth 
Amendment text does not guarantee an “effective” lawyer and argue that this 
aspect of the right is grounded in due process. See id. (“Th[e] right to effective 
assistance of counsel . . . itself goes further than the Sixth Amendment 
text . . . . This is therefore also an example of an intersectional claim . . . .”). 
 289. See supra notes 183–190 and accompanying text (discussing Boyd). 
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imported without payment of duties.290 The Court arguably relied 
on a combination of the Fourth Amendment and the privilege 
against compelled self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment. 
Justice Bradley, for the majority, asserted that at least regarding 
a compulsory production of a person’s “private papers to be used as 
evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods,” the 
“[F]ourth and [F]ifth [A]mendments run almost into each other.”291 
Bradley identified “the intimate relation between the two 
amendments” and concluded that “[t]hey throw great light on each 
other.”292 He asserted that unreasonable searches and seizures 
“are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to 
give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is 
condemned in the [F]ifth [A]mendment” and that the prohibition 
on compelling one to be a witness against himself in a criminal case 
“throws light on the question as to what is an ‘unreasonable search 
and seizure’ within the meaning of the [F]ourth [A]mendment.”293 
The Court’s ruling in Boyd’s favor could be understood as declaring 
the existence of a hybrid protection that rested on the two clauses 
together.294 
2. Avoiding Flag Salutes and Pledges of Allegiance 
Another more modern but still early example of arguable 
clause aggregation occurred in West Virginia State Board of 
                                                                                                     
 290. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626–30 (1886) (reviewing legal 
canon to find that forcing one to forfeit “his private papers . . . is 
within . . . condemnation”), abrogated by Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 
387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
 291. Id. at 630. 
 292. Id. at 633. 
 293. Id.  
 294. At one point, the Court said that the state’s actions violated each 
provision, but, given its preceding discussion, could have meant that each took its 
meaning from the other when applied to Boyd’s case, involving his private papers: 
[W]e are further of the opinion that a compulsory production of the 
private books and papers of the owner of goods sought to be forfeited 
in such a suit is compelling him to be a witness against himself, with 
the meaning of the [F]ifth [A]mendment to the [C]onstitution, and is 
the equivalent of a search and seizure—and an unreasonable search 
and seizure—within the meaning of the [F]ourth [A]mendment. 
Id. at 634–35.  
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Education v. Barnette.295 The case arose when two sisters were 
expelled from a West Virginia public school for refusing to salute 
the United States flag and to recite the pledge of allegiance.296 A 
Board of Education resolution, prompted by a recently-enacted 
state law aimed at fostering the “spirit of Americanism,” had made 
such a refusal grounds for expulsion, among other consequences.297 
The sisters were Jehovah’s Witnesses, and, believing the flag 
salute and pledge sinful, challenged the state’s actions as a “denial 
of religious freedom and freedom of speech.”298 They brought their 
claims under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.299 The Court ruled in the 
girls’ favor, declaring that a state cannot “prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or matters of opinion, or 
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”300 For 
the majority, Justice Jackson made clear that the protection was 
not limited to those with religious objections.301 The opinion gave 
prominence to the First Amendment,302 although it cited no 
particular clause as the basis for the ruling. Arguably, the support 
came from a combination of several provisions.303 Professor 
Laurence Tribe has described Barnette as resting “on no single 
                                                                                                     
 295. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 296. See id. at 630 (“Children . . . have been expelled from school and are 
threatened with exclusion for no other cause [than refusing to salute the flag for 
religious reasons].”). 
 297. Id. at 625–26. 
 298. Id. at 629–30. 
 299. See id. (“The Board . . . moved to dismiss the complaint . . . alleging that 
the law and regulations . . . are invalid under the ‘due process’ and ‘equal 
protection’ clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 300. Id. at 642. 
 301. See id. at 634 (“Nor does the issue as we see it turn on one’s possession 
of particular religious views or the sincerity with which they are held.”). 
 302. See id. at 642 (“We think the action of the local authorities in compelling 
the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power 
and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First 
Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.”). 
 303. The Court later described the decision as one of several that were 
“decided exclusively upon free speech grounds,” but that “also involved freedom 
of religion.” Emp’t Div., Dept. of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 
(1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1993), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507 (1997). 
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clause of the Bill of Rights but on the broader postulates of our 
constitutional order.”304 The ruling perhaps could be viewed as an 
example of tacit clause aggregation. 
3. Accessing Post-Trial Proceedings by Indigents 
Clause aggregation also arguably helped the Court to ensure 
access by indigent litigants to post-trial proceedings. Due process 
gives states great latitude on whether to provide for criminal 
appeals.305 At the same time, equal protection typically allows the 
government to impose financial requirements on litigants, since 
indigence is not a suspect classification.306 Nonetheless, in Griffin 
v. Illinois,307 the Court ruled that a state that provides for criminal 
appeals of right may not condition appeals by indigent defendants 
on their payment for trial transcripts.308 The rationale arguably 
rested on the combination of the Due Process Clause and the Equal 
Protection Clause: “[B]oth call for procedures in criminal trials 
which allow no invidious discriminations between persons and 
different groups of persons.”309 Likewise, in Douglas v. 
California,310 the Court found that a state may not require indigent 
criminal defendants to pay for their own counsel on appeals of 
right.311 In this case as well, the Court cited the ideals of both due 
process and equality in support of the right.312 In subsequent years, 
                                                                                                     
 304. Tribe, supra note 36, at 26. 
 305. See, e.g., McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 688–89 (1894) (finding that 
the Constitution does not require the opportunity to appeal a criminal conviction 
because “whether an appeal should be allowed . . . [is] for each state to determine 
for itself”). 
 306. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (“[P]overty, standing alone 
is not a suspect classification.”). 
 307. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
 308. See id. at 18 (finding that as Illinois provides for appeals, “at all stages 
of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses protect persons 
[who are indigent] from invidious discrimination”). 
 309. Id. at 17. 
 310. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
 311. See id. at 357–58 (finding that “[t]here is lacking that equality demanded 
by the Fourteenth Amendment where the rich man, who appeals as of right, 
enjoys the benefit of [counsel] . . . while the indigent . . . is forced to shift for 
himself”). 
 312. See id. at 356–58 (referencing both maxims). 
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the Court also looked back on those cases as ones in which due 
process and equal protection converged to provide the right.313 
4. Using Contraception 
Probably the most well-known example of explicit clause 
aggregation occurred in Griswold v. Connecticut, where the Court 
identified a right of married couples to use contraception.314 Justice 
Douglas, for the majority, eschewed reliance on the notion of 
substantive due process so as to avoid any suggestion of 
Lochnerizing.315 Instead, he found the right in the protection of 
“privacy surrounding the marriage relationship”316 created by 
“penumbras, formed by emanations”317 from the First Amendment, 
the Third Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth 
Amendment, and the Ninth Amendment.318 As for unmarried 
couples, the Court later extended the protection through the Equal 
Protection Clause.319 
                                                                                                     
 313. See, e.g., Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610 (2005) (asserting that 
the Court’s prior decisions regarding indigent access to appeals reflect “both equal 
protection and due process concerns”); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996) 
(“We observe . . . that the Court’s decisions concerning access to judicial 
processes, commencing with Griffin . . . reflect both equal protection and due 
process concerns.”); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983) (asserting that 
principles from the two clauses “converge” in the “analysis in these cases”); Ross 
v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608–09 (1974) (asserting that the rationale for Griffin 
and Douglas was clause aggregation, “some support being derived from the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and some from the Due Process 
Clause of that Amendment”). 
 314. See id. at 484–86 (finding that with respect to a martial couple’s privacy, 
“[s]uch a law [criminalizing contraception use] cannot stand”). 
 315. See id. at 481–82 (rejecting “the invitation” to use Due Process with 
Lochner as a guide). 
 316. Id. at 486. 
 317. Id. at 484. 
 318. See id. (listing sources giving rise to “zones of privacy”). 
 319. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454–55 (1972) (“We hold that by 
providing dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons who are 
similarly situated, [the laws criminalizing contraceptive distribution, except to 
married couples] violate the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
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5. Viewing Obscene Pornography Privately at Home 
In Stanley v. Georgia, the Court explicitly averred to clause 
aggregation in justifying a right to view obscene pornography 
privately at home.320 The Court had previously held, without 
qualification, that obscenity is not protected by the First 
Amendment.321 However, in Stanley, the Court created a narrow 
exception that built on two previously recognized fundamental 
rights, each purportedly also derived through clause 
aggregation.322 First, the Court asserted that “[i]t is now well 
established that” there is a “right to receive information and ideas” 
that is grounded on two clauses in the First Amendment: the 
freedom “of speech and press.”323 Likewise, the Court noted that 
“also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited 
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s 
privacy.”324 In support of this privacy right, the Court cited 
Griswold,325 which, as we have seen, relied itself on clause 
aggregation.326 The effect of the aggregation was both to support 
the new right and to narrowly limit its scope.327 
                                                                                                     
 320. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (“We hold that the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit making mere private possession of obscene 
material a crime.”); infra notes 323–327 and accompanying text (reviewing the 
Stanley application of clause aggregation). 
 321. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that 
“obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press”). 
 322. See infra notes 323–327 and accompanying text (explaining the Court’s 
methodology). 
 323. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564 (citing Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 
141, 143 (1943), among other cases). 
 324. Id. at 564. 
 325. See id. (referencing Griswold, among other cases). 
 326. See supra notes 314–319 and accompanying text (examining clause 
aggregation in Griswold). 
 327. The opinion was not always thoroughly transparent. In its statement of 
the holding at the end, the Court said that “the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments prohibit making mere private possession of obscene material a 
crime.” Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568. This was not entirely accurate, because the 
decision was actually based on multiple clauses both in the First Amendment and 
beyond. See supra notes 323–325 and accompanying text (detailing the actual 
grounds, based on clause aggregation). 
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6. Engaging in Intimate Associations 
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,328 “the Court derived a 
right of intimate association (such as noninterference in family 
life) from the right to association in the First Amendment and the 
right to due process in the Fourteenth Amendment.”329 The case 
involved a Minnesota statute that aimed to eliminate gender bias 
and that the Minnesota courts had applied to require a private, 
national organization with thousands of members to admit women 
to full membership.330 The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that 
the organization was not the sort that involved intimate 
association.331 However, in the process of recognizing the existence 
of such a right, the Court noted cases decided under the First 
Amendment and under the Due Process Clause that protected 
various aspects of family life.332 The Court seemed to view the right 
to intimate association as a hybrid-clause right.333 
7. Engaging in Expressive Associations 
The Court arguably combined clauses to recognize a right of 
“expressive association” in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.334 At 
issue was a New Jersey law that required the Boy Scouts to 
readmit Dale to adult membership after the group’s leadership 
                                                                                                     
 328. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 329. Porat & Posner, supra note 27, at 50–51 (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618–
19). 
 330. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612–16 (addressing a conflict between the 
State’s effort to eliminate gender-based discrimination and the freedom of 
association of members of a private organization). 
 331. See id. at 620–22 (concluding that the organization lacked the distinctive 
characteristics that might afford constitutional protection to the decision to 
exclude women). 
 332. See id. at 619 (“Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state 
interference therefore safeguards the ability independently to define one’s 
identity that is central to any concept of liberty.”). 
 333. See Marcum v. Catron, 70 F. Supp. 2d 728, 733–34 (E.D. Ky. 1999) 
(interpreting Roberts as having acknowledged intimate association as a “hybrid 
right”). 
 334. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (determining 
that the New Jersey Supreme Court’s interpretation of a New Jersey public 
accommodations law violated the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment right of 
expressive association). 
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dismissed him upon learning of his status as a gay person and of 
his gay-rights activism.335 The Supreme Court rejected the 
application of the New Jersey law to the Boy Scouts, concluding 
that the group was engaged in expressive association and that one 
of the group’s desires was not to condone homosexual conduct as a 
legitimate form of behavior.336 Readmitting Dale to membership 
would have unduly burdened the group’s expression of this view.337 
This right of expressive association338 “might be taken as a hybrid 
of the right to free speech and the right to association.”339 
8. Acting on Religious Beliefs Connected with Communicative 
Rights or Parenting Rights 
In several cases, the Court has invalidated even neutral, 
generally applicable laws based on the Free Exercise Clause in 
conjunction with another constitutional protection, such as the 
right of parents to direct the education of their children340 or the 
freedom of speech or of the press.341 For example, in Wisconsin v. 
                                                                                                     
 335. See id. at 644–45 (“New Jersey’s public accommodations statute 
prohibits, among other things, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
in places of public accommodation.”). 
 336. See id. at 648–53 (“Forcing a group to accept certain members may 
impair the ability of the group to express those views, and only those views, that 
it intends to express.”). 
 337. See id. at 661 (“[P]ublic or judicial disapproval of a tenant of an 
organization’s expression does not justify the State’s effort to compel the 
organization to accept members where such acceptance would derogate from the 
organization’s expressive message.”). 
 338. The Court had previously recognized the right of “expressive association” 
in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618, 622–23 (1984), involving a 
Minnesota statute that the state had interpreted to require the Jaycees to admit 
women to membership. In Roberts, the Court had found that the state statute as 
applied to the Jaycees narrowly served a compelling interest of the state and 
imposed little burden on the expressive freedom of the Jaycees’ members. Id. at 
623–29. 
 339. Porat & Posner, supra note 27, at 50. 
 340. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) 
(determining that legislation that required children to attend public schools 
unreasonably interfered with parental rights). 
 341. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304–07 (1940) (concluding 
that a state statute that forbids any person from soliciting money or valuables for 
any alleged religious cause is a previous restraint upon the free exercise of 
religion and a deprivation of liberty without due process of law in violation of the 
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Yoder,342 the Court invalidated compulsory school-attendance laws 
as applied to Amish parents who declined on religious grounds to 
send their children to public schools.343 The Barnette case, as we 
have already seen, also arguably relied on both free speech and the 
free exercise clauses, if not others as well, to invalidate a 
compulsory flag salute and pledge of allegiance law when 
challenged by religious objectors.344 In Employment Division v. 
Smith345 the Court looked back on those cases, “in denying requests 
for free exercise relief,” and “suggested that the Free Exercise 
Clause might elsewhere operate ‘in conjunction with other 
constitutional protections’ to impose a stronger set of limits than 
what any single clause would impose on its own.”346  
9. Engaging in Private Sexual Conduct 
The Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas,347 protecting the 
right of persons to engage in intimate sexual conduct, including 
with a person of the same sex, arguably reflected clause 
aggregation.348 A Texas statute made it a crime for two persons of 
the same sex to engage in “deviate sexual intercourse with another 
                                                                                                     
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 342. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 343. See id. at 233 (“[W]hen the interests of parenthood are combined with a 
free exercise claim . . . more than merely a ‘reasonable relation to some purpose 
within the competency of the State’ is required to sustain the validity of the 
State’s requirement under the First Amendment.”). 
 344. See supra notes 295–304 and accompanying text (arguing that West 
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) is an example 
of tacit clause aggregation). 
 345. 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990). 
 346. Coenen, supra note 28, at 1071. The Smith decision has been criticized 
for creating a “free exercise jurisprudence devoid of strict scrutiny except in 
‘hybrid situations’ where free exercise claims are joined by colorable claims 
arising under another part of the Constitution.” Ming Hsu Chen, Note, Two 
Wrongs Make a Right: Hybrid Claims of Discrimination, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 685, 
686 (2004); see also Coenen, supra note 28, at 1071–72 (noting that many 
commentators have criticized the decision for a variety of reasons, including its 
failure to explain how the combination analysis should function). 
 347. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 348. See id. (invalidating a Texas statute that made it a crime for two persons 
of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct). 
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individual of the same sex.”349 The Court, through Justice 
Kennedy, decided the case under the Due Process Clause to make 
clear that it was overruling Bowers v. Hardwick,350 a decision 
seventeen years earlier in which the Court upheld a Georgia 
statute that criminalized sodomy, whether committed with a 
person of the same or opposite sex.351 By deciding Lawrence on due 
process rather than equal protection grounds, the Court clarified 
that even a facially non-discriminatory statute, like the one at 
issue in Bowers, was no longer constitutional.352 Yet, the Lawrence 
opinion also noted the equal protection concerns involved and 
suggested that seeing the inequality at play helped the Court 
understand the importance of the liberty interest of all persons to 
engage in intimate sexual conduct.353 Justice Kennedy said, at one 
point: “Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand 
respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of 
liberty are linked in important respects,” and he emphasized that 
“a decision on the latter point advances both interests.”354 Because 
Justice Kennedy also did not assert a “fundamental right,” but 
nonetheless invalidated the Texas statute, he seemed to employ a 
non-traditional analysis that rested on the convergence of both 
                                                                                                     
 349. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (West 2003), invalidated by Lawrence, 
539 U.S. at 579. 
 350. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 351. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984) 
A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits 
to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth 
or anus of another . . . . 
A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by 
imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years . . . . 
 352. Professor Pamela Karlan had suggested this approach, based on the 
asserted “synergistic” relationship of the two clauses, the year before in an article 
published in the McGeorge Law Review, a journal associated with the law school 
where Justice Kennedy taught constitutional law before ascending to the 
Supreme Court. See Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the 
Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 473, 474, 485–87 
(2002) (“[S]ometimes looking at an issue stereoscopically—through the lenses of 
both the due process clause and the equal protection clause—can have synergistic 
effects, producing results that neither clause might reach by itself.”). 
 353. See Lawrence, 539 U.S at 575 (“If protected conduct is made criminal and 
the law which does so remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma 
might remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection 
reasons.”). 
 354. Id. 
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clauses. Indeed, the Court itself later looked back on Lawrence in 
those terms, asserting that the decision “drew upon principles of 
liberty and equality to define and protect the rights of gays and 
lesbians.”355 
10. Entering Into Same-Sex Marriage 
The constitutional right to enter into same-sex marriage also 
seems to rest on clause aggregation. In Obergefell v. Hodges, the 
Court invalidated statutes from several states that defined 
marriage as a union between one man and one woman and denied 
same-sex couples marriage licenses.356 In seriatim discussions, 
Justice Kennedy, for the Court, referred to both the Due Process 
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause as the bases for the 
ruling.357 Yet, he also asserted a relevant “synergy” between the 
two provisions.358 Purportedly, this synergy also helped explain 
several earlier marriage-right decisions359 and others, such as 
                                                                                                     
 355. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015). 
 356. See id. at 2593, 2608 (“These cases come from Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, 
and Tennessee, States that define marriage as a union between one man and one 
woman.”). 
 357. See id. at 2604 (“It is now clear that the challenged laws burden the 
liberty of same-sex couples, and it must be further acknowledged that they 
abridge central precepts of equality.”). 
 358. See id. at 2603 (“The synergy between the two protections is illustrated 
further in Zablocki.” (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978))). 
 359. The Court pointed, for example, to Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), 
in which it had struck down Virginia miscegenation statutes that criminally 
punished marriage between a white person and a non-white person. See 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603 (“In Loving the Court invalidated a prohibition on 
interracial marriage under both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process 
Clause.”). Despite the Court’s effort to portray Loving as reflecting this dynamic, 
the hybrid-clause nature of the ruling there was not as clear as in Obergefell. Id. 
In Loving, the Court had declared the Virginia statues to violate the Equal 
Protection Clause. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. The Court then concluded that the 
prohibition offended the Due Process Clause because it denied equality: “To deny 
this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications 
embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle 
of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the 
State’s citizens of liberty without due process of law.” Id. While this language 
suggested some inter-connectedness between the two clauses, the decision in 
Loving was easily justified under the Equal Protection Clause alone, particularly 
because the statutes were “designed to maintain White Supremacy.” Id. at 11. 
Under that clause, a “racially discriminatory purpose is always enough to subject 
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Lawrence. In Obergefell, as in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy shifted 
the focus to the word “liberty” in the Due Process Clause and 
contended that liberty was intertwined with equality.360 He 
asserted, for example: “Each concept—liberty and equal 
protection—leads to a stronger understanding of the other.”361 He 
did not explain the interconnectedness at length in theoretical 
terms. But, in practical terms, the importance of the combination 
for identifying new constitutional rights was two-fold. First, it 
arguably limited the precedential value of the ruling to cases 
involving a claim for equal dignity by a group of persons who, 
because of what Justice Kennedy described as an “immutable”362 
characteristic, were previously subordinated, although they were 
not necessarily within a “suspect classification” under equal 
protection doctrine.363 Second, that limitation, in turn, enabled the 
Court to avoid the “history and tradition” plus “careful delineation 
of the right” requirements364 for identifying a “fundamental 
right.”365 Because Justice Kennedy’s discussion under each of the 
clauses incorporated these departures from the Court’s traditional 
approaches, the ostensible influence of clause-aggregation was 
readily discernible.366 
B. Has Clause Aggregation Actually Mattered? 
Despite the ostensible support in Supreme Court cases for the 
notion of rights-based clause aggregation, one could plausibly 
                                                                                                     
a law to strict scrutiny.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 600 (2003) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241–42 (1976)). 
 360. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604 (explaining that the Court has, on 
multiple occasions, confirmed the relation between liberty and equality); 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (same). 
 361. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603. 
 362. Id. at 2596. 
 363. See Yoshino, supra note 51, at 174 (arguing that the antisubordination 
principle constrains the precedential effect). 
 364. See supra notes 227–231 and accompanying text (explaining the Court’s 
approach to identifying a non-enumerated right that ranks as fundamental). 
 365. See Yoshino, supra note 51, at 162–66 (arguing that restrictions based 
on tradition will be more difficult to invoke after Obergefell). 
 366. See id. at 162–66, 174–76 (explaining potential effects of the Obergefell 
decision). 
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question whether it has actually been outcome-determinative in 
the creation of new constitutional rights. I hypothesize in this 
section that it has not mattered—that the Court would have 
created the same new constitutional rights by using single clauses 
were clause aggregation deemed an inappropriate rhetorical 
technique. Yet, I ultimately concede failure in proving this 
hypothesis. While clause aggregation is under-theorized in the 
Court’s opinions as a constitutional force, one cannot disprove that 
it sometimes has influenced decisions to recognize new 
constitutional protections.  
1. The Hypothesis of Non-Influence 
There are reasons to doubt that rights-based clause 
aggregation has mattered in producing constitutional rights. First, 
one could nitpick with some of the examples, such as Boyd,367 
because it was later overruled,368 and Barnette, because the clause 
aggregation there was especially ambiguous.369 But, putting aside 
                                                                                                     
 367. See supra notes 183–190 and accompanying text (explaining that Boyd 
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), was an early case wherein the Court began 
to examine “the zone of constitutionally protected interests and the limits on 
investigative authority” (quoting Rosenthal, supra note 183, at 888)). 
 368. As we have seen, the Court later rejected the whole idea that the Fifth 
Amendment privilege ever combines with the Fourth Amendment to protect 
certain kinds of evidence from compulsory production or search and seizure in a 
greater way than those provisions would afford protection on their own. See supra 
notes 199–203 and accompanying text (explaining that the Court overturned 
Boyd in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1976)). 
 369. While Barnette could have been based on multiple provisions in the First 
Amendment and beyond, it also seems plausible that it merely reflected an 
interpretation of the Free Speech Clause. On that view, the Free Speech Clause 
would have to protect not only the right of persons to affirmatively express their 
views but also their right not to be “forced to . . . make any statements when they 
would rather be silent or express different views.” Leora Harpaz, Justice 
Jackson’s Flag Salute Legacy: The Supreme Court Struggles to Protect Intellectual 
Individualism, 64 TEX. L. REV. 817, 818 (1986). Justice Kennedy’s strategic 
reference to Barnette in Obergefell hints perhaps that the ruling and its 
descendants should now be understood as reflecting a more expansive right, some 
qualified form of human “dignity.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2606 
(2015). See generally Tribe, supra note 36, at 26 n.73. Nonetheless, one could still 
conclude that Barnette, while not resting explicitly on any single clause, was 
simply a freedom of expression case until given a much broader meaning later. 
See Harpaz, supra, at 20 (asserting that Barnette “was the first Supreme Court 
decision establishing that the free speech guarantee also secures the right to 
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those small concerns, the central challenge to clause aggregation 
is that it is irrelevant. In all of the purported examples, one can 
reasonably doubt that there is any aggregated or “synergized” 
harm greater than that which the Court could easily have 
acknowledged under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clauses. On this view, the use of multiple clauses was 
simply a way to limit the precedent, something that could also have 
been accomplished under a Due Process Clause with a bit of 
nuanced explanation. 
Consider the group of cases involving the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses—Griffin and Douglas along with 
Lawrence and Obergefell. In these cases, the Court viewed the 
individual interest at stake as highly important, whether or not 
called “fundamental.” In Griffin and Douglas, it was the 
opportunity to appeal a criminal conviction.370 In Lawrence, it was 
the interest in engaging in intimate sexual activity.371 In 
Obergefell, it was the interest of same-sex couples in entering into 
marriage, which the Court actually characterized as 
“fundamental.”372 Given the Court’s view as to the importance of 
those interests, one could reasonably conclude that it would have 
decided all of those cases the same way under the Due Process 
Clause alone were clause aggregation deemed an improper 
rationalizing technique. On this view, the emphasis the Court gave 
in each of the cases to the vulnerable or subordinated experience 
of the class of persons to which the petitioners belonged (the 
equality concern) was primarily a way to limit the precedent. Only 
indigents, for example, had a right to a free trial transcript and 
government supplied counsel, not people who could pay.373 Only 
                                                                                                     
remain silent in the face of a government effort to coerce expression”). 
 370. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18–19 (1956) (determining that States 
must provide adequate appellate review to all defendants, regardless of their 
ability to pay); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) (same). 
 371. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (concluding that 
homosexuals have the right to engage in consensual sexual activity in the home 
without government intervention). 
 372. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05 (“[T]he right to marry is a 
fundamental right inherent in the liberty of a person, and . . . couples of the 
same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”). 
 373. See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18–19 (determining that States must provide 
adequate appellate review to all defendants, regardless of their ability to pay); 
Douglas, 372 U.S. at 355 (1963) (same). 
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gay or lesbian intimate sexual intimacy was protected, not adult 
incest or bestiality. And the right between two gay people to marry 
was newly protected, but not the right of three or more people to a 
plural marriage.374 While clause aggregation was convenient for 
emphasizing the narrowing constraints, the Court could have 
accomplished the same limiting effect merely by carefully 
describing the boundaries of each holding under the Due Process 
Clause.375  
For Griswold and cases in which the Court combined 
provisions from the First Amendment with the Due Process 
Clause, the aggregation is also reasonably viewed as not crucial to 
the outcomes. The Griswold use of penumbras from multiple 
clauses to identify a “privacy” right has been harshly criticized for 
a variety of reasons, including the failure to adequately explain 
“how a series of specified rights combined to create a new and 
unspecified right.”376 Yet, the fact that “almost no one believes that 
the contraception decisions should now be overruled”377 implies 
that the Court could have simply decided Griswold the same way 
directly under the Due Process Clause. Likewise, cases in which 
the Court recognized rights to intimate or expressive associations 
or rights to religious exercise in connection with an associational 
right could all have been grounded on the Due Process Clause. 
“The process of aggregating rights merely asks the ultimate 
constitutional question: To what degree has the challenged action 
infringed liberty?”378 This ultimate question could have been asked 
                                                                                                     
 374. See Yoshino, supra note 51, at 177 (“[T]he antisubordination principle 
likely provides a strong constraint on recognition of polygamous unions as a 
fundamental right.”). 
 375. Suspicion that the Court would have done the same thing in the absence 
of an Equal Protection Clause easily builds on the Court’s incorporation against 
the federal government through the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause of 
equal protections rulings promulgated against the states. See generally Bolling v. 
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–500 (1954). However, such “reverse incorporation” 
rulings, could also be seen as more essential in the Fifth Amendment context, 
based on the need to hold the federal government to the same standards as the 
states. See supra note 280 and accompanying text (“In such cases, the right 
already theoretically exists in relation to the federal government . . . .”). 
 376. Bork, supra note 33, at 9. 
 377. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 103 (1996). 
 378. David L. Faigman, Measuring Constitutionality Transactionally, 43 
HASTINGS L.J. 753, 778 (1994). 
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and answered the same way under the Due Process Clause in those 
cases as under some amalgamation of provisions. 
The same critique would apply to all of the other examples. 
Rights-based clause aggregation is merely a way to ask whether 
the challenged governmental action infringes a liberty that should 
be protected under the Constitution. That same question can 
always be asked under the Due Process Clause. The Court also has 
some room to manipulate what qualifies as a “fundamental right” 
or the standard of review to be applied in its due process cases to 
allow it usually to reach the result that it desires.379 Thus, in the 
end, it is not logical that the answers it will provide should differ 
when it employs clause aggregation versus a direct due process 
analysis. 
2. Countering the Hypothesis 
The central difficulty with the hypothesis that rights-based 
clause aggregation doesn’t really matter in constitutional 
adjudication is that it cannot be proven. Despite reasons for doubt, 
rights-based clause combination may well have been (and continue 
to be) outcome-determinative in the identification of constitutional 
rights. When the Court has turned to the clause aggregation 
approach, there was probably a reason. 
In the cases involving the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses, aggregation enabled the Court to depart from the 
Glucksberg strictures that governed the recognition of 
“fundamental rights,” and, thus, to find rights that it could not as 
easily have recognized under either clause alone.380 In Griffin and 
Douglas, the Court apparently did not want to say there was a 
“fundamental right” to an appeal. It also did not want to say, given 
the implications, that indigence constitutes a “suspect 
classification.” Likewise, in Lawrence, the Court did not want to 
say there was a “fundamental right” to engage in the sexual acts 
                                                                                                     
 379. See supra notes 191, 236–239 and accompanying text (explaining that 
the Court’s approach to recognizing a fundamental right is manipulated to 
produce desired outcomes). 
 380. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18–19 (1956) (determining that States 
must provide adequate appellate review to all defendants, regardless of their 
ability to pay); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1965) (same). 
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involved. And, it was not prepared to say that the petitioners, as 
gay or lesbian persons, were subject to a “suspect classification.” 
Nonetheless, in all three cases the Court was able to consider both 
clauses together and find a need for protection. It also applied 
these provisions against the states without declaring the existence 
of a “fundamental right.” If clause aggregation somehow had been 
deemed an unavailable rhetorical approach, perhaps the Court 
would have reached the same outcomes anyway, by simply 
identifying a “fundamental right” to an appeal or to intimate 
sexual activity. However, given the Glucksberg strictures,381 that 
conclusion seems far from certain. 
The same could be said about Obergefell. If there were no 
Equal Protection Clause, we cannot be sure that the Court would 
have reached the same result, even if we strongly suspect it. The 
complexity of dual violations that the Court introduced into the 
case by emphasizing that an unfairly subordinated group was 
being unfairly subordinated again—a problem the Court could 
express as a violation of equality—provided an especially strong 
confining effect on the ruling. The Court could “respond to the 
Lochner bugaboo by invoking the theme of antisubordination.”382 
The ability to tightly wind “the double helix of Due Process and 
Equal Protection into a doctrine of equal dignity”383 allowed Justice 
Kennedy to break out of the Glucksberg constraints with less 
concern that the rulings would have unduly expansive 
implications.384 On this view, clause aggregation might have 
mattered. 
As for cases in which the Court combined provisions from the 
first eight Amendments with the Due Process Clause and others 
as well, we also cannot be sure that the aggregation did not 
influence outcomes. Consider again Stanley, where the Court cited 
multiple clauses to recognize a right to view obscene pornography 
privately at home and, ultimately, to declare it a “fundamental” 
                                                                                                     
 381. See supra notes 227–233 and accompanying text (discussing that the 
Court’s modern approach has limited the recognition of fundamental rights to 
those “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”). 
 382. Tribe, supra note 36, at 19 nn.19–20. 
 383. Id. at 17 n.11. 
 384. See Yoshino, supra note 51, at 171 (asserting that the Court provided the 
principle for distinguishing Lochner “in its synthesis of liberty and equality”). 
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right.385 If clause aggregation was an improper methodology, 
would the Court have reached the same outcome directly under the 
Due Process Clause? Perhaps, yet viewing obscene pornography 
seems rather sybaritic, and we should not forget that obscenity is 
generally excluded from First Amendment protection.386 The 
reluctance of the Court to endorse obscene pornography more 
broadly hints that the majority might only have been able to get to 
its conclusion by combining the “right to receive information and 
ideas,” which was itself grounded on two clauses in the First 
Amendment—the freedom “of speech and press,”387—with “the 
right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from 
unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy,”388 which 
was grounded on Griswold’s multi-clause penumbral 
emanations.389 Clause aggregation helped limit the precedent so as 
not to protect, on the one hand, public displays of obscene 
pornography, or, on the other hand, injecting heroin or possessing 
a sawed-off shotgun or shoulder-mounted missile launcher in the 
privacy of one’s home.390 It also helped avoid claims of 
Lochnernerizing, which was harder to do “within the confines of 
the due process clauses,” because they “expressly list life, liberty 
and property as interests subject to due process protections.”391 In 
the end, despite doubt, we cannot be certain that clause 
aggregation did not influence the outcome. 
                                                                                                     
 385. See supra notes 321–329 and accompanying text (explaining that the 
Court relied on the First and Fourteenth Amendments in Stanley. 
 386. See supra note 321 and accompanying text (citing Roth v. United States, 
354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957), wherein the court determined that obscenity is not 
constitutionally protected speech or press). The Court continued to maintain this 
view after Stanley. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (“[O]bscene 
material is unprotected by the First Amendment.”). 
 387. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (citing Martin v. City of 
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)). 
 388. Id. 
 389. See supra notes 318, 378 and accompanying text (stating that the Court 
found that married couples have a right to use contraception by “penumbras, 
formed by emanations” from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth 
Amendments (citation omitted)). 
 390. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568 n.11 (“What we have said in no way infringes 
upon the power of the State or Federal Government to make possession of other 
items, such as narcotics, firearms, or stolen goods, a crime.”). 
 391. Kanter, supra note 288, at 672. 
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Even regarding Griswold, clause aggregation may have moved 
forward a ruling that would not otherwise have come until later. 
The Court at that time clearly was concerned about not 
re-Lochnernizing substantive due process.392 The Griswold Court 
never mentioned the words “fundamental right,” even though it 
applied the protection against a state. The worry over Lochner was 
further evidenced by the majority’s failure even to mention the Due 
Process Clause as one of those from which a zone might also 
emanate and contribute to the liberty protection that it identified 
as surrounding contraception.393 Nonetheless, the Griswold idea 
that multiple clauses, through overlapping zones emanating from 
their core and penumbral rights, can give rise to a new right not 
covered by the core or penumbra of any clause alone is not 
insensible.394 The Griswold Court did not explain this idea well, 
but it is comprehensible, as Professor Stephen Kanter has 
demonstrated.395 It is even plausible to see the core of particular 
clauses in the first eight amendments as falling within the core of 
the Due Process Clause, and yet see overlapping zones emanating 
from one or more of those clauses and from the larger Due Process 
Clause that give rise to rights that no single clause, through its 
core or penumbra, could support.396 While the Griswold opinion 
                                                                                                     
 392. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 219, at 850 (“In an attempt to avoid 
substantive due process, Douglas, who had lived through the Lochner era, found 
privacy in the ‘penumbra’ of the Bill of Rights.”). 
 393. See id. at 849 (“Douglas, however, expressly rejected the argument that 
the right was protected under the liberty of the due process clause.”). 
 394. See Kanter, supra note 288, at 624 (“[T]here is legitimacy and vitality to 
this theory, even though it was rather vaguely and poorly explained in 
Griswold.”). 
 395. See id. at 625–40 (discussing the analytical approach to finding 
fundamental rights in the majority opinion in Griswold). 
 396. Professor Michael Coenen insightfully expressed the underlying 
problem: 
Can we sensibly claim that a law “kind of,” “partially,” or “barely” 
complies with the dictates of a particular constitutional clause, or must 
we always reach the conclusion that the law either fully does or fully 
does not comply? I do not have a definitive answer to this question, 
and, in some sense, no such answer may exist. We are all free to adopt 
whatever metaphysical picture of the clauses we want to adopt, and it 
is hard for me to think of any objective criteria by which one such 
picture would qualify as more conceptually valid than any other. Some 
of us might prefer to compare the clauses to on/off switches, whereas 
others might prefer to compare them to sliding scales. We may have 
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was problematic for several reasons,397 the Court majority 
apparently was not ready to find a fundamental right to protect 
marital contraceptive use directly under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Even if the majority’s thinking was illogical or 
ill-formed, the clause aggregation alternative may have helped one 
or more of those Justices to get to the Griswold holding. 
In the end, if my allegation about the invalidity of rights-based 
clause aggregation was true, it would also perhaps prove too much. 
The idea that clause aggregation has been irrelevant would mean 
that the Court’s modern substantive due process approach, as 
represented by Glucksberg, would have blown up long ago if it ever 
got off the ground. For, without the route for recognizing and 
protecting new rights offered by clause aggregation, the Court 
would have to have somehow recognized and protected those same 
rights, and in each case from the very start, directly through the 
Due Process Clause, which would not have been possible while 
maintaining any allegiance to the Glucksberg framework.  
 This reality points us back to the meaning of Obergefell, which 
used clause aggregation but also found a “fundamental right” to 
same-sex marriage by circumventing Glucksberg. Professors Kenji 
Yoshino and Laurence Tribe have concluded that Obergefell has 
now effectively blown up the Glucksberg strictures398 and 
                                                                                                     
good practical arguments for favoring one conception over the other, 
but I suspect that any further conceptual debating of the issue would 
prove fruitless. There is, I suspect, no “right” or “wrong” view of the 
clauses metaphysical structure; there are only different metaphors 
that we may or may not choose to employ. 
Coenen, supra note 28, at 1095. 
 397. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 33, at 9 
Justice Douglas called the amendments and their penumbras ”zones of 
privacy,“ though of course they are not that at all. They protect both 
private and public behavior and so would more properly be labelled 
‘zones of freedom’ . . . . We are left with no idea of the sweep of the right 
of privacy. 
See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 219, at 850 (asserting that the opinion also 
does not seem to achieve Douglas’s goal of avoiding substantive due process 
because the Bill of Rights is applied to the states as a matter of due process, so 
that “the penumbral approach is thus ultimately a due process analysis”).  
 398. See Yoshino, supra note 51, at 162 (“After Obergefell, it will be much 
harder to invoke Glucksberg as binding precedent.”); Tribe, supra note 36, at 16 
n.4 (asserting that the Obergefell decision “represents the culmination of a 
decades-long project that has revolutionized fundamental rights jurisprudence” 
and “has definitely replaced Washington v. Glucksberg’s wooden three-prong 
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reconstructed substantive due process analysis based heavily on 
Obergefell’s emphasis on “anti-subordination” or “equal dignity.”399 
I am not as sure, particularly because the anti-subordination 
principle offers little help in explaining some of the fundamental 
rights the Court has previously recognized, such as the one 
recognized in Stanley. I suggest that an important question to ask 
about Obergefell is whether it should be understood primarily to 
have constructed a grand new approach to substantive due process 
or primarily to have given a new bit of impetus to clause 
aggregation. I contend that these two ideas are not the same thing 
and that we should consider whether the latter view might be the 
more salient one.  
C. Is Clause Aggregation Principled Enough To Matter? 
Although rights-based clause aggregation may sometimes 
affect outcomes in Supreme Court decision-making, one could still 
doubt that it has mattered often enough and in a sufficiently 
principled way to have any normative force for the future. Indeed, 
I hypothesize in this section that rights-based clause aggregation 
is too rarely important and too unprincipled in its application for 
litigators ever to anticipate that it would succeed. Yet, while this 
hypothesis might actually be true, I reject the view that litigators 
should not focus more on aggregation arguments, especially after 
Obergefell. Most of the contours remain undeveloped in the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on rights-based clause 
aggregation. Yet, those who aim to foresee how constitutional 
rights will advance must try to find bases to understand how that 
approach could contribute to the recognition of new constitutional 
rights in the future.  
                                                                                                     
test”). 
 399. See Yoshino, supra note 51, at 174 (“What emerges from Lawrence and 
Obergefell is a vision of liberty that I will call ‘antisubordination liberty.’”); Tribe, 
supra note 36, at 20 nn.25–26 (asserting that “the rubric under which 
fundamental rights should be evaluated going forward is what I will call the 
doctrine of equal dignity”). 
854 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 779 (2018) 
1. The Hypothesis of Unpredictably Rare Application 
The principal reasons to doubt that the Court’s rather atypical 
use of rights-based clause aggregation has been principled enough 
to carry predictive power are of two sorts. First, the Court has 
never articulated rules or standards that help resolve when such 
aggregation is appropriate, and those measures are not obvious 
from the decisions. Second, the Court has failed to use clause 
aggregation in plenty of situations in which commentators have 
argued that it would have been warranted. Based on these 
omissions, a litigator could reasonably conclude that offering an 
argument based on rights-based clause aggregation—like a claim 
calling for recognition of a new “fundamental right” under the Due 
Process Clause alone—will always be akin to a Hail Mary. The best 
bet will almost always will be on failure. 
In none of the cases in which the Court has employed 
rights-based clause aggregation has it provided a decent 
explanation for why, when or how the approach should apply. The 
Griswold opinion has been ridiculed for its vacuity on this score.400 
The Court did make a bit of effort at explanation way back in Boyd, 
but the assertions were more confounding than illuminating,401 
and, of course, Boyd was overruled both as to its holding and its 
rationales after the Fourth Amendment was incorporated and 
became important.402 Look for a good explanation of the rules or 
standards governing clause aggregation in the opinions in 
Barnette, Griffin, Stanley, or any other Supreme Court case, and 
you will come up empty-handed. Even in Obergefell, Chief Justice 
Roberts’s dissent was charitable in describing Justice Kennedy’s 
explanation of a “profound” connection and “synergy”403 between 
liberty and equality as “difficult to follow.”404 Justice Kennedy’s 
                                                                                                     
 400. See, e.g., Dixon, supra note 33, at 84 (“Douglas . . . skipped through the 
Bill of Rights like a cheerleader—‘Give me a P . . . give me an R . . . give me an 
I . . .,’ and so on, and found P-R-I-V-A-C-Y as a derivative or penumbral right.”). 
 401. See supra notes 289–296 and accompanying text (arguing the Court’s use 
of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) 
was an early example of clause aggregation). 
 402. See supra notes 199–203 and accompanying text (explaining that the 
Court overruled Boyd in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1976)). 
 403. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015). 
 404. Id. at 2623 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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explanation never penetrated the superfice. He said, for example: 
“The reasons why marriage is a fundamental right became more 
clear and compelling from a full awareness and understanding of 
the hurt that resulted from laws barring interracial marriage.”405 
Here is another example: “Each concept—liberty and equal 
protection—leads to a stronger understanding of the other.”406 
Those sorts of statements were reiterations of the conclusion, not 
explanations, and Justice Scalia’s response was never refuted: “If 
the opinion is correct that the two clauses ‘converge in the 
identification and definition of [a] right,’ that is only because the 
majority’s likes and dislikes are predictably compatible.”407 In the 
end, the problem for those trying to understand the “synergy” 
asserted in Obergefell is that, if there was one, “the Court did not 
define what the intersectional right consists in.”408 
There are also plenty of instances in which commentators 
have noted that the Court could have but did not use clause 
aggregation,409 and I will offer another. In McCleskey v. Kemp,410 
the petitioner challenged his death sentence under the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause and the Equal Protection Clause, 
using rather compelling statistical evidence to claim that the 
Georgia death penalty system unconstitutionally discriminated 
against him as a black defendant convicted of killing a white 
                                                                                                     
 405. Id. 
 406. Id. 
 407. Id. at 2630 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 408. Abrams & Garrett, supra note 43, at 26. 
 409. See, e.g., id. at 39–40 (pointing to Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 
(1996), where the Court “famously deemed irrelevant to its Fourth Amendment 
analysis whether there was also racial targeting”); Porat & Posner, supra note 27, 
at 51–53 (pointing to Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007), involving two Fifth 
Amendment claims brought by a rancher against the Bureau of Land 
Management, alleging a taking and an illegal form of retaliation); David D. 
Meyers, Gonzales v. Carhart and the Hazards of Muddled Scrutiny, 17 J.L. & 
POL’Y. 57, 84 (2008) (pointing to Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), where 
the Court upheld the federal Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2003, without taking 
account of the equality implications for women); Faigman, supra note 276, at 663 
(noting “the Court has never specifically explained its failure to aggregate rights, 
even in cases where it would seem necessary to do so,” and pointing to Ross v. 
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1973), involving denial of a claim for appointment of counsel 
for state discretionary appeals in criminal cases).  
 410. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
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victim.411 The Court could have chosen to employ a 
clause-combination approach that would have helped it rule in 
McCleskey’s favor without setting a precedent that extended 
beyond the death penalty context. Instead, the Court chose to 
uphold his death sentence, addressing separately the Equal 
Protection Clause,412 and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause.413 Why this seriatim approach? The answer is mysterious. 
Cases like McCleskey help confirm that the Court chooses when to 
employ clause aggregation from among the cases where it is 
plausibly employed, and the factors that influence that choice are 
unspoken by the Court and typically non-evident to the observer. 
2. Countering the Hypothesis 
The very idea of rights-based clause aggregation means that 
claims for new, unenumerated rights are judged at times more like 
figure skating than pole vaulting. In pole vaulting, one’s score 
depends entirely on whether one gets over the still-standing bar, 
and there are no partial points for nice tries. Figure skating, by 
contrast, is not about such “all or nothing” leaps but about the 
overall quality of a presentation, in which a win may come from 
partial points for several jumps that were each imperfect but 
together were impressive. There is nothing theoretically wrong 
with this latter scoring approach. The rules for constitutional 
construction are not part of the natural order. And, as Professor 
Michael Coenen notes, the accumulation of partial points through 
clause aggregation is logical in theory: “Just as my limited desire 
to see a movie and my limited desire to buy clothes might together 
yield an overwhelming desire to go to the mall, so too might clauses 
providing limited individual support for a judicial result operate 
together to generate strong collective support for the result.”414  
                                                                                                     
 411. For a summary of the study, see DAVID C. BALUDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE 
AND THE DEATH PENALTY 40–228, 306–69 (1990). 
 412. See id. at 291–99 (addressing McCleskey’s claim that the statute violates 
the Equal Protection clause). 
 413. See id. at 299–313 (addressing McCleskey’s claim that the capital 
sentencing system violates the Eighth Amendment). 
 414. Coenen, supra note 28, at 1067. 
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Admittedly, the Court has not developed a method for deciding 
when to award and cumulate partial credit under each of multiple 
clauses, nor any method for deciding how many partial points to 
award for each of multiple imperfect constitutional contentions. 
Yet, these problems may be largely unavoidable. 
Clause-aggregation problems represent a series of unusual, if not 
one-off, conundrums that are not easily handled by a set of rules, 
standards or balancing tests. 
Despite the uncertainties, there are some factors that 
probably influence the judicial use of rights-based clause 
aggregation that no interested litigants or observers should ignore. 
Obviously, a court is most likely to use the technique when the 
court has difficulty justifying the requested unenumerated 
protection as a “fundamental right” based on history and tradition 
but still finds the request compelling. “[J]udicial decision precedes 
articulate theory.”415 That point is banal, but remembering it leads 
to another point that is more important. A court is more likely to 
use clause aggregation where the proponent of the right uses the 
approach to make the requested right appealing. Clause 
aggregation can sometimes assist in such an effort by enabling the 
full presentation of the various aspects of the harm involved with 
a challenged government action. If the litigant doesn’t use the 
strategy in a case where it could help persuade, the court is less 
likely to be persuaded. The court will then probably see the harm 
as it has been presented—divided into pieces—and think about the 
pieces separately. 
A few patterns to be gleaned from the Supreme Court’s use of 
rights-based clause aggregation may also help predict its future 
application. First, as with claims addressed singularly under the 
Due Process Clause, the Court has more often recognized negative 
fundamental rights (the right to be free from governmental 
restraint) than positive fundamental rights (the right to a 
government benefit).416 There are exceptions to this pattern, such 
as the provision of transcripts and counsel in Griffin and Douglas. 
However, in the vast majority of multiple-clause cases, including 
Boyd, Barnette, Griswold, Stanley, Roberts, Dale, Yoder, and 
Lawrence, the right recognized was one involving freedom from 
                                                                                                     
 415. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 194 (1995). 
 416. Supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
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government intrusion. We could also understand Obergefell as 
falling in the latter group, but marriage is a mixed bag, because its 
provision “creates a zone of privacy into which the state cannot 
intrude,” but also “requires the state to grant the parties 
recognition and benefits.”417 Still, on the whole, the cases suggest 
that a request for recognition of a negative rather than a positive 
right is probably more likely to prevail. 
The cases on clause aggregation also reveal a particular 
concern by the Court with “privacy.” Griswold purported to 
vindicate privacy by combining various clauses from the first 
eighth amendments to protect marital use of contraception.418 
Stanley also demonstrated a special concern with protecting 
privacy by relying on Griswold to protect private viewing of 
obscene pornography.419 Lawrence, while purporting to protect the 
right of gay and lesbian persons to engage in intimate sexual 
contact under the Equal Protection Clause, relied heavily on 
Griswold and the right to privacy.420 Although the claim to privacy 
will not shield all private conduct from government intrusion, it 
will favor the proponent of the right, at least where the conduct 
involved involves no harm to others.421  
Claims involving “somewhat-suspect” discrimination along 
with “semi-fundamental” rights also seem to gain traction with the 
Court. This is what Justice Kennedy may have been referencing 
through the “synergy” idea in Obergefell. There, the synergy notion 
seemed like surplusage, because the Court earlier asserted that it 
already had identified same-sex marriage as a “fundamental” 
                                                                                                     
 417. Yoshino, supra note 51, at 168. 
 418. See supra notes 314–319 and accompanying text (stating that in 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) the Court found married couples 
have a right to use contraception by “penumbras, formed by emanations” from the 
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments). 
 419. Supra notes 324–328 and accompanying text. 
 420. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564–65 (2003) (discussing Griswold 
as “the beginning point in our decision”); id. at 578 (noting that the case “does not 
involve public conduct” and declaring that “[t]he petitioners are entitled to respect 
for their private lives” and that “[t]he State cannot demean their existence or 
control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime”). 
 421. See id. (emphasizing that “[t]he present case does not involve minors” or 
“persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships 
where consent might not easily be refused”). 
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAUSE AGGREGATION 859 
right.422 However, where that is not true, the idea has more allure. 
To demonstrate, imagine that we are picking coffee for ten millibits 
per basket. Most of us would be annoyed, even mad enough to 
complain, if the farm manager for the public owner paid eighty 
percent of the pickers (not us) two extra millibits per basket 
because they were good-looking. Assuming there were no 
minimum wage established, a court might conclude that, while 
“less-than-good-looking” persons is not a suspect classification, and 
while the manager’s discrimination has a rational basis (the 
manager prefers being around attractive people and thinks 
everyone else is happier and works harder), there ought to be a 
prohibition against this. A living wage is semi-fundamental to 
one’s existence, and discrimination based on good looks versus bad 
looks amounts to a somewhat-suspect classification. So, what 
should the court do? On this set of facts, the court might say there 
ought to be a right to a living wage of twelve millibits per basket.423 
It’s not because twelve millibits per basket is a fundamental right 
or because “less-than-good-looking” is a suspect classification. It’s 
because of the combination of a semi-fundamental interest and 
somewhat-suspect classification. This is the idea represented in 
cases like Griffin, Douglas, and Lawrence. The right rests on two 
clauses that neither alone would support it. While avoiding the 
Glucksberg strictures, the combination also confines the precedent 
based on the complexities.  
The cases also reveal that the combined clauses should not 
double-count injury to create a new right.424 This requirement can 
                                                                                                     
 422. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (“[T]he reasons 
marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to 
same-sex couples.”). 
 423. This outcome is not, however, compelled by the facts or by anything 
inherent in notions of liberty, equality or their combination. The court could 
decide that everyone should get just ten millibits per basket. The court could 
decide that everyone should get eleven and six-tenths millibits per basket. The 
Court could decide that good-looking people should get one but not two extra 
millibits per basket. Or, the Court could decide that nobody is getting paid enough 
and that everyone should receive at least fourteen millibits per basket. That none 
of these possibilities is necessarily wrong coincides with the view that the notion 
of a “synergy” between liberty and equality doesn’t lead to particular answers 
about “fundamental rights.” 
 424. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), exemplifies this idea in an 
immigration case involving two claims of discrimination. One of the petitioners, 
a U.S. citizen, challenged the denial of a visa to his biological son born out of 
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sometimes present “difficult value judgments”425 that can “mask 
what are at their core normative debates about what the substance 
of the doctrines should be.”426 Yet, clearly some combination claims 
would only seek double credit for harm already fully encompassed 
by one of the clauses.427 For example, suppose a federal criminal 
defendant claimed a denial of both the right to effective assistance 
of counsel and the right to due process from defense counsel’s 
failure to object to improper comments by the prosecutor in closing 
argument. If the argument is not a winner because of inadequate 
prejudice under either clause alone, it does not become a winner 
when the claim is brought as a hybrid. Each clause would already 
take account of whatever prejudice was involved, and that harm 
would either be enough to constitute a violation or it would not.428 
Separate clauses should account for separate aspects of an injury 
                                                                                                     
wedlock. Id. at 790. Under then-existing law, the child of a non-married father 
was not entitled to a visa based on the father’s status as a citizen. Id. Petitioner 
claimed the statute discriminated against him both as a man and as a non-marital 
father. Id. Because of the “plenary power” doctrine, only rational-basis review 
would normally apply. Id. Petitioner’s counsel argued that the dual nature of the 
discrimination justified heightened scrutiny. Id. Yet, this was an effort to have 
the Court double count the same injury to create a special right, and the Court 
rejected it. See id. at 794 (“[T]his Court has resolved similar challenges to 
immigration legislation based on other constitutional rights of citizens, and has 
rejected the suggestion that more searching judicial scrutiny is required.”). 
 425. Coenen, supra note 28, at 1124. 
 426. Id. at 1125. 
 427. See id. at 1122–25 (“Just as courts might undervalue the 
combination-based elements of a prior decision, so too might they overvalue these 
elements, by combining constitutional clauses that have already been 
combined.”); Faigman, supra note 276, at 662 (“To be sure, certain specific 
constitutional values can be found implicit in both the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments and so, double counting must be avoided when aggregating 
rights.”). 
 428. Professors Kerry Abrams and Brandon Garrett would make the case, I 
believe, that the right to effective assistance of counsel already vindicates both 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the due process right to a fair trial. 
See Abrams & Garrett, supra note 43, at 31 (“The right to effective assistance of 
counsel at trial and during pre-trial representation, itself goes further than the 
Sixth Amendment text, which guarantees a right to a lawyer, but not an effective 
one.”). This insight would help illuminate why trying to create a hybrid-clause 
claim for relief on these facts would amount to double counting and should be 
rejected. However, even if the right to effective assistance of counsel is viewed as 
grounded solely in the Sixth Amendment, there would still be double-counting 
going on. 
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the aggregation of which none of the clauses would encompass 
alone.429  
The cases also reveal that the harms aggregated under 
multiple clauses must cohere around a relatively specific right for 
it to receive recognition. Otherwise, the grievant could simply 
point to various constitutional clauses in combination to support a 
“right to be treated fairly” or a “right to a fair trial,” and, to 
establish a violation, offer a series of scattered complaints each 
with some substance but none amounting to a constitutional 
violation. This will not do. The Supreme Court has not clarified 
how specific the right must be to receive recognition through clause 
aggregation. Nonetheless, one can see from reviewing the Court’s 
decisions that the recognized rights are generally quite specific. 
Even when the Court has expressed the right in overly-broad 
terms, such as the right to “privacy,” the liberty actually protected 
could be defined narrowly.  
If the past is prologue, clause aggregation will not work very 
often to promote the recognition of new constitutional rights. Yet, 
it is important to try to envision situations in which the approach 
might apply. That brings us back to recreational marijuana 
activities. Could clause aggregation at some point help make the 
case for a constitutional right to use and possess marijuana in 
limited circumstances? We now turn to that question. 
V. The Clause Aggregation Case for a Right To Possess and Use 
Marijuana for Recreational Purposes 
The case for a federal constitutional right to engage in 
recreational marijuana activities in states that continue to 
criminalize that conduct is for the future. At present, there are 
strong arguments favoring a constitutional right to possess and 
use marijuana for therapeutic purposes in jurisdictions that do not 
yet permit even medical use.430 There are also plausible 
arguments, based in part on federalism concerns, to support a 
                                                                                                     
 429. See Faigman, supra note 276, at 662 (“[D]ouble counting must be avoided 
when aggregating rights.”). 
 430. See supra notes 247–253 and accompanying text (arguing that 
marijuana becomes fundamentally important to one’s well-being when consumed 
to relieve “excruciating pain and suffering”). 
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constitutional challenge to federal prosecutions of minor 
marijuana crimes in states that have stopped criminalizing such 
conduct.431 However, for recreational marijuana activities, the 
time probably has not arrived for recognition of a federal 
constitutional right, regardless of how proponents frame the 
argument. There is not a sufficient national consensus to support 
the claim, as demonstrated by the still small number of states that 
have legalized recreational marijuana and the continuing 
criminalization at the federal level.432 While we have seen grounds 
to anticipate that a solid majority of states will legalize for 
recreational purposes within a decade or two,433 we have also seen 
that single-clause arguments for a constitutional right would not 
likely succeed even then.434 But, could proponents of a right prevail 
at that point using a clause aggregation approach? In this Part, I 
explain why that is a better strategy. As to whether it could 
succeed, I answer with cautious affirmance, focusing on adults only 
and on use only in private settings and on possession in public only 
of small amounts. I limit consideration to those scenarios, because 
they present the best possibilities for success. 
A. The Clause Aggregation Approach Applied 
Clause aggregation, as opposed to a single clause approach, 
would favor proponents of the right in three ways. First, it would 
allow them to present, for balancing against the state’s interests, 
a more complete picture of the harms caused by the marijuana 
prohibition. Second, it would allow a court to use the greater 
complexity of considerations involved to better confine the 
                                                                                                     
 431. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (suggesting that marijuana 
could be removed from the federal Controlled Substances Act, thus resolving a 
federalism concern). 
 432. See supra notes 125–134 and accompanying text (noting that only eight 
states plus D.C. have legalized marijuana and that tension remains between 
federal and state law enforcement). 
 433. See supra notes 135–143 and accompanying text (suggesting that more 
states will legalize recreational marijuana use on a limited basis within only a 
few years). 
 434. See supra Part II (examining why alternative arguments under the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause, the Fourth Amendment, the Due Process 
Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause would likely fail). 
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precedential effect of a ruling in their favor. Third, the first two 
effects could encourage the Court to apply a higher level of scrutiny 
to the state’s asserted rationales for prohibition and, ultimately, to 
produce a ruling in the proponents’ favor. To understand how these 
effects would play out, let’s hypothesize persons similar to those 
we imagined in Part II, adult defendants charged in criminal cases 
with minor marijuana offenses. We are again assuming that thirty 
states have legalized minor marijuana activity. Let’s also imagine 
now that the defendants are among a broader group of civil 
plaintiffs that includes users or would-be users of marijuana who 
are suing for declaratory relief against the enforcement of a state’s 
marijuana laws, by claiming a federal constitutional right.435 
Exploring the interests of the individual that these plaintiffs could 
emphasize by employing a clause aggregation approach can help 
us see why they are more likely to prevail than our hypothetical 
litigants in Part II, who focused on single clause arguments. 
1. Bringing to Light the Individual Interests 
As we saw in Part II, a single clause approach to challenging 
the cannabis laws based on the existence of a constitutional right 
never requires the reviewing court to consider the balance of 
interests involved between individuals and the state. A categorical 
challenge under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause alone 
can be tossed as quickly as the court concludes that there is not 
enough evidence of a national consensus against marijuana 
prohibitions.436 A categorical challenge under the Fourth 
Amendment will be rejected out of hand on the view that such 
                                                                                                     
 435. Attacking federal marijuana crimes through a civil action for declaratory 
relief was the approach followed by the unsuccessful plaintiffs, medical marijuana 
users, and their marijuana providers in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). See 
also Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 854 (9th Cir. 2007) (following, on remand, 
the Supreme Court’s decision, affirming the district court’s denial of motion for 
preliminary injunction). To meet constitutional standing requirements, “the 
plaintiff ‘must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to 
the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.’” Spencer v. 
Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (citation omitted). Our hypothetical plaintiffs could 
meet this standard. See generally Raich, 500 F.3d. at 857. 
 436. See supra Part II.A (concluding that the hypothetical defendants should 
expect to lose because they engaged in affirmative, voluntary conduct that society 
has not yet sufficiently condoned). 
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claims are not contemplated by that provision.437 A challenge 
under the Due Process Clause, since there is no “fundamental 
right” based on history and tradition, will only require the 
government to show a rational basis for its marijuana crimes, 
something it can accomplish merely by stating a few plausible 
concerns associated with marijuana usage.438 The same is true 
under the Equal Protection Clause, once the court finds that the 
challengers are not subject to a suspect classification.439 The 
various interests of the individual with regard to the marijuana 
laws do not even make it to the surface to be acknowledged under 
this single-clause approach. They are essentially irrelevant. 
What about under a clause aggregation approach? First, let’s 
consider what interests are at stake in relation to the marijuana 
prohibition for our hypothetical litigants. At the highest level of 
abstraction, they would allege that it is about their liberty or 
autonomy to experience their life as they please as long as they do 
no significant harm to others, which also encompasses the idea 
that they do no major harm to themselves. In more specific terms, 
for those arrested and charged, the interest is in avoiding 
punishments, fines, fees, and stigma related to their potential 
criminal convictions for what they would say is essentially 
non-culpable behavior, as demonstrated by its legalization in a 
super-majority of states. For those who want to use marijuana or 
want to use it more than they do but have been deterred by the 
law, it would be the loss of the benefits of use, a similar loss of 
autonomy in their efforts to endure the vicissitudes of life. In 
addition to its therapeutic benefits for many users,440 marijuana 
brings a feeling of well-being and pleasure to many others,441 which 
                                                                                                     
 437. See supra Part II.B (noting that, under modern Fourth Amendment law, 
there are no categories of ordinary criminal evidence that are recognized as 
immune from police search and seizure). 
 438. See supra Part II.C (noting that states can easily satisfy the “rational 
basis” standard of review). 
 439. See supra Part II.D (stating that criminalizing marijuana activity 
involves no discrimination based on a suspect classification or improper purpose). 
 440. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (identifying conditions which 
cannabis or cannabinoids are effective for treating). 
 441. See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 506 (Alaska 1975) (stating that “[t]he 
immediate psychological effects of marijuana are typically a mild euphoria and a 
relaxed feeling of well-being,” and many users also experience “a heightened 
sensitivity to taste and to visual and aural sensations”). 
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is why, before 2014, 111 million Americans had tried marijuana, 
despite its widespread illegality.442 For many of the plaintiffs, 
there would also be the loss of privacy and security in their 
persons, homes and effects from the actual or feared intrusion by 
the police to discover the marijuana. For many of the plaintiffs, 
there would also be the added injury of realizing that they are 
being treated differently in their own state than similarly situated 
persons who possess or use alcohol or tobacco, substances that are 
more dangerous to the user or others than cannabis, but not 
prohibited.443  
The Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment encompass 
these concerns sufficiently to conclude that considering and 
weighing them seems relevant in asking whether a marijuana 
prohibition is constitutionally sensible. The Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause is concerned with over-punishing conduct or, 
according to Robinson v. California, making something criminal 
that is not sufficiently culpable to merit criminalization.444 The 
Fourth Amendment is concerned with protecting the privacy of 
one’s home and the security of one’s person and effects against 
governmental invasion. According to Griswold v. Connecticut and 
Stanley v. Georgia, the First, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments 
also come together with the Fourth Amendment to provide an 
especially strong “privacy” protection for the home.445 Further, the 
liberties protected in a substantive sense by the Due Process 
Clause extend to “certain personal choices central to individual 
dignity and autonomy,”446 and decisions regarding what to 
consume or ingest into one’s body come near the core of those 
libertarian concerns. Finally, the Equal Protection Clause focuses 
on troubling disparities in the treatment of persons,447 which our 
                                                                                                     
 442. See Boffey, supra note 22, at A22 (reporting that, despite its illegality, 
marijuana is less dangerous than alcohol and tobacco). 
 443. See id. (positing that marijuana’s “downsides are not reasons to impose 
criminal penalties on its possession, particularly not in a society that permits 
nicotine use and celebrates drinking”). 
 444. See supra notes 162–169 and accompanying text (deciding that a 
California law could not criminalize a mere status in lieu of actual culpable 
conduct). 
 445. See supra notes 257–259 and accompanying text (finding privacy 
protection in the “penumbras” of these amendments). 
 446. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015). 
 447. See supra notes 257–258 and accompanying text (directing that persons 
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plaintiffs allege occurs between marijuana users and users of 
alcohol and tobacco. While none of these clauses alone would give 
rise to a right to possess and use marijuana, they can be 
understood to come together to make relevant the individual 
interests at stake in determining whether the Constitution, 
through its “broader postulates,”448 creates such a right. 
To focus on this broader set of individual interests in assessing 
the constitutional question is not to engage in judicial legislating. 
The constitutional propriety of such an inquiry is highlighted by 
recognizing that clause aggregation would not make relevant all of 
the evidence and arguments that proponents of the right might 
want to offer against the marijuana laws in a legislative context. 
For example, proponents of the right might wish to present 
evidence and argument that our marijuana prohibitions have 
negatively affected Mexico, by fomenting a black market that has 
helped sustain illegal Mexican drug cartels that, in turn, have 
spurred violence and corruption in that country.449 Indeed, prior to 
the beginning of legalization in the United States, marijuana 
accounted for about one and one-half billion dollars per year for 
those cartels, approximately twenty percent of their annual 
                                                                                                     
in an equal position should be treated equally). 
 448. Tribe, supra note 36, at 18 n.16. Although I do not aim to resolve the 
precise contours of the right, a clause-aggregation approach could readily confer 
more than mere freedom from criminal sanctions. Consider that a state might 
impose civil bans and sanctions, including property forfeitures, on minor 
marijuana activity. For a discussion of civil sanctions on marijuana activity, see 
MIKOS, supra note 1, at 92. Civil bans and sanctions would not implicate the same 
injury to one’s liberty that arises with a criminal conviction and sentence, but 
could still raise similar concerns to criminal bans, including widespread invasions 
of privacy.  Some states empower law enforcement to conduct searches for civil as 
well as criminal contraband. See id. at 166–70 (presenting contrasting state-court 
cases that allow and disallow searches for marijuana as civil contraband). Thus, 
a clause-aggregation approach seemingly could justify striking down civil bans 
and sanctions if it justified striking down criminal bans and sanctions. At the 
same time, I propose a right to use and possess marijuana only as a negative right 
against state interference. Moreover, I do not propose that it would necessarily 
entail freedom from all state-imposed burdens on use and possession, such as 
taxes or even criminal prohibitions on marijuana transactions. 
 449. See Elisabeth Malkin & Azam Ahmed, Ruling in Mexico Sets Into Motion 
Legal Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2015, at A1 (noting the political corruption 
and violence fomented in Mexico by the drug cartels, explaining the importance 
of marijuana to their revenues, and asserting that legalization of U.S. marijuana 
production could dry up demand for Mexican marijuana in the U.S.). 
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revenues.450 While the consequences for our neighboring country 
might be another policy reason to favor legalization, it is an 
argument for legislative reform and not properly part of the 
constitutional calculus.451 
Considering the various interests of the right proponents also 
arguably makes sense here. As we have seen, there are no 
established criteria that define when a court is to view as a unified 
whole some set of individually imperfect claims that each tie to 
different clauses.452 However, we have also seen patterns that 
appear in the Supreme Court cases involving multi-clause 
rights,453 and the claims of our defendant fit the patterns. Although 
not an absolute requirement, the defendants seek a negative 
liberty rather than a positive one, meaning they seek only to be left 
alone by government rather to gain an entitlement. The rights for 
which they seek recognition also can be understood as fairly 
specific—the right to possess and use marijuana—rather than as 
only a highly abstract one, such as a right to be treated fairly. 
Likewise, the harms they seek to aggregate are separate in the 
sense that combining them would not involve merely a ruse of 
double-counting. At the same time, the harms they allege logically 
tie together as the individual interests at stake when a government 
criminalizes even minor marijuana activity. 
                                                                                                     
 450. See BEAU KILMER, JONATHAN P. CAULKINS, BRITTANY M. BOND & PETER H 
REUTER, REDUCING DRUG TRAFFICKING REVENUES AND VIOLENCE IN MEXICO: 
WOULD LEGALIZING MARIJUANA IN CALIFORNIA HELP? 3 (2010), 
www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP325.pd
f (estimating gross revenues from moving marijuana across the border into the 
United States and selling it to wholesalers). 
 451. A variety of other concerns might also affect the legislative question but 
not the constitutional question. For example, states could allocate law 
enforcement and correctional resources that are dedicated to marijuana to other 
problems, and could also tax marijuana sales, producing resources for supporting 
the enforcement of laws against more dangerous drugs. See KAPLAN, supra note 
18, at 349 (“Licensing the sale of marijuana . . . might also have the desired effect 
of restricting the underground drug market that today makes available, and even 
encourages, the use of drugs far more harmful than marijuana.”). 
 452. See supra notes 400–410 and accompanying text (noting that the Court 
has not provided a decent explanation for why, when, or how the approach should 
apply). 
 453. See supra notes 414–432 and accompanying text (arguing that a court is 
more likely to use clause aggregation where the proponent of the right uses the 
approach to make the requested right appealing). 
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For a court to aggregate, some claims may need to be 
“colorable” on an individual basis, and our litigants also arguably 
meet that standard. Their claim would not likely prevail under the 
Due Process Clause alone, but their due process contention is also 
one that a court would likely have trouble rationalizing away as 
clearly without merit. After all, given that viewing obscene 
pornography at home was declared a “fundamental right” in 
Stanley,454 why is it so obvious that using marijuana at home (or 
even having a small amount in one’s pocket in public) should not 
qualify? Perhaps there is more harm from marijuana use than 
from viewing obscene pornography, but a court would probably 
struggle some to justify the differing treatment. Likewise, the 
claim of our hypothetical litigants under the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause is inadequate by itself to justify their proposed 
right, but arguably still a colorable contention. That is so because 
we are assuming that a super-majority of states have legalized 
recreational marijuana under their own laws, which implies that 
a societal consensus has nearly developed that the conduct is 
non-culpable.455 The litigants’ aggregation strategy may depend on 
whether this claim is colorable. We can see its importance by 
imagining how a court would view their clause-aggregation claim 
if they presented it today, when only a small number of states have 
legalized. A court might well reject the approach and analyze the 
case under single clauses, separately. 
2. Limiting the Precedent 
A second important consequence of employing a 
clause-aggregation approach is to increase the complexity of the 
rationale for a ruling favoring the existence of the right. The added 
                                                                                                     
 454. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (finding that the “right 
to read or observe what he pleases” is fundamental to our scheme of individual 
liberty). 
 455. If almost all states plus the federal government had legalized 
recreational marijuana, the litigants would have a colorable claim under the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause alone—maybe a “near-miss.” See supra 
notes 158–175 and accompanying text (suggesting that if society had sufficiently 
condoned the use of marijuana, the litigants would have a better Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments argument). With only a super-majority of states having 
legalized, their claim would be less strong but arguably still colorable. 
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complication would actually favor the right proponents. The 
multi-sourced basis for a ruling in their favor would help confine 
the scope of the holding. A court could try to introduce the same 
sort of complexity under a single clause by merely stating that the 
holding was limited by various factors. However, that approach 
would either alter existing doctrine under those clauses or, if the 
court stated that the marijuana case was sui generis, appear as an 
unjustified departure from the doctrine. Clause aggregation would 
allow the court to justifiably confine the holding, without changing 
existing, single-clause jurisprudence. 
We have already seen the consequences of an effort by a court 
to rule for our right proponents under any single clause. A ruling 
for them under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause alone 
would imply that the death penalty could also soon become 
categorically unconstitutional.456 A ruling for them under the 
Fourth Amendment or under the Due Process Clause would imply 
that using or possessing dangerous drugs, like heroin, cocaine, and 
methamphetamines, should also receive protection.457 A ruling for 
them under the Equal Protection Clause would imply that crimes 
like polygamy, prostitution, and bestiality are all vulnerable, 
because they also involve matters of personal autonomy that 
arguably cause only minor social harm and minimal harm to the 
defendant.458 Were a court tempted to find a right to pursue minor 
marijuana activities under any of the single clauses, the prospect 
of those kinds of collateral consequences would provide cause for 
second thoughts. 
Through clause aggregation, a court could rule for our right 
proponents without such concerns. For example, because a ruling 
in their favor would rest in part on the liberty under due process 
to make “certain personal choices central to individual dignity and 
                                                                                                     
 456. See supra notes 176–178 and accompanying text (arguing that if the 
Eighth Amendment supported a right to possess or use marijuana, the death 
penalty would seem in danger of constitutional invalidation). 
 457. See supra notes 212–215, 254–256 and accompanying text (arguing that 
if the Fourth Amendment supported a right to possess or use marijuana, other 
drug crimes might also seem invalid). 
 458. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (arguing that if marijuana 
laws were held to violate equal protection, crimes involving little risk of serious 
harm to the participants or others might become vulnerable). 
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autonomy,”459 the validity of the death penalty would not be put in 
question by also basing the ruling on the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause. Few persons would conclude that “individual 
dignity and autonomy” encompass the right to commit a capital 
crime. Likewise, because a ruling in their favor would rest in part 
on the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the validity of 
dangerous drug-possession crimes would not be put in doubt by 
also basing the ruling on the Due Process Clause or the Fourth 
Amendment. Doubt over the societal consensus as to the 
permissibility of minor marijuana activity would not extend to 
injecting heroin or ingesting crack cocaine, even if conducted 
privately in one’s home.  
Clause aggregation would also allow a court to justifiably 
rebuff claims that it was re-Lochnerizing substantive due process. 
This was the concern of the Supreme Court in Griswold,460 that 
helps explain why the Court used clause aggregation there.461 The 
same benefit would accrue in using clause aggregation to recognize 
a right to engage in minor marijuana activities. By relying on 
multiple clauses rather than due process alone, the Court would 
not have to declare the existence of a “fundamental” right to use 
and ingest marijuana. It could simply find the right to exist under 
multiple clauses, and the protection would apply automatically to 
the states because several of those clauses have already been 
incorporated. This was the Court’s approach not only in Griswold 
but in several other clause aggregation decisions declaring new 
rights and applying them against the states, such as Lawrence v. 
Texas and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.  
3. Scrutinizing and Balancing Government Rationales 
Clause aggregation potentially produces a third effect that is 
a consequence of the first two. Acknowledging the individual 
                                                                                                     
 459. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015). 
 460. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 219, at 850 (“In an attempt to avoid 
substantive due process, Douglas, who had lived through the Lochner era, found 
privacy in the ‘penumbra’ of the Bill of Rights.”). 
 461. See supra notes 392–395 and accompanying text (noting how the 
majority’s worry over Lochner emanated from its failure to mention the Due 
Process Clause as contributing to the liberty protection surrounding 
contraception). 
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interests at stake and seeing the limiting effect of a multi-sourced 
ruling favoring a right can encourage the court to apply a higher 
level of scrutiny to the state’s asserted rationales for prohibition. 
The very act of taking into account the individual’s interests at 
stake contemplates that they also should weigh against the state’s 
competing rationales in the calculus over if and when the 
marijuana prohibitions are constitutional. Yet, the rational basis 
test, which would apply if our proponents made their claim under 
the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses alone, would not 
allow this.462 That test would focus only on whether the state could 
offer some plausible reason for criminalizing minor marijuana 
activity, without regard to the competing interests of the rights 
proponents.463 To allow scrutiny of those interests, a more 
demanding test would have to apply. It need not be “strict 
scrutiny,” which would demand the showing by the state of a 
“compelling” purpose.464 A form of “intermediate scrutiny” that 
asked about whether the state’s marijuana prohibition is 
substantially related to an important government purpose would 
suffice.465 Application of such an approach could lead a court to rule 
in favor of our right proponents regarding private use of marijuana 
in one’s home and even public possession of small amounts of 
marijuana in public. 
To see how the analysis would proceed, let’s assume that the 
government would assert four kinds of interests in justifying laws 
criminalizing minor marijuana activity. Those interests include 
preventing immoral conduct, promoting productive behavior by the 
populace, preventing harm to the user and, finally, avoiding social 
harm to non-users. While these asserted interests, singularly or 
together, would easily satisfy the rational basis test, they would 
                                                                                                     
 462. See supra notes 217–219 and accompanying text (explaining that the 
rational basis test does not include a balancing of individual versus state 
interests). 
 463. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (noting that, because 
marijuana-related activities arguably will cause at least some risk of minor harm 
to the actor, the state can easily meet the rational basis test). 
 464. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (explaining that 
racial classifications are subject to the most exacting scrutiny). 
 465. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266 (1983) (applying 
intermediate scrutiny to discrimination based on non-marital, parent-child 
relationships); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (applying intermediate 
scrutiny to gender discrimination).  
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not so obviously overcome heightened scrutiny, particularly when 
applied to private use of marijuana at home and probably not when 
applied to possession of small amounts in most public settings. 
Consider first the interest in preventing immoral conduct. 
This is not an insubstantial concern of government, and some 
crimes find justification largely on this basis. Bestiality and 
prostitution are examples. A significant portion of the population 
becomes upset knowing that others are engaged in activities that 
they deem immoral and particularly upset if the government gives 
license to the immorality.466 Government must choose whether to 
inflict unhappiness on those persons with high moral standards or, 
instead, on those who want to pursue the arguably unethical 
behavior,467 and often governments have chosen to disfavor the 
latter group. For much of the twentieth century, using marijuana 
was widely viewed as depraved,468 and it will still be so viewed by 
many persons in the future.469 Yet, while this concern is a good 
enough reason to justify criminalizing the behavior under a 
rational-basis test, it would almost surely not work under 
heightened scrutiny. Viewing obscene pornography is immoral to 
many persons, but the Court rejected Georgia’s effort to 
criminalize it in Stanley.470 Same-sex sodomy is immoral to many 
persons, but the Court rejected Texas’ effort to criminalize it in 
Lawrence.471 Under heightened scrutiny, the effort to promote 
                                                                                                     
 466. See Bork, supra note 33, at 9–10 (“Where the Constitution does not 
embody the moral or ethical choice, the judge has no basis other than his own 
values upon which to set aside the community judgment embodied in the 
statute.”). 
 467. See id. (“Every clash between a minority claiming freedom and a majority 
claiming power to regulate involves a choice between the gratifications of the two 
groups.”). 
 468. See supra Part I.A (providing the example that by the mid-1930s, 
twenty-two states had criminalized the sale or possession or marijuana). 
 469. See supra notes 145–149 and accompanying text (discussing how many 
persons continue to believe that even moderate cannabis use is risky and 
immoral). 
 470. See supra notes 320–329 and accompanying text (averring explicitly to 
clause aggregation in justifying a right to view obscene pornography privately at 
home). 
 471. See supra notes 347–356 and accompanying text (protecting the right of 
persons to engage in intimate sexual conduct, including with a person of the same 
sex). 
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morality could not sustain the criminalization of minor marijuana 
activity. 
The effort to promote productivity among the populace also 
probably would not survive heightened scrutiny. Many would 
agree that the government has an interest in “form[ing] and 
sustain[ing] the character of its citizenry.”472 However, studies 
have not found that marijuana, except in a tiny percentage of 
heavy users, produces chronic or long-term demotivation. More 
than forty years ago, in Ravin v. State,473 the Alaska Supreme 
Court relied on a privacy protection grounded in the state 
constitution to find a right to use marijuana in one’s home.474 The 
Alaska court subsequently applied an intermediate scrutiny test 
to the state’s rationales for criminalizing marijuana possession 
and rejected the “amotivational syndrome” argument.475 Indeed, 
the court found “no adequate justification for the state’s intrusion 
into the citizen’s right to privacy by its prohibition of possession of 
marijuana by an adult for personal consumption in the home.”476 
The right has existed there as a matter of state constitutional law 
for more than four decades, and there is no study that indicates 
that a significant portion of the Alaska citizenry has become more 
apathetic or indolent due to marijuana use.477 Arguably 
undermining any such hypothesis, Alaska is one of the states that 
legalized minor marijuana activities in 2014.478 
Arguments about harm to the marijuana user are also of 
questionable force in the face of heightened scrutiny, although they 
                                                                                                     
 472. James Q. Wilson, Drugs and Crime, in DRUGS AND CRIME 521, 524 
(Michael Tonry & James Q. Wilson eds., 1990). 
 473. 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975). 
 474. See id. at 500–01, 511 (noting the effect of an Alaska amendment was to 
place privacy among the specifically enumerated rights in Alaska’s constitution). 
 475. See id. at 507 (relying on the National Commission’s conclusion that 
“long-time heavy users do not deviate significantly from their social peers in 
terms of mental functioning”). 
 476. Id. at 511.  
 477. See Jason Brandeis, Ravin Revisited: Alaska’s Historic Common Law 
Marijuana Rule at the Dawn of Legalization, 32 ALASKA L. REV. 309, 309 (2015) 
(discussing the Ravin opinion and the subsequent survival of the state 
constitutional right to use marijuana in one’s home in more depth).  
 478. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (noting the states which have 
legalized marijuana use). 
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would easily satisfy rational-basis review.479 Our right proponents 
could not credibly contend that marijuana poses no risks for the 
user, as there is plenty of evidence that it can have some ill-effects 
on long-term health and mental functioning when consumed 
heavily for long periods.480 Young persons are the most vulnerable 
to long-term, adverse effects on brain functioning,481 as “the brain 
undergoes active development until about age 21.”482 This concern 
would justify prohibiting marijuana use by young persons, but not 
by adults. The problems with marijuana pale when compared to 
the health consequences associated with alcohol and tobacco, 
which are legal for adults to consume.483 Marijuana produces 
dependence only among a small portion of heavy users, and, even 
then, the physical dependence is much lower than that associated 
with alcohol or tobacco.484 The risks of fatal overdose of marijuana 
are also minimal.485 “[T]he myth that it leads users to more 
                                                                                                     
 479. Under a rational-basis review, courts in the past consistently rejected 
claims to a right to possess and use marijuana by finding, in part, that states had 
a legitimate goal of avoiding harm to the user and to others. See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Leis, 243 N.E.2d 898, 902–03 (Mass. 1969) (finding that the 
legislature acted “rationally and reasonably”); Raines v. State, 225 So. 2d. 330, 
330 (Fla. 1969) (“This drug is within the category of injurious substances which 
the Legislature may regulate and prohibit in the exercise of its police power.”); cf. 
People v. McKenzie, 458 P.2d 232, 234 (Colo. 1969) (upholding a state law that 
classified marijuana as a narcotic drug against due process and equal protection 
challenges). 
 480. See, e.g., Nora D. Volkow, Ruben D. Baler, Wilson M. Compton & Susan 
R.B. Weiss, Adverse Health Effects of Marijuana Use, NEW ENG. J. MED. (June 5, 
2014), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMra1402309 (last visited Apr. 
14, 2018) (noting various risks, including some disease risks but conceding 
substantial uncertainties, such as the lack of a clear connection to lung cancer, 
unlike for smoking tobacco) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 481. See AM. SOC’Y OF ADDICTION MED., WHITE PAPER ON STATE-LEVEL 
PROPOSALS TO LEGALIZE MARIJUANA 6 (2012) (“Of greatest concern regarding the 
brain is use of marijuana during adolescence—a time of ongoing brain 
development.”). 
 482. Boffey, supra note 22, at A22. 
 483. See id. (“Marijuana cannot lead to a fatal overdose. There is little 
evidence that it causes cancer. Its addictive properties, while present, are low, 
and the myth that it leads users to more powerful drugs has long since been 
disproved.”). 
 484. See CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, supra note 15, at 25 
(“Regular marijuana use does not necessarily indicate dependence.”). 
 485. See Lachenmeier & Rehm, supra note 22, at 4–6 (concluding that 
cannabis is “low risk”). 
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powerful drugs has long since been disproved.”486 Admittedly, 
uncertainty exists about some of its short-term and long-term 
effects, because the consequences of its use have not been studied 
to the same degree as with alcohol and tobacco. For example, 
concerns exist that marijuana use may tend to promote greater use 
of tobacco.487 There are also concerns that marijuana has been bred 
in recent decades to be more potent in its primary psychoactive 
ingredient, Delta9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC),488 and that it 
could be bred to be even more potent in future years, with unknown 
consequences for the user.489 However, despite those uncertainties, 
a court could easily conclude, as did the Alaska Supreme Court, in 
Ravin, that “mere scientific doubts will not suffice” for the state to 
“demonstrate a need based on proof that the public health or 
welfare will in fact suffer if the controls are not applied.”490 For the 
vast majority of users what appears certain is that the greatest 
danger from marijuana use where it is a crime is the prospect of 
being arrested, jailed, punished and stigmatized as a law-breaker, 
injuries that disappear when cannabis is legalized.491 
Concern about injury to others from driving under the 
influence of marijuana is probably the most powerful reason for a 
state to limit even minor marijuana activity by adults.492 
Marijuana use does not lead to violent or aggressive behavior.493 
                                                                                                     
 486. Boffey, supra note 22, at A22. 
 487. See CAULKINS ET AL., CONSIDERING MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, supra note 
113, at 128 (noting that “interactions with tobacco” could matter greatly). 
 488. See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 505 (Alaska 1975) (“Other cannabis 
derivatives with a higher THC content, such as hashish, are available in the 
United States . . . .”). 
 489. See, e.g., CAULKINS ET AL., CONSIDERING MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, supra 
note 113, at 13 (“While there’s not much dispute that potency has increased, there 
is dispute over how much it matters.”). 
 490. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 511. 
 491. On this score, see supra note 23 and accompanying text (exploring the 
societal costs of incarceration and enforcement related to marijuana crimes). 
 492. See INST. OF MED., MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE 
BASE 4 (Janet E. Joy, Stanley J. Watson, Jr., & John A. Benson, Jr. eds., 1999) 
(noting that “for most people the primary adverse effect of acute marijuana use is 
diminished psychomotor performance” and that, therefore, it is “inadvisable to 
operate any vehicle or potentially dangerous equipment while under the influence 
of marijuana”). 
 493. See Boffey, supra note 22, at A22 (“Its effects are mostly euphoric and 
mild, whereas alcohol turns some drinkers into barroom brawlers, domestic 
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However, marijuana does “reduce[] psychomotor performance in 
ways that increase overall risk of accidents and, in particular, 
impairs driving.”494 The effect of alcohol on driving appears to be 
much worse. Studies have shown that “the overall risk of 
involvement in an accident increases by a factor of about 2 when a 
person drives soon after using marijuana” while “the overall risk 
of a vehicular accident increases by a factor of almost 5 for drivers 
with a blood alcohol level above 0.08%, the legal limit in most 
countries.”495 Despite the lesser danger of marijuana compared to 
alcohol from driving impairment, the problem with marijuana, 
unlike alcohol, is the absence of reliable, well-accepted 
breathalyzer tests for determining promptly and accurately 
whether one is under the influence according to a legally specified 
threshold.496 New devices are being developed and used to measure 
recent marijuana use, but they remain controversial in part 
because it is not clear how to determine the point at which 
impairment occurs.497 Whether states can solve this problem in the 
next decade remains uncertain. In the meantime, however, we 
should not exaggerate the problem. Police officers currently can 
still offer substantial evidence of driving under the influence of 
marijuana, based on their observations and field tests, plus the 
strong odor associated with burned marijuana.498 Likewise, in 
                                                                                                     
abusers or maniacs behind the wheel.”). 
 494. CAULKINS ET AL., CONSIDERING MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, supra note 113, 
at 33 (citing J.G. Ramackers, G. Berghause, M. van Laar & O.H. Drummer, Dose 
Related Risk of Motor Vehicle Crashes after Cannabis Use, 73 DRUG & ALCOHOL 
DEPENDENCE 109 (2004); J.G. Ramaekers, M.R. Moeller, P. van Ruitenbeck, E.L. 
Theunissen, E. Schneider & G. Kauert, Cognition and Motor Control as a 
Function of Delta9-THC Concentration in Serum and Oral Fluid: Limits of 
Impairment, 85 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 114 (2006)). 
 495. Volkow et al., supra note 480, at 2223 nn.37, 39. 
 496. See David Downs, Don’t Hold Your Breath for a Marijuana 
“Breathalyzer” Test, SCI. AM. (Nov. 7, 2016), 
https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:25uwfSDD7CcJ:https://
www.scientscientificam.com/article/don-t-hold-your-breath-for-a-marijuana-brea
thalyzer-test/+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us (last visited Mar. 9, 2018) (noting 
that obtaining data “could cost millions of dollars in human trials, and the effects 
of the drug vary tremendously between users”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 497. See id. (“[S]cience still lacks data correlating the presence of THC and 
actual impairment.”). 
 498. See, e.g., Mandiberg, supra note 14, at 40–42 (discussing the importance 
of the distinctive odor of burned or burning marijuana and the odor of marijuana 
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cases involving accidents, “a combination of sobriety checks and 
tests of blood, urine or hair for marijuana metabolites . . . can be 
enough to convict impaired drivers.”499 
While a state purpose to deter drivers from operating under 
the influence could justify limits on possession and use of 
marijuana, a total prohibition would not substantially relate to 
that purpose. The Alaska Supreme Court reached that conclusion 
in the Ravin case.500 The court upheld the criminalization of 
possession of marijuana in public based on “the need for control of 
drivers under the influence” and “the potential for serious harm to 
the health and safety of the general public” from such drivers.501 
However, relying on the right to “privacy,” the court found that 
there was no “close and substantial relationship between public 
welfare and control of ingestion of marijuana or possession of it in 
the home for personal use.”502 A similar conclusion would seem to 
follow under a clause aggregation approach. However, because 
clause aggregation would not focus so heavily on the privacy right, 
even some public possession of cannabis would seem to warrant 
protection. Being in public places outside of an automobile with 
marijuana would not present a serious problem. Indeed, even 
possession of a small amount of cannabis in the trunk of one’s car 
arguably would not be sufficiently problematic. Under heightened 
scrutiny, even concern over impaired driving should only justify 
prohibitions on public possession that are substantially related to 
that concern, such as possession in the passenger area of a vehicle. 
B. Objections 
Opponents of the right would surely object to the application 
of heightened scrutiny here, and I review some of the probable 
criticisms that I have not already addressed. First, some opponents 
                                                                                                     
lingering on a subject’s clothing as evidence that a driver has recently smoked the 
substance).  
 499. Downs, supra note 496. 
 500. See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 511 (Alaska 1975) (concluding that “no 
adequate justification for the state’s intrusion into the citizen’s right to privacy 
by its prohibition of possession of marijuana by an adult for personal consumption 
in the home has been shown”). 
 501. Id. 
 502. Id. 
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would likely offer a general broadside against the further use of 
rights-based clause aggregation to recognize any non-textual, 
constitutional right, on grounds that the approach arrogates too 
much power to the courts. Also, opponents would likely offer a 
series of more specific objections to the recognition of even a limited 
marijuana right, focusing on symbolic messages, drug treaties, 
international cooperation against serious drugs, and mission creep 
on marijuana. As we have seen, the Supreme Court has exercised 
substantial discretion over when to employ rights-based clause 
aggregation, and it has not used it on numerous occasions when 
commentators contend the approach would appropriately have 
applied.503 I do not contend that there is a special reason to think 
that the Court would use it to uphold a marijuana right in the 
future. At the same time, I contend that neither a general 
broadside against rights-based clause aggregation nor the more 
specific objections that I will review are good reasons to avoid using 
the approach to protect minor marijuana activity. 
The general broadside against rights-based clause 
aggregation that some opponents might lodge would likely rest on 
an originalist view of how courts should interpret the Constitution. 
Originalists typically oppose the idea that courts can recognize 
non-textual rights as a matter of substantive due process, if only 
because it gives too much power to judges to constitutionalize 
protections according to their own values.504 Some opponents 
might lodge the same kind of objection against rights-based clause 
aggregation as a way to recognize new rights. Yet, such an 
objection would lack merit. Clause aggregation at least builds on 
the text of clauses (something arguably not true of “substantive” 
due process)505 and puts the concerns they embody together. As 
Professor Michael Coenen has contended, this approach parallels 
other interpretative techniques that are standard in constitutional 
construction, such as interpretations based on structure or on the 
                                                                                                     
 503. See supra notes 409–414 and accompanying text (exploring cases in 
which the Court could have applied clause aggregation). 
 504. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2632–37 (2015) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (opposing on originalist grounds the recognition of a right to 
same-sex marriage as a matter of substantive due process). 
 505. See id. at 2631 (arguing against substantive due process doctrine as 
“straying from the text of the Constitution”). 
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limiting effect of one clause on another.506 Moreover, even ardent 
originalists have not objected to rights-based clause aggregation 
when they think the outcome appropriate. A good example is the 
Dale case,507 in which a five Justice majority used clause 
aggregation to recognize a right to expressive association that 
enabled the Boy Scouts to exclude gay persons from membership, 
despite a state prohibition.508 The most originalist-oriented 
Justices, Thomas and Scalia, joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
opinion for the Court without expressed concern that it was 
anti-originalist.509 
As for specific objections to a judicial opinion declaring a 
marijuana right, opponents would likely contend that it would 
send the wrong message about marijuana. Particularly if it were 
the Supreme Court that were to uphold the right, they might 
contend that the public would infer that there is nothing risky 
about consuming the drug. This is a legitimate concern, although 
I contend that it is not sufficiently weighty that it should influence 
the judicial outcome. A court upholding the right could take pains 
to clarify that the use of marijuana carries risks and is not 
recommended. The Alaska Supreme Court in the Ravin case 
demonstrated how to do this. That court emphasized at length that 
it opposed the use of marijuana or any “psychoactive” drug and 
that every person should “consider carefully the ramifications for 
himself and for those around him of using such substances.”510 At 
the same time, we should remember that recognition of the right 
by the federal Supreme Court would not likely happen before a 
super-majority of states had already legalized recreational 
marijuana and that the level of illicit use in states in which 
                                                                                                     
 506. See Coenen, supra note 28, at 1095–1101 (arguing that “combination 
analysis shares significant functional features with two widely utilized tools of 
constitutional decision-making: namely, the constitutional avoidance canon and 
arguments based on constitutional structure”). 
 507. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647 (2000) (pointing out the 
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 510. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 511 (Alaska 1975). 
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marijuana is prohibited has for decades been quite high.511 These 
points suggest that use would likely only increase modestly after a 
Supreme Court recognition of the right. Moreover, states opposing 
marijuana use could commence an education campaign with 
resources saved from the elimination of marijuana enforcement 
and resources gained from taxes on marijuana sales to launch an 
educational campaign against marijuana consumption.512 In these 
circumstances, there is not a compelling reason to believe that a 
judicial declaration of the right would contribute much to 
undermining public health. 
Opponents might also assert that a judicial declaration of the 
right to use and possess marijuana would violate our international 
obligations. The United States is committed under the 1961 Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs as Amended by the 1972 Protocol to 
restrict the use of marijuana “exclusively to medical and scientific 
purposes.”513 Further, the United States is committed under the 
1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances to criminalize even minor forms of 
marijuana activity other than for medical or scientific purposes.514 
These are not self-executing treaties but they have been 
implemented by the federal Controlled Substances Act,515 and by 
the expectation that states would continue to criminalize minor 
                                                                                                     
 511. See supra notes 239, 442 and accompanying text (reporting the number 
of Americans who have partaken in marijuana); KAPLAN, supra note 18, at 23–29 
(summarizing the extent of marijuana use). 
 512. See KAPLAN, supra note 18, at 349 (“Such taxation could serve 
the . . . purpose of providing revenue for use in combating the drug problem 
generally.”). 
 513. 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs as Amended by the 1972 
Protocol art. 4., Aug. 8, 1975, 26 U.S.T. 1439; see also Bennett & Walsh, supra 
note 86, at 15 (delving into how the United States is obligated to criminalize minor 
marijuana activity under this treaty). 
 514. See 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances art. 3, Dec. 20, 1988, 1988 U.S.T. LEXIS 194 
(representing a significant development in the effort to combat illicit trafficking 
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treaty obligates the U.S. to criminalize marijuana activity, see Bennett & Walsh, 
supra note 86, at 15–16 (explaining how the drug treaties “plainly obligate 
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markets”). 
 515. See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text (discussing how the 
Controlled Substances Act is important in fulfilling the United States’ obligations 
regarding marijuana under several treaties). 
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marijuana activities.516 Yet, there are two answers to an argument 
that the Supreme Court should weigh these treaty obligations in 
deciding whether there is a constitutional right to possess and use 
marijuana. First, the United States has arguably already violated 
those treaties517 now that eight states plus the District of Columbia 
have legalized minor recreational marijuana activities under their 
state laws and the federal government has essentially deferred.518 
We would even more clearly violate them when a super-majority of 
states legalize. Second, international treaties cannot obligate the 
United States Supreme Court to uphold legislation that violates 
the United States Constitution.519 Therefore, as difficult as it will 
be, the federal executive branch, with the required super-majority 
approval by the Senate, must work with other countries to amend 
the treaties (which the United States originally championed)520 to 
allow for recreational use of marijuana.521 
Critics of the right might lodge the closely related charge that 
a Supreme Court declaration of a right to use marijuana will 
eliminate any pretense that we are in compliance with our 
international treaty obligations (assuming they are not amended) 
and thereby spur a reduction in international cooperation against 
more dangerous drugs, such as heroin and cocaine. As part of this 
argument, they might contend that we can at least maintain the 
                                                                                                     
 516. See Bennett & Walsh, supra note 86, at 2 (noting the “predicament” 
created for the federal government under the treaties when Colorado and 
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appearance of compliance if the marijuana prohibitions in the 
federal Controlled Substances Act remain technically in force 
along with criminalization in a strong minority of states. However, 
by the time a super-majority of states have legalized, the 
International Narcotics Control Board, which is the international 
body that determines whether member states comply, will have 
publicly declared our non-compliance.522 Such a ruling by the 
Board already will have dealt a serious blow to the credibility of 
the United States on international drug treaty matters. A ruling 
of our Supreme Court protecting a limited right to use and possess 
marijuana will not do much further damage on the international 
front. 
A final objection might well focus on the purported illogic of 
declaring a right to use and possess marijuana but no right to 
produce it for sale or to sell it. More specifically, the objection might 
be that, inevitably, the right will extend to commercial marijuana 
activity for recreational purposes. The answer is that the same 
kind of argument was made but did not turn out true regarding 
Stanley, where the Court upheld the right to view obscene 
pornography privately in one’s home.523 Commentators noted that 
granting the right to view obscene pornography in one’s home 
strongly suggested that one had the right to acquire it outside the 
home, which, in turn, suggested that others had the right to 
produce and sell it.524 Otherwise, how would the average consumer 
secure the obscene pornography for private viewing? However, the 
Supreme Court subsequently maintained the constitutional line 
that it had drawn in Stanley, rejecting arguments that the right to 
view obscene pornography extended to public theaters or to the 
right to distribute the material.525 The Supreme Court could do the 
                                                                                                     
 522. See id. at 8–9 (noting that the 2013 Board report, which was released in 
2014, concluded that the approach of legalization and regulation in Washington 
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 523. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (reaffirming that “the 
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same with cannabis. The right to use marijuana in the home or to 
possess small amounts in public need not extend to public 
distribution. The Court could plausibly find that the interests of 
states in regulating the commercial production and sale of 
cannabis is sufficient to justify restrictions on those activities but 
not the more basic right of the individual to use it privately or to 
possess small amounts of it in public. 
VI. Conclusion 
This Article began by asking two questions about 
constitutional law, one substantive and the other methodological. 
The substantive question is whether the Constitution in the 
foreseeable future could provide a limited right to use and possess 
cannabis for recreational purposes. The methodological question is 
whether the Supreme Court, after Obergefell, will use rights-based 
clause aggregations to recognize more constitutional rights that it 
would not recognize under any clause considered singularly. My 
answer to both questions, despite some skepticism, is a qualified 
yes. But, the larger idea of the article is that there is a benefit in 
exploring these two problems together. There seems little chance 
in the foreseeable future that the Supreme Court would recognize 
a right to possess and use marijuana for recreational purposes 
under any single clause in the Constitution. However, the idea 
becomes more plausible with clause aggregation. Likewise, it is 
difficult to identify with confidence many new rights that the Court 
will acknowledge and protect through clause aggregation that it 
could not fairly easily acknowledge and protect through a 
single-clause analysis. However, a limited right to possess and use 
a small amount of marijuana recreationally might be that kind of 
liberty. 
                                                                                                     
(rejecting constitutional protection for obscene material outside the home); 
United States v. 12,200-Ft. Reels, 413 U.S. 123, 128 (1973) (refusing to “extend 
the precise, carefully limited holding of Stanley to permit importation of 
admittedly obscene material simply because it is imported for private use only”). 
